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Abstract 
It is common practice to administer personality assessments in personnel 
selection due to their ability to cost-effectively predict organizationally relevant 
criteria with relatively small subgroup differences. However, concerns are often 
raised about test-taker response bias. The proposed research focuses on one issue 
related to personality test accuracy, namely faking. Also called response distortion 
or inflation, faking represents a multidimensional behavior that is both intentional 
and deceptive and seeks to benefit one’s own interests. The current study uses the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985) and expectancy theories of motivation 
(e.g., Vroom, 1964) as a theoretical basis for understanding faking. Prevalence 
estimates vary, but common estimates state that around 30% of applicants can be 
classified as fakers. Faking on personality assessments can influence response 
scores, the ability to make valid inferences from these scores, and even selection 
decisions. The utility of the selection system is critically undermined to the extent 
that any or all of these factors are altered.  
Given the prevalence of faking, research is focused on preventing faking 
on personality assessments and/or reducing its negative impact on organizational 
decision-making. This dissertation uses meta-analysis to evaluate the efficacy of 
different faking interventions. There are two main categories of interventions: 
preventive and remedial. Remedial interventions are focused on altering the 
interpretations or decisions made from personality scores after test-taker data has 
been collected. Preventive strategies, on the other hand, seek to limit faking 
before the behavior occurs. For instance, warnings seek to limit faking intention 
while time limits, forced choice formats, and decreased item transparency seek to 
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limit faking ability. Meta-analysis will be used to quantitatively aggregate the 
results of multiple primary studies. Meta-analysis can be used to test relationships 
not addressed in the primary study, and can provide summary statements about 
effects observed in the largely disjointed faking literature. Two meta-analyses 
were conducted in order to better understand the effectiveness of faking 
interventions. First, effect size estimates of the difference between personality 
scale mean scores (i.e., sample-weighted d’s) across intervention conditions was 
conducted. Second, meta-analysis of the relationships between personality traits 
and performance outcomes (i.e., correlation) was conducted in order to estimate 
the criterion-related validities of personality traits across different intervention 
conditions.  
Results suggest that interventions are generally effective at reducing 
faking behavior, evidenced by smaller sample-weighted mean d’s for studies with 
a faking intervention compared to those without any intervention. Warnings are 
generally more effective than forced-choice or item transparency interventions at 
reducing faking behavior. Randomizing items, on the other hand, does little to 
influence faking. Although based on a limited primary studies, the criterion-
related validity of personality scores on performance outcomes were not enhanced 
due to the presence of a faking intervention. Taken together, these results suggest 
that faking interventions may influence observed personality scores but did not 
seem to influence the ability to make valid inferences based on the scores. 
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Introduction 
Personality assessments have regained popularity in Industrial-
Organizational (I-O) psychology within the last 25 years (Barrick & Mount, 1991; 
Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991) and are now utilized for selection purposes by 
over 40% of Fortune 100 companies (Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Beyond their 
usefulness for predicting organizationally-relevant criteria (e.g., Hurtz & 
Donovan, 2000), personality assessments are attractive selection tools because 
they typically have smaller subgroup differences than other personnel selection 
tools (Hough & Oswald, 2008; Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2000). However, the 
ability for these assessments to be faked raises concerns about the measures’ 
usefulness (Morgeson et al., 2007a). The purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the effectiveness of various approaches designed to reduce faking on personality 
assessments when used for employee selection. 
Personality Assessments and Personnel Selection 
The general consensus on a taxonomy of personality traits, namely the 
Five Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & John, 1992), was a main catalyst for a 
renewed interest in personality testing that started in the 1980’s. Although there 
are several theories with regards to how to personality dimensionality, most 
current personality research and practice is based on the five dimensions of 
openness to experience (openness), conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and emotional stability. The current research focuses on these five 
dimensions because they are the most widely researched, and other personality 
frameworks can be mapped onto the FFM. Openness is characterized by a healthy 
curiosity about the world and an interest in new intellectual or imaginative 
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experiences. People with high levels of openness are often described as curious, 
artistic, or insightful. Conscientious individuals are characterized by self-control, 
persistence, and focus on details. Individuals with high levels of 
conscientiousness are often described as efficient, organized, and achievement 
striving. Extraverted individuals are driven by the need to seek social stimulation. 
Individuals with high levels of extraversion are often described as assertive, 
gregarious, or outgoing. Agreeable individuals are characterized by a tendency to 
be friendly and cooperative. People with high levels of agreeableness are often 
described as appreciative, kind, or accommodating. Finally, emotionally stable 
individuals tend to have solid control over their emotions and are relatively 
resilient to negative cues in their environment. Individuals with low levels of 
emotional stability are often described as anxious, irritable, or stressed.  
Questioning assumptions of personality assessments. The practice of 
administering personality assessments for personnel selection has two strong 
assumptions. First, by requiring applicants to complete a personality test, 
administrators (e.g., employers) assume that the measure accurately assesses the 
true, underlying disposition. Thus, a test-taker that scores high on a measure of 
conscientiousness truly possesses that trait. Research supports this assumption. 
Widely used personality measures tend to demonstrate strong psychometric 
properties across a variety of settings (cf. Hough & Ones, 2002), and there is 
significant cross-observer agreement across the five factors (Connelly & Ones, 
2010; McCrae & Costa, 1987). The second assumption is that these scores serve 
as useful predictors of future behavior or performance. This assumption tends to 
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be supported for organizational outcomes such as effectiveness and performance 
(e.g., Barrick & Mount; 1991; Driskell, Hogan, & Salas, 1987; Morgeson et al. 
2007a), organizational citizenship behaviors (Chiaburu, Oh, Berry, Li, & Gardner, 
2011), and organizational commitment (Erdheim, Wang, & Zickar, 2011). 
However, the validity coefficients tend to be modest across these various criteria.  
Despite some support for these assumptions across a variety of contexts, 
both researchers and practitioners have reason to doubt the viability of these two 
assertions. The properties of self-report measures are a major factor driving this 
doubt. Self-report assessments, the most common manner of collecting 
personality data, are limited in part due to their susceptibility to positive response 
distortion (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004). In other words, test-takers can appear 
more externally desirable than they truly are. The result of response distortion (or, 
faking) may directly undermine the aforementioned assumptions. Although not all 
researchers believe that faking has these effects (e.g., Morgeson et al., 2007a), a 
considerable set of research suggests there may be cause for concern (e.g., Tett & 
Christiansen, 2007). Participants may be able to fake their responses in such a 
way that the test no longer accurately predicts the criterion of interest (cf. 
Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Also, the mean scores of traits may be altered to such 
an extent that the tests are no longer able to differentiate test-takers (e.g., Ones, 
Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1996).  
As such, there is a great amount of dissent in the literature regarding the 
utility of personality assessments for selection. Some researchers argue for the 
abandonment of these tests based on the lack of confidence in the scores (e.g., 
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Morgeson et al., 2007a), while others argued that faking tends to be uniform 
across applicants and thus practical decisions such as hiring decisions are not 
adversely influenced (Morgeson et al., 2007b). Neither of these is desirable, as 
both fail to actually address the issue of faking.  
The core assumptions of personality testing are questioned based on the 
expectation that test-takers fake as long as there is motivation or incentive to do 
so. Moreover, important hiring decisions can be influenced (e.g., Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, & Levin, 1998), and these subpar hires can end up imposing substantial 
costs onto the organization. Depending on various factors such as the proportion 
of fakers in the sample and the selection ratio, faking can cost organizations over 
$2,000 per worker per year (Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008). Beyond 
affecting valid inferences from test scores and the rank order of applicants, 
applicants may react negatively if they believe others have faked on an 
assessment (Converse et al., 2008). This can have a meaningful impact on the 
organization, as negative reactions during the selection process can result in lower 
test-taking motivation and an increase of applicants who self-select out of the 
process (Ployhart, McFarland, & Ryan, 2002). Due to these potential 
consequences, organizations should focus their efforts on how to mitigate the 
negative influence of faking. Research in this area has strong implications for 
practitioners, and will also drive future research in the field by shining a light on 
the more efficacious interventions for addressing faking. 
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Theoretical Perspectives on Faking 
Faking is often regarded as a volitional behavior used by a test-taker to 
improve the likelihood of attaining desired outcomes. There are various 
intrapersonal and situational factors that influence the test-taker’s decision to fake 
or not. A review of the theoretical perspectives on faking and its determining 
factors will offer a useful framework for understanding how interventions seek to 
influence faking behavior.  
Social desirability as a theory of faking. Social desirability (SD), or the 
tendency for test-takers to respond in a way that they feel is externally or socially 
valued (Paulhus, 1991; Smith & Ellingson, 2002), is the most common theory 
applied to faking. Commonly used measures of SD such as the Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) include two SD dimensions: self-
deceptive positivity and impression management (Paulhus, 1984). Empirical tests 
of the scales demonstrate appropriate levels of discriminant validity to treat them 
as distinct constructs (e.g., Paulhus & Reid, 1991).  
 Self-deceptive enhancement is considered to be a more “natural” form of 
response distortion, as high scores do not represent a deliberate attempt to deceive 
test administrators. Instead, self-deceptive enhancement operates through the 
unconscious, positive biases individuals hold when evaluating themselves (Bing, 
Kluemper, Davison, Taylor, & Novicevic, 2011). While it still presents the test 
taker in an overly-positive light (i.e., not fully accurate), this form of response 
distortion is less of a focus for test administrators because it is done 
unconsciously. In other words, unconscious distortion will likely always be 
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present in any self-report test (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946; Quist, Merlini, & 
Griffith), and because it is done unconsciously is more difficult to correct. 
Moreover, it may be a partial extension of self-efficacy (Barrick & Mount, 1996).  
Test administrators are more concerned with conscious distortion 
behaviors, as opposed to unconscious distortion. The impression management 
dimension of SD involves deliberate alteration of responses in order for test-
takers to create an artificially positive image. A test taker engaging in impression 
management consciously responds to the situational demands and motives in a 
way that seeks to enhance the interpretation of the responses compared to others. 
Impression management is especially prevalent when the test taker is motivated to 
present one’s self positively, such as in the case of applying for a job. In fact, 
Paulhus (1984) demonstrated that scores on impression management, and not self-
deception, tended to increase from more to less verifiable settings. This implies 
that impression management scores can be consciously manipulated, because 
impression management, not self-deception, scores were influenced by the 
situational demands. High impression management scores also tend to be strongly 
associated with traditional lie scales used in personality test, such as the MMPI lie 
scale (Barrick & Mount, 1996), and other distortion measures (Quist, Arora, & 
Griffith, 2007).  
However, there are two main reasons why social desirability and faking 
should not be considered isomorphic. First, SD has substantial overlap with 
substantive personality traits. Impression management in particular shares 
meaningful variance with traits such as conscientiousness and emotional stability 
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(Barrick & Mount, 1996; Li & Bagger, 2006; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996). 
It is thus difficult to identify whether SD is indicative of a faking behavior or a 
disposition to fake. Knowing an individual’s disposition to fake is certainly 
useful, but it is not equivalent to faking behavior. Second, SD cannot adequately 
address the complexity of faking behavior. Impression management is often used 
as a part of faking models (e.g., Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006), 
but it does not fully represent the construct. For instance, a test taker’s efficacy of 
positive self-presentation was found to be more reflective of faking than 
impression management (Pauls & Crost, 2005). In other words, attitudes and 
beliefs regarding one’s ability to fake may be as or more important for 
determining faking behavior than dispositional tendencies to fake. These two 
issues suggest that although SD provides a useful starting point, it does not offer a 
complete representation of faking.  
Theory of Planned Behavior. The main limitation of SD as a theory for 
faking is that it represents an overly simplified description of a complex behavior. 
Ajzen’s (1985; 1991) theory of planned behavior (TPB) is more complete as it 
includes crucial antecedents. TPB represents a meditational model from cognition 
to behavior. According to this theory, three behavior-specific cognitions (i.e., 
attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral control) influence behavior 
through individual intentions. Within the context of faking, test-takers looking to 
engage in faking behavior must first have cognitive dispositions that influence 
their intent to distort their responses (Yu, 2008). Indeed, TPB is used in many 
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studies to predict a range of behaviors from theft (Beck & Ajzen, 1991) to 
recycling (Boldero, 1995).  
Each of the cognitions plays an important role in predicting intention and 
behavior. Attitudes represent an evaluative appraisal of the behavior in question. 
More positive attitudes suggest that an individual is more likely to engage in the 
specified behavior. Social norms operate on a more external level than attitudes. 
Instead of an internal evaluation, the presence of social pressure drives an 
individual to engage in a given behavior. If other people are engaging in the 
behavior or if the behavior is determined to be socially valued, an individual is 
more likely to engage in the focal behavior. The third cognition is perceived 
behavioral control. If a person believes he or she can perform the behavior, then 
they are likely to engage in said behavior. This is similar to efficacy of positive 
self-presentation discussed previously (Pauls & Crost, 2005). Finally, intentions 
serve a mediating role between the above cognitions and behavior (Ajzen, 1991).  
TPB highlights the complexity of a given behavior, suggesting a variety of 
situationally dependent factors that play a part in an individual’s choice to engage 
in a behavior. Many of these factors are largely intra-personal and thus may be 
dependent on the situation or various cognitions. This dynamic understanding of 
behavior calls into question more static explanations such as that offered by SD 
above. The theory also applies well to faking because it more accurately defines 
the construct as a behavior rather than a stable trait.  
Two recent models of faking included TPB as a central component (i.e., 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Attitudes, social norms, 
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and perceived behavioral control all emerged as significant determinants of faking 
behavior in empirical tests of these models. Attitudes toward faking tended to be 
stronger predictors of faking behavior than dispositional factors such as 
Machiavellianism (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). This suggests faking is a 
behavior and not a trait. Social norms and perceived behavioral control also 
emerged as major factors in building an intention to fake. Multiple studies 
observed that expecting others to engage in faking, perceiving the situation as 
important for achieving goals, and perceiving control over the situation increase 
intention to fake (e.g., Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Pauls & Crost, 2005).  
Additional research suggests that a model of faking that incorporates TPB 
offers a good fit to the data (McFarland & Ryan, 2006; see Figure 1). The authors 
tested several iterations of their model (McFarland & Ryan, 2000), and ultimately 
found that faking intentions were significantly related to faking behavior. 
Attitudes and perceived behavioral control both were significant predictors of 
faking intentions. In sum, TPB is a useful framework for discussing the 
mechanisms by which individuals choose to engage in behaviors in general, and 
faking behaviors in particular. 
Motivation and faking. Factors outside of those offered in TPB can 
influence an individual’s decision to fake. For instance, the motivation to achieve 
a desired outcome such as a job plays a meaningful role in guiding behavior. 
While the idea of motivation is partially addressed by “intentions” within the TPB  
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Figure 1. Model of Faking based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (based on 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006).  
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framework, we can gain a more complete understanding of faking through a more 
nuanced focus on motivational antecedents. 
Expectancy theories of motivation are often used to explain and predict 
volitional behaviors (cf. Ellingson, 2011). In particular, Vroom’s (1964) Valence-
Instrumentality-Expectancy (VIE) theory is well positioned to contribute to the 
understanding of faking. VIE theory is used in many contexts to describe how an 
individual chooses from multiple courses of action in the pursuit of valued, 
extrinsic outcomes (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). Although meta-analytic 
support is tenuous for the theory as a whole, the individual factors are useful for 
explaining motivation and behavior (van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Valence is the 
affective component of the theory, referring to the preference for a particular 
outcome based on the anticipated satisfaction or desirability associated with it. 
Instrumentality refers to the belief that engaging in a particular behavior will 
actually result in achieving the outcome in question. This construct can be 
understood as having a clear “line of sight” between a behavior and an outcome. 
If instrumentality is high, individuals clearly see the connection between a 
behavior and an outcome. Finally, expectancy refers to the extent to which an 
individual believes he or she can accomplish the behavior. Test-takers will not be 
motivated to engage in faking behavior without the belief that they have the 
capability to fake and increase their scores on the assessment. Refinements to VIE 
theory also include an explicit ability component (e.g., Lawler & Suttle, 1973), 
meaning that people must truly possess the ability to achieve an outcome and not 
simply believe that they have the ability to do so.  
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 Within the selection literature, VIE theory is used to understand 
motivation during applicant test-taking (Sanchez, Truxillo, & Bauer, 2000). 
Research on VIE and faking suggests that a multiplicative approach among 
factors is most appropriate (Ellingson, 2011). This means that positive, non-zero 
levels of each of the factors (i.e., valence, instrumentality, and expectancy) are 
needed in order to fake. If an individual already possesses the trait in question, 
then he or she would have no instrumentality because there is no reason to believe 
that faking will influence their chances of achieving a desired outcome (Ellingson 
& McFarland, 2011). Snell, Sydell, and Lueke (1999) went on to propose a model 
in which test-takers’ increased desire for the job (i.e., valence) and confidence 
that they can successfully raise their test score (i.e., expectancy) lead to increased 
faking motivation. However, the authors and others note that certain assessment 
characteristics such as item type or item format can inhibit test-takers’ ability to 
fake, regardless of their VIE levels. In other words, there are test-specific factors 
that can moderate faking behavior by influencing faking ability (Ellingson & 
McFarland, 2011; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Tett, Freund, Chistiansen, Fox, & 
Coaster, 2012).  
More systematic variance is often observed in personality scores from 
motivated contexts than from unmotivated contexts (e.g., Heggestead, 2011). In 
conjunction with the review of VIE above, these findings add to the 
understanding of faking in two ways. First, it complements the aforementioned 
discussion of intention within the TPB framework by furthering our 
understanding of when and why individuals intend to engage in a behavior. A 
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comparison of the model proposed by VIE theory in Figure 2 with that of TPB in 
Figure 3 shows how well the two theories complement each other. Second, it 
directly addresses one of the main conceptualizations of faking discussed in the 
literature. Many studies use laboratory groups that differ solely in their motivation 
to achieve a valued outcome, and used this as an experimental comparison of 
faking and honest responding. Integrating TPB and VIE theories provides a more 
comprehensive theoretical foundation that can be used to understand faking. 
 
Figure 2. Model of Faking based on the Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy-
Theory 
Faking within psychometric theory. A thorough understanding of faking 
must have some foundation within psychometric theory because of its core 
existence as a measurement issue (Heggestead, 2011). This additional lens will 
  16   
apply parts of the theories discussed above in order to identify potential sources of 
faking behavior. The following discussion will round out our discussion of faking 
from a theoretical standpoint, and assist in defining the construct. The discussion 
uses classical test theory (CTT) as a framework. Although generalizability theory 
is more widely encouraged in the field, CTT offers a particularly accessible and 
clear mechanism for demonstrating the impact of faking and will assist in creating 
a general framework for the faking interventions discussed later.  
 According to classical test theory, an observed score is the function of an 
individual’s true score and error, commonly represented by:  
X = T + E.        (1.1) 
The true score (T) represents the expected score for an individual if he or she were 
to complete a particular personality assessment across a large number of identical 
testing situations. Random error (E) can be understood as noise in the equation; 
inconsistent “variations in attention, mental efficiency, distractions, and so forth” 
(Schmidt, Le, & Ilies, 2003, p. 208). Because all testing operates within the social 
environment, there will always be a certain degree of error associated with the 
observed score (X).  
 As a measurement issue, faking must be incorporated into this equation. 
Because many studies find differences in mean trait scores between motivated and 
unmotivated contexts (e.g., Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 2007), faking 
cannot be considered simple random error. One potential solution is to simply 
include it as one other variable in the equation. For example, if we are interested 
in faking on an extraversion scale (Heggestead, 2011), an equation may look like: 
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X = Textra + Tfake + E.      (1.2) 
 Here, a unitary concept of faking is incorporated into the equation. This is 
problematic because faking has already been established as a multidimensional 
construct. Faking behavior has several antecedents and is conditional on a variety 
of factors, as discussed above. The complexity of behavior renders a single faking 
factor incomplete. Thus, several components of faking behavior should be 
incorporated into the equation. For example:  
   X = Textra + (TF-instrumentality + TF-ability + TF-intent … + TFn ) + E  (1.3) 
where TF-valence .. TFn represent various sources of faking behavior. Instrumentality, 
ability, and intent are included as examples in this equation to address TPB and 
VIE discussed previously. For instance, observed scores can be influenced by the 
instrumentality of faking, the ability to fake on the assessment, and test-taker 
intent to fake on the assessment. There are a number of other sources of faking 
(e.g., valence, perceived behavioral control) excluded in the equation above for 
the sake of demonstration.  
Many interventions designed to mitigate the effect of faking target one of 
these sources, most often faking intent or ability. For instance, warning statements 
target faking intent in an attempt to produce a more accurate portrayal of a true 
score, while using subtle items attempt to reduce faking ability. Other 
interventions disregard these sources and attempt to address faking after-the-fact. 
Indeed, many assessment publishers suggest correcting for social desirability 
when interpreting personality assessments. Understanding faking within the 
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context of CTT helps us to identify how such interventions differ in their 
approach to diminishing faking behavior.  
This equation highlights the core message from the previous theoretical 
review: faking is a complicated behavior with several factors to consider. Framing 
faking within CTT more clearly identifies some of the “sources” of faking that 
can influence an observed score. The application of this final lens to faking does 
well to assist in understanding the role various faking interventions take in 
influencing faking behavior.  
Summary and conceptual definition of faking. Based on the theoretical 
review above, faking is conceptually defined as a multidimensional behavior that 
is both intentional and deceptive, and seeks to benefit one’s own interests. There 
are several important aspects of this definition. First, faking is multidimensional. 
Classical test theory and TPB suggest that faking, like other behaviors, is the 
result of a dynamic interaction of factors such as intentions and attitudes. It is 
important to understand faking as multidimensional from both a conceptual and 
practical perspective. For the latter, interventions looking to combat faking should 
be concerned with how the intervention is influencing behavior. As mentioned 
earlier, different interventions may be targeted at different sources of faking 
behavior such as intent and ability. It is additionally crucial to point out that 
faking is a behavior and not a trait. Differences in faking occur across people, but 
also across situations within individuals.  
The conceptual definition also describes faking behavior as intentional. 
VIE theory suggests faking is a volitional behavior done to enhance the chances 
  19   
of acquiring a desired outcome. Further, faking includes deception, which may be 
internally or externally focused. Regardless of the focus, the core intent of this 
deception is not malicious. It is primarily meant to benefit one’s own interests or 
improve the possible outcomes (e.g., obtaining a job). While faking may have 
adverse outcomes for other parties such as the organization, these consequences 
are a by-product of the faking behavior and not the primary intent (Ellingson & 
McFarland, 2011). 
Operationally Defining Faking  
With a clear conceptual understanding of faking, the discussion can now 
move to how the construct is operationally defined in empirical research. The 
extant literature has found difficulty researching the topic because it requires 
deducing a complex array of human behavior into a single test or observation. 
However, a consistent understanding and measurement of faking is necessary. For 
this meta-analysis, faking will be operationalized by comparing mean scores 
across conditions that are theorized to only differ with respect to faking. Most of 
the literature regards “faked” scores as those that are outside of a 95% confidence 
interval away from the mean on that trait. There are some differences in 
techniques, as some researchers have used the standard error of measurement 
(SEM; e.g., Griffith et al., 2007), others have used the standard error of the 
difference (SED; et al., Peterson et al., 2009), and others have used the standard 
error of measurement for the difference score (e.g., Arthur, Glaze, Villado, & 
Taylor, 2010). There is evidence that these methods differ significantly in 
identifying fakers (Peterson, Griffith, Converse, & Gammon, 2011). However, the 
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basic premise in the methods is the same, as faked responses on a socially-
desirable trait are expected to have a higher mean score than honest responses. 
Because of differences observed in classification methods, and to facilitate the 
aggregation of data, the current analysis focuses on the effect size (i.e., 
standardized mean difference) between conditions. 
Comparison studies are typically either naturally occurring (e.g., 
comparing applicants to incumbents) or experimentally induced (e.g., comparing 
participants instructed to fake or not). Results from the two samples are 
compared, and the difference in personality mean scores is attributed to faking. 
This way of operationalizing faking rests largely on the assumption that people 
will present themselves in a positive light when motivated to do so, and respond 
more honestly (i.e., less socially desirable) when the motivation is absent (e.g., 
Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). 
The rationale behind operationalizing faking as mean difference scores 
across motivated conditions is straightforward. Baseline or control data is 
collected in an unmotivated context (i.e., the incumbent or no faking instructions 
group). The scores are then either compared to another motivated group (between-
subjects) or collected from the same test-takers again in a motivated context 
(within-subjects). For traits that should be perceived as desirable (e.g., 
conscientiousness), motivated contexts should display higher mean scores than in 
unmotivated contexts, while the inverse would be true for undesirable traits like 
neuroticism. Indeed, meta-analytic results suggest that participants are able to 
increase scores more than half a standard deviation under instructions to fake 
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good compared to no instructions (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Table 1 
demonstrates that test-takers are able to meaningfully change the mean dimension 
scores across each of the Five Factor traits. It should be noted that experimentally 
induced faking tends to produce a larger effect size than does naturally occurring 
faking (Holden & Book, 2011), although consideration of methodological 
moderators may limit these differences (Hooper, 2007). 
The assumption of equality between the two samples is most frequently 
cited as a criticism of this understanding of faking (Mount & Barrick, 1995; 
Tristan, 2009). Incumbents may be substantially different from applicants, if for 
no other reason than because they already passed the selection assessment in 
question. Researchers and practitioners who believe faking is inconsequential or 
its research is unnecessary argue that incumbents will score high on the selection 
measure because they were already selected, and that the applicant sample will 
have more variability. While this likely true, it does not explain why applicants 
would then score higher on the personality assessment than incumbents. (e.g., 
Ellingson, Sackett, & Connelly, 2007; Griffith et al., 2007). In fact, applicants 
tend to score roughly one-third of a standard deviation higher (d = .35) across all 
of the FFM traits compared to incumbents (Tett et al., 2006). 
At its core, the issue of nonequivalence represents a concern over 
between- versus within-group study designs. There are indeed numerous 
differences between samples, especially applicants versus incumbents, which are 
not accurately caught by a between-subjects design (Guion & Cranny, 1982; 
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Table 1. 
Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) Mean Effect Sizes (d) for Five Factor Model 
Dimensions Under Fake Good Instructions. 
 Fake Good 
Personality Trait Within Between Weighted Average** 
Emotional Stability 0.93 0.64 0.76 
 (921)* (1357)  
Extraversion 0.54 0.63 0.61 
 (391) (1122)  
Openness 0.76 0.65 0.68 
 (259) (614)  
Agreeableness 0.47 0.48 0.48 
 (408) (1009)  
Conscientiousness 0.89 0.60 0.66 
 (723) (2650)  
Weighted Average 0.78 0.60 0.65 
Note: Effect sizes represent the difference in mean personality trait scores 
between fake good and honest instructions. 
* Numbers in parentheses represent the total N per mean effect size. 
** Weighted averages are average mean effect sizes weighted by total N in each 
condition or trait. 
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Tristan, 2009). Although lab studies that use “instructionally-induced” faking can 
use random assignment to address non-equivalence, many faking researchers 
argue that between-subject designs are less methodologically sound than within-
subject designs (cf. Griffith & Converse, 2011). Collecting personality data from 
the same individual in a motivated context and in an unmotivated context 
provides stronger evidence that differences are due to faking and not due to 
differences on extraneous variables. Between-subjects designs are frequently used 
in large part due to the practical ease of their implementation. The type of design 
is an important consideration when designing a faking study. Effect size 
calculations, as well as prevalence estimates, vary as a function of design type 
(e.g., Peterson, Griffith, O’Connell, & Isaacson, 2008).  
Prevalence of Faking 
Prevalence estimates of faking tend to vary depending on how faking is 
operationalized. When studies define faking as mean difference scores, the 
prevalence tends to be around 30 percent of test-takers. For instance, Griffith et al. 
(2007) classified applicants as fakers by examining those who elevated their score 
in a motivated context to a score that fell outside of a confidence interval around 
their honest score (i.e., the score obtained in an unmotivated condition). With a 
95% confidence interval based on the standard error of measurement (SEM), 
roughly 31% were classified as fakers. However, the same study used the standard 
error of the difference SED to identify only 22% of the sample as fakers. Other 
studies on the prevalence of faking find similar estimates, ranging from 21% 
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(Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2008) to 33% (Arthur et al., 2011) of samples 
identified as fakers (the latter using the SEM approach).  
It is clear that prevalence estimates vary across different 
operationalizations of faking. Little research has directly compared prevalence 
estimates using different methods. Peterson et al. (2011) directly compared three 
methods on the same sample of simulated applicants (i.e., students instructed to 
fake as if they were an applicant for a job). The authors found that the choice of 
faking detection method significantly altered the percent of responses flagged as 
faked. Using the SEM consistently identified a larger proportion of fakers, while 
the SED approach identified the lowest proportion of “fakers” across personality 
traits.  
The current study is not focused on identifying the prevalence of faking, 
but it is important to understand the extent of faking in order to understand its 
implications. Because the prevalence rates tend to vary, it is likely that roughly 
30% of test takers can be classified as “fakers.”  
Implications of Faking 
The nontrivial prevalence of faking may represent a threat to an 
organization’s selection system. As discussed earlier, faking may produce a 
meaningful cost to organizations. It is thus quite important for organizations to be 
aware of the potential areas in which faking may have an effect. Most research on 
the implications of faking focuses on changes to the rank-order of the applicants 
(i.e., shifts in mean scores) and the validity of inferences from the assessment 
(i.e., criterion-related validity). 
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Faking and rank-order of applicants. Given the literature review to this 
point on the effect faking has on mean personality scores, it is unsurprising that 
faking can influence the rank-order of applicants in such a way that benefits 
fakers at the detriment of honest test-takers. This undermines one of the key 
assumptions of using personality tests discussed at the beginning of this chapter, 
as organizations assume that the test yields an accurate reading of a test-takers 
relative standing on a given trait. 
 Multiple simulations show that faking can change the rank-order of 
applicants, particularly at the upper-end of the distribution (Douglas et al., 1996; 
Zickar et al., 1996). This suggests that in a top-down selection system, hiring 
decisions may be altered by the prevalence of faking. Empirical studies find 
similar results, with substantially different rank-orders of applicants between 
adjusted and nonadjusted personality score conditions (Rosse, Stecher, Miler, & 
Levin, 1998).  
Among other factors such as test reliability (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003) 
and individual differences in willingness to fake (Griffith et al., 2006 ), 
researchers highlight the importance of selection-ratio in considering how faking 
influences rank-order or selection decisions (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & 
Rothstein, 1994; Griffith et al., 2007; Rosse et al., 1998). As the selection ratio 
decreases, the number of fakers selected disproportionately increases (Mueller-
Hanson et al., 2003). With a very high selection ratio (e.g., 60% and above), the 
percent of honest respondents selected is sufficiently similar to the percent of 
honest responders in the entire sample. However, when the selection ratios were 
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smaller (e.g., below 50%), the number of honest responders selected was 
significantly lower than the number in the entire sample. Meanwhile, Rosse and 
colleagues (1998) found that seven of the eight people hired were fakers when 
only the top 5% of applicants are hired. These results demonstrate that faking has 
a particular influence at the upper-end of the distribution of personality scores, 
which is exactly where it will have the most influence (Jenson & Sackett, 2012; 
Tett et al., 2006). This creates an increased opportunity for those applicants who 
are not naturally high on the job-related trait in question. 
The results do not guarantee that fakers will always be hired above honest 
responders. For one thing, most organizations use a variety of selection tools 
when making hiring decisions. However, if the rank-order is influenced even 
slightly, selection decisions may be altered in turn.  
Faking and criterion-related validity. A limited body of research within 
the faking literature focuses on criterion-related validity. It is also inexorably 
connected to one of the assumptions of the use of personality assessments in 
selection. Recall that the practice of administering a personality assessment to 
employees assumes that it is a useful predictor of future behavior or performance. 
Researchers arguing for the significance of faking suggest that faking on 
personality measures attenuates the criterion-related validity. This finding is 
widely debated within the field, with a fair amount of support for both sides of the 
argument.  
Past research observes greater prediction error for incentivized participants 
compared to a control condition, particularly at the upper-end of the distribution 
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of scores (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Mueller-Hanson, 
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003). In the incentive group, the relationship between 
personality and the criterion was significantly lower for test-takers that scored in 
the upper third of personality scores (r = .07) compared to test-takers at the 
bottom third of the distribution (r = .45). On the contrary, no differences were 
observed for the control group. Although this study did not demonstrate a 
statistically significant difference between validity coefficients for the two 
conditions (i.e., incentive and control), the difference was practically significant. 
Other research demonstrates significant differences in validity coefficients 
between conditions, such as fake good and honest responding conditions (e.g., 
Holden & Jackson, 1981). In a Monte Carlo simulation, Douglas, McDaniel, and 
Snell (1996) demonstrated how the inclusion of fakers into a sample lowers the 
criterion-related validity when predicting job performance. Specifically, the 
validity coefficients for conscientiousness and agreeableness dropped 
significantly as fakers were added to the simulated sample. Similarly, Komar et 
al. (2008) used a simulated dataset to demonstrate that faking can significantly 
decrease validity coefficients for predicting supervisory ratings of job 
performance under certain situations, such as the variability of faking and 
selection ratio.  
Still, others maintain that faking has no noticeable effect on criterion-
related validity across applicant and incumbent samples. Some note estimates are 
higher for applicants (r = .40) than for incumbents (r = .29) when examining the 
relation between integrity tests and overall job performance (Ones, Viswesvaran, 
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& Schmidt, 1993). In a similar vein, research suggests that the small differences 
in validity coefficients between applicant and incumbent samples (e.g., .07 
difference; Hough, 1998) are not practically significant. Even in comparing “fake 
good” and “fake bad” conditions, validity coefficients remained stable. Finally, 
some researchers feel that faking is not a problem because of the already modest 
criterion-related validity coefficients for personality in most contexts (Morgeson 
et al., 2007a). Under ideal scenarios, personality tests can only account for about 
15% of the variance in job performance. This does not leave much room for 
faking to meaningfully impact one’s ability to make valid predictions based on the 
scores on a personality assessment.  
 The above review shows that research on faking and criterion-related 
validity is by no means consistent. One reason for discrepant findings regarding 
criterion-related validity may be in how the authors define a “significant change.” 
That is, different estimates will result if operationalizing the change as 
significantly different from zero (i.e., single-group validity) versus significantly 
different from each other (i.e., the two groups). In any case, this disagreement 
simply highlights the continued need for research to refine our understanding for 
how response distortion affects criterion-related validity.  
Interventions for Faking 
 Faking has a measureable impact on the efficacy of personality assessment 
for employee selection. As such, researchers and practitioners have developed 
various interventions that seek to address the problem. Conceptually, these 
interventions seek to eliminate the different “types” of error within the classical 
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test theory lens discussed above. A visual representation of how each intervention 
theoretically influences faking behavior is offered in Figure 3. The proposed 
model of interventions represents an application of the theoretical bases of faking 
behavior. Factors such as perceived control (Theory of Planned Behavior; TPB) 
and valence (Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy; VIE) serve as antecedents. 
This list is far from exhaustive, and partially represents individual differences 
with regards to faking. As seen in the model, faking interventions primarily focus 
on situational factors rather than intraindividual factors. More specifically, faking 
interventions can be classified as either preventive or remedial. Preventive 
interventions seek to influence behavior before it occurs, while remedial 
approaches allow the assessment to be administered and seek to tease out the 
potential effect of faking after the fact.  
A more nuanced look into these interventions demonstrates that they target 
specific factors within some of the previous theoretical models of faking behavior. 
Preventive interventions can either focus on modifying intent or ability to fake. 
Warning statements are the most common approach for preventively influencing 
faking intent, while item transparency, forced choice formats and time limits seek 
to influence faking ability. The most common remedial strategies are score 
corrections or removing individuals due to high SDR scores. These are done after 
assessment data are collected, and thus do not influence actual faking behavior. 
The following sections will review the most common interventions, discussing 
both the theory behind them and the empirical support in the extant literature. The 
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discussion will follow the progression put forth in Error! Reference source not 
found.  
  31   
 
 
Figure 3. Theoretical Model of Faking Integrated with Proposed Interventions 
based on McFarland and Ryan (2000). 
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Preventive interventions – intent. Preventive interventions focused on 
limiting intention to fake can do so by modifying test-taker cognitions such as 
instrumentality or valence. Test-takers can be expected to engage in less faking 
behavior to the extent that they believe that others are no longer engaging in the 
behavior or that the behavior is not socially valued. The most common approach 
focused on intent is the use of a warning statement in the assessment instructions. 
Warnings. Using this approach, test-takers are cautioned prior to taking 
the assessment that there are measures that can detect distorted or faked 
responses. This technique is effective in that it directly addresses one of the 
limitations of self-report personality data; namely, a lack of accountability to the 
answers provided (Dunning et al., 2004). Warning statements seek to provide this 
accountability by making the items appear verifiable. In practice, the content 
warning statements can take a variety of forms that typically conform to one of 
five categories (cf. Pace & Borman, 2006). In its most simple form, detection 
warnings suggest that faked responses can be detected, while consequential 
warnings suggest a negative outcome (e.g., removal from applicant pool) as a 
result of faking. The other three categories of warning statements (i.e., appeal to 
reason, educational, and appeal to moral principles) receive much less empirical 
testing than the first two warning types. Warnings looking to appeal to reason 
state that test-takers who respond more honestly will more accurately represent 
their personality, while warnings appealing to moral principles state that, as an 
honest and moral individual, the test-taker should not lie. Finally, educational 
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warnings state that faking on the assessment means that the researchers or test 
administrators cannot accurately evaluate the responses.  
Warning statements are effective insofar as they influence the intention to 
fake (see Figure 3). This sentiment is reflected in McFarland and Ryan’s (2000) 
model of faking behavior, where warnings are proposed to moderate the 
relationship between beliefs toward faking and faking intentions. The authors 
later found support for this proposition, finding that warnings had a direct effect 
on intention to fake for most of the five factor personality traits (McFarland & 
Ryan, 2006). The authors also unexpectedly found that warnings have a direct 
effect on faking behavior, even when controlling for intention to fake. This 
unexpected finding suggests that warnings may be a particularly robust 
intervention for addressing faking.  
Compared to an assessment given across motivated and unmotivated 
conditions without a warning, the presence of a warning should result in a smaller 
difference in mean personality scores. Empirical studies suggest warnings are 
effective in lowering scores on both personality trait and SD scores. Dwight and 
Donovan (2003) meta-analytically demonstrated that test-taker personality scores 
were substantially lower (d = .23) for positive traits like conscientiousness when 
they were warned than when they were not. More recent primary studies support 
the findings of this meta-analysis and find that warnings are effective at reducing 
faking behavior across a variety of settings (e.g., Converse, Oswald, Imus, 
Hedricks, Roy, & Butera, 2008; Dullaghan, 2010; Griffith et al., 2006; Landers, 
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Sackett, & Tuzinski, 2011). It thus appears that warnings are effective at deterring 
faking behavior.  
Mean differences in predictor scores and social desirability are useful in 
showing that warning statements change behaviors. However, the utility of 
warning statements for making accurate decisions is also an important issue. The 
criterion-related validity of the assessment plays a big role in these decisions. 
Interestingly, some studies find lower criterion-related validity coefficients in 
warned than in unwarned conditions (Harold et al., 2004; McFarland, 2003). 
Although the warning lowered self-reported faking, McFarland (2003) found 
lower correlations between GPA and all five factors of personality in the warned 
condition than in the unwarned condition. Other research suggests criterion-
related validity coefficients are unchanged across warned and unwarned 
conditions when prediction criteria such as leadership and absenteeism (Converse 
et al., 2008; Fox & Dinur, 1998). 
Some research uses an external rater’s judgment of the test-taker’s 
personality as a criterion for personality score accuracy. Others’ ratings of a test-
taker’s personality are frequently used for assessing personality (e.g., Connelly & 
Ones, 2010) and often come in the form of peer’s or acquaintances that know the 
test-taker well. One study found no difference between the self-observer ratings 
across warned and unwarned conditions (Robson, Jones, & Abraham, 2008). 
However, another study using self-observer ratings contradicted these findings 
and found that warnings moderated the relationship between self and other ratings 
of personality (Robie, Taggar, & Brown, 2009). This is not the only study to find 
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that warnings enhance criterion-related validity and selection decisions. Higher 
criterion-related validity estimates were observed in the warned condition than the 
unwarned condition when predicting behavioral procrastination (Illingsworth, 
2004). Warnings can also enhance the criterion-related validity of other non-
cognitive measures such as biodata (Mock, 1947).  
Looking across both lab and applied settings, the presence of a warning 
has a meaningful influence on selection decisions (Fan et al., 2012; Lopez, 2009). 
The amount of fakers selected dropped 20% after a warning was given, while no 
drop was observed for the unwarned test-takers. Despite the mixed findings, 
warning statements are expected to enhance criterion-related validity.  
Few studies compare the effectiveness of the different categories of 
warnings. In a follow-up primary study to their meta-analysis, Dwight and 
Donovan (2003) found that consequential warnings were more effective at 
lowering mean personality scores than detection alone in a motivated context. 
Several studies have followed suit, and tend to combine these two categories of 
warning into a single warning statement. Dullaghan (2010) hypothesized that the 
more “applicant friendly” appeal to reason warning would be more effective than 
a potentially disingenuous threat. However, results indicated that 
detection/consequential warnings were more effective than reasoning warnings in 
an applied context. The latter warning showed no significant change in mean 
scores compared to that of the faking condition. Additional research focused on 
the content of the warning statement is needed (Dilchert & Ones, 2011; Rothstein 
& Goffin, 2006).  
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The main limitation of warning statements is that the effectiveness of this 
intervention lies in the test-taker’s trust in the warning’s accuracy. It seems 
plausible if not likely that individuals’ trust will vary significantly, making it 
difficult to generalize the effectiveness of one type of warning across test-takers. 
Some researchers also question the ethicality of providing false warning 
statements (Dilchert & Ones, 2011), especially considering the unconvincing 
literature discussed previously regarding direct faking measures. Because the 
detection measures are far from accurate, the warning statements about detection 
may be interpreted as disingenuous (Fort, 2010). Some researchers also suggest 
that warnings increase the cognitive difficulty of the measure (Vasilopoulos et al., 
2005). If warnings make the response more complex, assessments with a warning 
may only be faked by test-takers with high general mental ability (Rothstein & 
Goffin, 2006).  
In sum, the research tends to support the use of warning statements as a 
faking deterrent despite a few potential limitations. The practical simplicity of 
implementation makes it a popular intervention. A consolidation of the literature 
will provide insight into the effectiveness of this intervention and reveal potential 
avenues for future research.  
Preventive interventions – ability. As opposed to warnings that focus on 
faking intent, other preventive interventions focus on faking ability. This category 
of intervention still seeks to modify faking behavior, but does so through a very 
different mechanism. Theories of faking suggest that even if a test-taker intends to 
fake, the assessment itself must allow for faking to occur. Ability interventions 
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thus overlook faking intentions, instead focusing efforts on limiting the 
“fakability” of the assessment. Research tends to focus on three specific 
interventions: using forced choice formats, and limiting item transparency, and 
imposing time limits.  
Forced-choice. The ability to fake an assessment can be strongly 
influenced by its design. Most personality assessments present items 
independently from one another, and have test-takers respond to items on a 
Likert-style scale. In this format, test-takers can easily endorse positive items (i.e., 
positive traits) while ignoring or downplaying negative ones. A Forced Choice 
(FC) measure seeks to take this choice away from the test-taker by making it 
impossible to avoid endorsing a more “negative” item. Research on FC measures 
suggests that they correlate strongly with normative measures and offer useful 
information about absolute trait levels (e.g., Bowen, Martin, & Hunt, 2002; 
Goffin, Jang, & Skinner, 2011; Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006).  
Most FC measures ask test-takers to respond to an item with multiple 
options that are balanced in terms of social desirability. Some FC items are 
structured in a way that asks the test-taker to rank the available options in terms of 
how much the items reflect their own personality. Another item may be formatted 
such that the test-taker chooses the option that is “most like him/her” or “least like 
him/her,” with as many desirable options as undesirable ones. For instance, two 
FC items may ask the following (Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005): 
“Which of the following adjectives is most true or most descriptive of you?”: 
(1) Practical or Imaginative 
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(2) Unkind or Careless 
For item (2) above, it is unlikely that either adjective is socially desirable 
for a job applicant. On the other hand, both adjectives in item (1) could be 
socially desirable. Thus, test-takers are unable to strictly adhere to socially 
desirable responding patterns.  
Regardless of format, the psychometric limitations of FC measures must 
be addressed. For instance, FC measures by nature reflect intraindividual 
differences as opposed to interindividual differences (Converse et al., 2010; 
Meade, 2004), and personality dimensions are not independent, such that a test-
taker cannot receive a high score on all dimensions (Dilchert & Ones, 2011). 
However, partially ipsative FC measures, as opposed to purely ipsative measures, 
address these limitations. Purely ipsative measures exist when test-takers have to 
rank all options per item or all paired comparisons are taken into account in 
scoring (Converse et al., 2010). This is problematic because the total score for all 
participants will be the same, which highly reduces the variance and often results 
in negative correlations in the data (Converse et al., 2010; Meade, 2004). Partially 
ipsative measures, on the other hand, increase test variance by not having the total 
test score constant across all test-takers. With the example above, a measure could 
be partially ipsative if some of the response options are not scored or differential 
weights are applied in scoring response options (Hicks, 1970). Other ranking 
formats can be partially ipsative if test-takers are not required to respond to all 
options within an item or if scales have a varying number of items (Dilchert & 
Ones, 2011).  
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As depicted in Figure 3, FC measures seek to reduce faking by limiting 
test-takers’ ability to fake. Test-takers cannot choose every desirable response 
because each item contains potentially multiple socially desirable options. Thus, 
the applicant’s response to the item theoretically represents the option that is most 
like the test-taker because they have to choose between multiple desirable options 
(Gordon, 1951).  
Within the faking literature, mean difference scores are typically 
compared between FC measures and non-FC measures (e.g., Likert-style). 
Jackson et al. (2000) found that participants completing a Likert-style personality 
inventory were able to increase their scores on a dependability scale nearly a full 
standard deviation (.95 SD) when instructed to do so, compared to a group that 
was instructed to respond honestly. This difference was over a half of a standard 
deviation higher than the increase for an FC measure. Martin, Bowen, and Hunt 
(2002) employed a slightly different method, comparing test-takers actual ratings 
to that of a self-rated “ideal” applicant. No difference in ratings was observed 
between honest and faking conditions for FC measures, while the normative (i.e., 
Likert-style) measures showed large differences between conditions. Consistent 
results were found in Bowen et al. (2002) using a similar approach and 
methodology. Within the five-factor framework, mean difference scores for 
conscientiousness and extraversion were higher across applicant and fake-good 
instructions for Likert-style measures than FC measures (Christiansen et al., 2005; 
Converse et al., 2010; Heggestad et al., 2006).  
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Although empirical research on mean difference scores is generally in the 
proposed direction, the strength of the effect varies significantly. For instance, 
Christiansen et al. (2005) found mean differences for conscientiousness to be 
much lower for FC (d = .40) than Likert (d = .68) measures when comparing 
honest and applicant instructions Heggestad et al. (2006), on the other hand, 
found much stronger mean differences for FC and Likert measures but the 
differences between them were minimal (d = 1.20 and 1.23, respectively). These 
varying effect sizes suggest that a meta-analysis may be useful for providing an 
estimate across studies of FC as a faking intervention.  
There are two important caveats in the discussion of FC measures. First, 
while FC measures tend to show less response inflation than Likert-style 
measures, both measures show inflated scores compared to an “honest” sample. 
Indeed, Jackson et al. (2000) reported that the mean shift between the honest and 
applicant conditions for the FC measure was meaningful (d = .32). Although this 
is less than the Likert-style measure (d = .95), a degree of inflation is still 
observed. Second, FC measures are problematic in selection contexts because 
normative comparisons across applicants are difficult. However, recent research 
suggests that some FC measures (i.e., partially ipsative measures) can be used to 
attain normative trait standing (Heggestad et al., 2006).  
Item transparency. The above section on FC measures indicated they 
limit faking ability in part by making the underlying trait less transparent. In 
typical test formats (e.g., Likert-scales), items measuring a similar construct are 
grouped together. This format typically demonstrates desirable psychometric 
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properties such as strong internal consistency and clean factor loadings 
(Schriesheim, Solomon, & Kopelman, 1989). However, doing so may increase 
faking ability. Additionally, the content of the items can influence the extent to 
which the test-taker is able to identify the measured construct. Measures that 
include the name of the construct in the item are likely especially transparent 
(e.g., Ten-Item Personality Inventory; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Thus, 
faking ability should be limited to the extent that the measured construct is less 
transparent. This is achievable through a variety of methods.  
 A scrambled or randomized format is where “proximal items on a scale 
load onto different constructs” (Dilchert & Ones, 2011, p. 187). This approach 
asserts that test-takers look for connections between items, and that the underlying 
constructs are less clear by mixing the items together. Despite assertions that 
grouping items together improves psychometric properties (e.g., Schriesheim & 
DeNisi, 1980), recent research suggests that internal consistency is not 
significantly different across scale format (Schnell et al., 2011). As opposed to the 
order of all the items on a scale, the content of the items may also influence 
faking behavior.  
Integrity testing and biodata research has long focused on the use of subtle 
versus obvious items (e.g., Alliger, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1995; Mael, 1991). 
The item content in this sense refers to the extent to which a test-taker can be 
reasonably expected to identify the trait measured by a given item. Obvious items 
reflect those of more common personality scales (e.g., NEO-FFI) where items are 
created with the intent of tapping a single construct. Subtle items, on the other 
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hand, are typically created through empirical keying. This means that they are not 
created for a construct a priori as obvious items are, but rather are chosen based 
on how well they empirically differentiate groups. Implicit measures of 
personality can be argued to be more subtle, but will not be included in this 
review because they reflect performance on tasks such as target discrimination 
and speed (e.g., Flipikowski, 2007).  
Using contextualized items can also limit faking behavior. Due to the 
ambiguous nature of some general personality measures, test takers may be more 
prone to respond positively across all items. By providing a context, such as a 
specific frame-of-reference (FOR), personality assessments may provide a more 
accurate level of a test-taker’s trait level. Previous researchers have theorized that 
an “at work” FOR in particular may limit the test-taker’s ability to fake by 
constraining the situational context (English, 2004). Empirical tests bear this out, 
as a version of the NEO-FFI that used an “at work” FOR showed less response 
distortion across the five traits than a general version of the NEO-FFI (English, 
2004; Griffith et al., 2006).  
Through the above discussion and review of the literature, it is clear that 
these three methods seek to limit faking by reducing “item transparency.” The 
rationale behind this decision has several key components. First, all three 
approaches are focused on the item level. This stands in contrast to other 
interventions such as warnings, which are focused on the person level. By sharing 
the same level of focus, these approaches are likely to influence faking behavior 
in similar ways. Indeed, these approaches target faking ability within the model of 
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faking behavior (see Figure 3). Similar to FC scales, the purpose is to modify test-
taker’s ability to fake or distort on the assessment. These approaches also use a 
similar rationale to limit transparency, and share the same mechanism for 
influencing behavior (i.e., limiting faking ability).  
The extant literature on item transparency as an intervention for faking 
almost exclusively focuses on its impact on mean personality trait scores. In 
general, both item order and subtlety have received partial support as viable 
interventions. Indirect support can be gleaned from a study that included items 
measuring a “decoy construct” around focal items (Bernal, 1999). Mean scores 
across honest and faked conditions on the focal personality traits decreased with 
the inclusion of a decoy construct the prevalence of faking, but did not influence 
the rank order of participants. Although this aligns with the theoretical assertion 
of randomizing item placement, the inclusion of a decoy construct may contribute 
additional problems such as increased cognitive or reading load.  
A more direct test of this intervention found that mean conscientiousness 
scores were higher for grouped items than for randomized items across honest, 
fake good, and respond as applicant conditions (McFarland, Ryan, & Ellis, 2002). 
The findings regarding the effectiveness of grouped and randomized items is far 
from consistent, as more recent research finds that only agreeableness has lower 
mean scores in randomized formats (Wolford, 2009), and others have found no 
significant mean differences for any personality traits (Schnell et al., 2011). 
However, even when not statistically significant, mean scores across the FFM 
traits tend to be smaller in randomized formats than in grouped formats.  
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Subtle items may provide an advantage over obvious items. Literature 
outside of the selection context suggests that empirically keyed scales are more 
resistant to faking than traditional ones (e.g., Dannebaum & Lanyon, 1993; Hsu et 
al., 1989). Within a selection context, however, the literature is more mixed. Item 
subtlety was not significantly related to item-level faking when operationalized as 
mean difference scores across motivated conditions (Gibby, 2004). Utilizing item 
response theory, item transparency led to more faking (operationalized as 
responses to an unlikely virtues scale) for openness and extraversion items, but 
not for conscientiousness (Day, 2008). Using an unlikely virtues scale stands in 
contrast to most other research on item transparency that uses mean difference 
scores to operationalize faking. Indeed, meta-analytic evidence suggests that 
subtle items are less likely to be faked than obvious items in terms of mean 
difference scores (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). The above literature review 
suggests that although the literature is inconsistent, item transparency (i.e., item 
order or content) may be effective at lowering faking when faking is 
operationalized as mean difference scores.  
Time limits. Many theorists hypothesize that the amount of time it takes 
an applicant to answer an item can be used as an indicator of faking. Both overall 
response time to a measure and response latencies (i.e., the amount of time 
between item presentation and item response; Hsu et al., 1989) are commonly 
investigated within the faking literature. Time limits are proposed to limit the test-
taker ability to fake on the assumption that lying takes time. Empirical literature, 
however, is mixed on the relationship between time and faking.  
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There are three main models of response time applied to faking that can be 
used to support opposing hypotheses. First, the Self-Schema model (Markus, 
1977) suggests that lying should take longer than responding honestly. Self-
schemas refer to generalizations about the self to aid in processing and organizing 
information. Because a distorted response is discordant with this self-schema, it 
takes time to cognitively process the options before providing an alternative 
response. It is therefore evident that this model considers faked and honest 
response patterns to involve very different cognitive processes. The Semantic 
Exercise model (Hsu, Santelli, & Hsu, 1989) suggests that faked responses will be 
faster because they refer to a less complex schema, namely that of an ideal 
respondent. This schema is more semantic in nature. The cognitive process will be 
less complex when “making a semantic evaluation than when making a self-
referenced evaluation” (Martin, 2011; p .16). Finally, the Adopted Schema Model 
(e.g., Holden et al., 1992) goes a step further to suggest that faked and honest 
responses involve similar cognitive processes. This model suggests that both a 
self-schema and an adopted (i.e., “faking”) schema exist while completing the 
assessment, where the latter represents the characteristics the test-taker wishes to 
display. Because the adopted schema has qualities more similar to that of an ideal 
candidate, the response time will be shorter for fakers responding in ways 
consistent with their adopted schema. Most importantly, this theory further 
proposes that honest responders will still use their self-schema during the 
assessment process. Fakers therefore display faster response times because of 
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their use of the adopted schema, as opposed to honest responders who use a self-
schema (Martin, 2011).  
There are two ways that organizations can use time in their personality 
assessment process. Time limits can be implemented before taking an assessment, 
or response time can be used remedially as an indicator of faking. The latter will 
be discussed shortly. Using time limits is done preventively with the intent of 
reducing test-takers’ ability to fake. It follows from the Self-Schema proposition 
that if lying takes time, limiting the time participants have to answer the items 
should limit or prevent faking. However, the previous paragraph also put forth 
theoretical support for faked responses taking less time than honest responses. If 
time has a null or negative relationship with faking, imposing a time limit will not 
avert faking and may even negatively affect honest responders. Some research 
suggests that including time limits has no impact on a participant’s ability to 
increase desirable trait scores compared to participants without a time limit 
(Holden, Wood, & Tomashewski, 2001; Robie et al., 2009; Robie et al., 2010). 
Other research finds that a time limit reduces socially desirable responding 
(Komar et al., 2010), while still other research finds that the results are mixed 
(Khorramdel & Kubinger, 2006). It is important to note that Komar et al. (2010) 
found an interaction between time limit and cognitive ability, showing that the 
time limit influenced SDR only for low cognitive ability participants. This 
assertion is consistent with self-regulatory models (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 
1989) or resource allocation theory (Ackerman, 1986). It follows that faking takes 
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up cognitive resources, and a time limit thus reduces the cognitive resources 
available for the test-taker to use for faking.  
In general, research on time limits as a preventive faking intervention 
suggests that it is less effective than other interventions. The other preventive 
interventions focused on limiting faking ability, namely forced choice and item 
transparency, are likely more useful at reducing faking than time limits.   
Remedial interventions. The primary mechanisms for influencing faking 
behavior are by limiting either intention or ability to fake. However, other 
interventions take a more pragmatic approach by focusing primarily on the 
decisions made from faking. In other words, remedial interventions seek to 
modify the interpretation of personality assessments after allowing potential 
faking behavior to occur. Common remedial interventions include partialling out 
variance due to socially desirable responding (e.g., SD scales, bogus items), or by 
removing applicants based on either elevated social desirability scores or response 
time.  
Direct measures of social desirable responding. Using direct measures of 
socially desirable responding (SDR) together with personality scales a common 
intervention used to address faking despite its many shortcomings (Bäckström, 
Björklund, & Larsson, 2011; Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999). Direct 
measures often come in the form of social desirability scales such as the BIDR 
(Paulhus, 1991), lie scales, or bogus item scales (Harvel, 2012). There are 
typically two ways of using SDR scores in this context, and they are driven by 
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distinct theories for how social desirability influences the relationship between 
personality and a criterion.  
First, high SDR scores can be considered an indicator of faking. 
Assessment administrators can choose to flag, retest, or even remove such test-
takers from a given pool (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). At the core of this 
approach is the assumption that SDR acts as a moderator. Specifically, the 
relationship between personality and a criterion is assumed to vary as a function 
of SDR. When SDR scores are quite high, the relationship between personality 
and the criterion (e.g., performance) is believed to no longer be sufficiently 
similar to the rest of the sample. In other words, the criterion-related validity is 
sufficiently different at high levels of SDR and cannot be meaningfully compared 
to the rest of the sample. This approach is often advocated by commercial 
personality assessments, as assessment publishers often state that individuals 
scoring high on a SDR scale will have invalid personality profiles (Rothstein & 
Goffin, 2003).  
Many empirical tests of this approach examine how the removal of high 
SDR scorers influences observations within a sample (e.g., Hough, 1998). Schmitt 
and Oswald (2006) found that removing applicants who scored above a cut-off on 
a SDR measure had little impact on mean job performance. Additional empirical 
research suggests that there are minimal differences, if at all, in the criterion-
related validity of personality measures when removing high scorers on a SD 
scale (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2005). Direct tests of SDR moderating the 
criterion-related validity of personality assessments are inconsistent. Hough et al. 
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(1990) concluded that criterion-related validity did not substantially change at 
high levels of SDR, but White, Young, and Rumsey (2001) used the same 
personality inventory to find support for moderation. White et al. found that 
criterion-related validity was consistently lower in the high SDR group as 
opposed to both the moderate and low SDR group. Other support for moderation 
is found in predicting self-other congruence as the criterion (Borkenau & 
Ostendorf, 1992; Holden, 2007). A recent simulation tested the moderation 
hypothesis and failed to find a significant effect (Paunonen & LeBel, 2012).  
Overall, the effect of SDR on criterion-related validity varies from small 
to nonsignificant. This stands in contrasts to other interventions, such as warnings, 
that tend to demonstrate more positive findings with regards to criterion-related 
validity (e.g., Illingsworth, 2004; Robie et al., 2009). Perhaps the main reason 
removing high SDR test-takers fails to enhance criterion-related validity is 
because, while fakers tend to score at the extreme on scales of SDR, extreme 
scorers on SDR are not necessarily fakers (Holden, 2007). Warning statements 
avoid this problem by preemptively limiting test-taker intent to fake. Regardless 
of the theoretical processes, providing warning statements appear to be a more 
viable intervention for enhancing criterion-related validity than removing cases 
based on high SDR scores.  
SDR scores can also be used to correct an observed trait score, such that 
SDR is partialled out or corrected. This approach assumes that SD acts as a 
suppressor variable. A variable acts as a suppressor to the extent that it is related 
to the predictor variable yet unrelated to the outcome or criterion (Paulhus, 
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Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Thus, the variance attributable to the 
suppressor (in this case, SDR) acts as a contaminant and removing it makes the 
personality measure more efficient. To the extent that SDR acts as a suppressor, 
partialling out or correcting for it should remove construct-irrelevant variance and 
enhance the criterion-related validity (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). SDR scores 
are partialled out using either part correlation, multiple regression, or by using the 
residualized score from the trait-SDR correlation as the predictor (Reeder & 
Ryan, 2011). Using corrections in this way is a popular approach for addressing 
faking; over half of surveyed researchers supported the use of score corrections 
based on SD or other lie scales (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003).  
Both primary and meta-analytic research, however, suggest that correcting 
for SD scores does not meaningfully enhance criterion-related validity. Five 
Factor traits, particularly conscientiousness and emotional stability, can actually 
demonstrate higher criterion-related validity in unadjusted rather than adjusted 
conditions (Barrick & Mount, 1996; Christiansen et al., 1994). Multiple meta-
analytic studies found that criterion-related validities were roughly the same or 
decrease when partialling out SDR-related variance (Li & Bagger, 2006; Ones et 
al., 1996). One potential reason why this approach is not empirically supported is 
because SDR does not measure response distortion, but rather a predisposition to 
fake. Thus, because SDR measures a trait that is not entirely orthogonal to the 
criterion, the variance removed is construct-relevant and consequently lowers 
criterion-related validity. Just like with removing cases based on extreme SDR 
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scores, correcting scores based on SDR is expected to be less effective at 
enhancing criterion-related validity than providing warning statements.  
Summary and integration. The previous sections review the most 
common interventions for combating faking. Preventive interventions focus on 
limiting actual faking behavior, either through faking ability or intention. 
Remedial interventions allow faking behavior to occur and instead seek to alter 
the interpretation of the personality assessment data.  
It is evident through the review that preventive interventions are often 
more effective than remedial ones. Because remedial strategies fail to modify 
faking behavior, they are likely ineffective at addressing the faking problem. 
Remedial interventions are also limited because they operate on the assumption 
that faking behavior can be directly measured. Although faking is a measurement 
issue, it is unlikely that a self-report scale will sufficiently help with scale 
criterion-related validity. Preventive interventions are instead more focused on 
modifying a specific antecedent of behavior that will in turn limit the prevalence 
or effect of faking. The effectiveness of preventive measures over remedial ones 
is supported by the extant literature reviewed above (e.g., Dwight & Donovan, 
2003; Jackson et al., 2000; Li & Bagger, 2006; McFarland et al., 2003; Ones et 
al., 1996; Robie et al., 2010).  
It is also important to compare the efficacy of the different preventive 
interventions. Limiting faking intention (i.e., warnings) assume that the warnings 
are equally received by all test-takers. Additionally, warnings may be problematic 
because they insinuate that the assessment administrator has a direct measure of 
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faking. The above review of remedial interventions suggests that this claim is 
tenuous at best. Despite the problems, warnings are typically a useful tool to limit 
faking. Alternatively, modifying faking ability directly addresses aspects of the 
assessment that are more easily faked. Forced choice formats in particular make it 
impossible to endorse every positive item on the assessment. However, time 
limits have limited support in the literature. Very few studies directly compare 
intervention strategies. Converse et al. (2008) utilized a 2 (forced choice vs. 
Likert) x 2 (warning vs. no warning) design but did not find clear differences 
across conditions. Other studies similarly find inconsistent results with direct 
comparisons of the interventions (e.g., Day, 2008; Ramakrishnan, 2005; 
Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). At this point, solid conclusions have yet to be reached 
on the most preferable preventive intervention.  
Rationale 
 This research investigates the effectiveness of interventions for addressing 
faking on personality assessments. Given that the preponderance of assessment 
data is collected by way of self-report, individuals have the opportunity to present 
themselves in a positive light with little chance of being caught. Thus, job 
applicants can be expected to positively distort their responses to the extent that 
they believe this behavior will result in obtaining a valued outcome, such as a job 
offer. Prevalence estimates vary, but studies tend to suggest that around 30% of 
applicants can be classified as fakers (Griffith & Converse, 2011).  
The number of potential fakers is quite alarming given that organizations 
utilize personality assessments under the assumption that they are tapping into 
job-relevant traits. However, research suggests that faking can influence mean 
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trait scores (Converse et al., 2008), the rank-order of applicants (Rosse et al., 
2008), and even the criterion-related validity of the test scores (Mueller-Hanson et 
al., 2003). The utility of the selection system is critically undermined to the extent 
that any or all of these factors are altered. This causes organizations to look for 
ways to ameliorate such deleterious outcomes, and research evidence implicates 
some interventions that may be viable. This dissertation seeks to identify which 
interventions are most useful for addressing the problem of faking in order to 
guide organizational decision-making and organize the faking literature to reveal 
important avenues for future research.  
There are two main categories of interventions: preventive and remedial. 
The previous sections reviewed the extant literature on five specific interventions 
that fall into these two categories. Warning statements are theorized to influence 
behavior by affecting the intent to fake, while forced choice formats, time limits, 
and item transparency influence the test-taker’s ability to fake. These 
interventions can influence both mean test scores as well as the ability to make 
inferences from these scores. An administrator could also implement remedial 
interventions after the scores are collected, such as score corrections or case 
removal based on scores on a social desirability scale. The primary purpose of 
remedial interventions is to try and enhance the ability to make valid inferences 
from the test scores.  
Overall, there is far less empirical support for remedial approaches than 
for preventive ones. This is likely because remedial approaches fail to influence 
actual test-taker behavior. By not altering behavior during the assessment process, 
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remedial approaches are less desirable interventions than the preventive 
approaches. Preventive approaches, on the other hand, can influence test-taker 
behavior by targeting either their intent or ability to fake. Remedial approaches 
also depend on a direct measure of faking (i.e., a social desirability scale). These 
scales are more useful for measuring a predisposition to fake than actual faking 
behavior, and also tend to share meaningful variance with traits such as 
conscientiousness (Smith & McDaniel, 2011). Other methods for operationalizing 
faking, such as increased mean dimension scores on desirable traits, are more 
effective at capturing the behavior.  
This dissertation offers a unique contribution to the field by comparing 
different faking interventions. This helps to provide a more nuanced perspective 
on not only which interventions are effective at addressing faking, but which 
interventions are most effective. Considering the potential for significant 
organizational costs due to faking, this research has strong implications for 
practitioners. An organization may lose over $2,000 per worker per year by 
selecting a less optimal candidate as a result of faking (Komar et al, 2008). The 
results of this research can be used by practitioners and organizational leaders to 
better position themselves and their selection tests to minimize the impact of 
faking. This dissertation also informs faking research by highlighting which 
interventions are most effective at limiting faking, and can drive future research 
examining the underlying mechanisms of these interventions in greater detail. To 
this end, Figure 3 depicts where interventions fit into a framework of faking 
behavior based predominantly on TPB (Ajzen, 1998; McFarland, 2003).  
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The overriding objective of this study is to consolidate the growing 
literature on faking and provide summary statements about the effectiveness of 
different interventions for limiting the behavior. This study uses meta-analysis to 
“quantitatively aggregate the results of multiple primary studies” (Arthur, 
Bennett, & Huffcutt, 2001, p. 8). This methodology allows for testing 
relationships outside of the scope of primary studies, such as comparing the 
efficacy of different interventions, and moderators such as study design (i.e., 
within vs. between subjects).  
Statement of Hypotheses 
Effect Size Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: Effect sizes for FFM trait scores between honest and faked 
conditions will be smaller for studies that issue a warning than studies that have 
no intervention.  
Hypothesis II: Effect sizes for FFM trait scores between honest and faked 
conditions will be smaller for studies that use a forced-choice test as compared to 
those who use a single-stimulus (e.g., Likert) test. 
Hypothesis III: Effect sizes for FFM trait scores between honest and faked 
conditions will be smaller for studies that use less transparent items as compared 
to those that use more transparent items. 
Hypothesis IV: Effect sizes for FFM trait scores between honest and faked 
conditions will be larger for studies that use a time limit intervention compared to 
A) warnings, B) Forced-Choice measures, and C) less transparent items.  
Hypothesis V: Effect sizes for FFM trait scores between honest and faked 
conditions will be smaller for preventive interventions focused on intent (i.e., 
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warnings) than preventive interventions focused on ability (i.e., forced choice, 
item transparency, time limits).  
Criterion-Related Validity Hypotheses 
Hypothesis VI: The criterion-related validity for personality scores will be higher 
when test-takers are given a warning compared to A) correcting personality scores 
for social desirability or B) removing scores based on high scores to a social 
desirability scale. 
Hypothesis VII: The criterion-related validity for personality scores will be higher 
when test-takers are given a forced choice scale compared to A) correcting 
personality scores for social desirability or B) removing scores based on high 
scores to a social desirability scale. 
Hypothesis VIII: The criterion-related validity for personality scores will be 
higher when test-takers are given less transparent items compared to A) correcting 
personality scores for social desirability or B) removing scores based on high 
scores to a social desirability scale.  
Method 
 Two separate meta-analyses were conducted for the two types of effect 
sizes, namely standardized mean differences (d’s) and correlations (r’s). A meta-
analysis of ds was conducted to test the extent to which a faking intervention 
limited the increase of mean personality scores between honest and faked 
conditions. A meta-analysis of r’s was conducted to test the extent to which the 
criterion-related validity of personality test scores changed based on the presence 
of a faking intervention. This chapter describes the search strategy, inclusion 
criteria, coding of the variables, and analytical strategy.  
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Search Strategy 
The following databases were searched to identify articles related to 
faking and personality: PsycINFO, PsycArticles, Business Source Complete, 
Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Google Scholar, and ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses Full Text. Databases were searched including the years 
1950 to June 2013, with the exception of the SSCI that only includes 1985 to 
present. The following search terms were used: “faking,” “personality,” “response 
distortion,” “fake good,” “impression management,” “social desirability,” “self-
presentation,”  “intentional distortion,” “warnings,” “instructions,” “forced-
choice,” “ipsative,” “response latency,” “response time,” “item placement,” “lie 
scale,” and “bogus items”. All of the searches included at least the terms 
“personality” and a combination of “faking or response distortion or self-
presentation or intentional distortion.” This search combination provided many of 
the articles that did not use any intervention. Subsequent inclusions of “warnings” 
or “instructions” in the next search provided many of the warning intervention 
studies. This pattern was followed for each of the hypothesized interventions. The 
same pattern was followed in each of the six databases. Because most research on 
faking and personality did not begin until after 1950, databases were not searched 
prior to 1950. During the initial article consolidation, articles were screened on 
the surface level for two factors: empiricism and adequacy of sample. For the first 
factor, book chapters, summaries, or other theoretical pieces that did not include 
necessary meta-analytic information upon initial inspection were excluded. If the 
source provided any tabular representation of data, it was retained for possible 
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inclusion. For the second factor, any articles that were expressly done in a clinical 
setting based on the title or abstract were excluded from the initial list. No other 
review for inclusion criteria (discussed below) were performed during the initial 
search.  The search identified 311 potential sources. 
Next, key journals between January 2008 and December 2012 were 
electronically searched via PsycInfo or through the journal’s website to assess 
whether the keywords failed to identify any relevant articles. I chose these years 
in order to focus on these recently published articles because they may have been 
in press in other reference lists or searches. The journals searched were those 
likely to include research on faking: Academy of Management Journal, Academy 
of Management Review, Human Performance, International Journal of Selection 
and Assessment, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Business and 
Psychology, Journal of Management, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Journal of Vocational Behavior, Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, and Personnel Psychology. No additional articles 
were identified through the manual search.  
Searches for unpublished research were performed via two sources: online 
conference programs and internet searches of departmental websites for faculty 
and universities that regularly conduct faking research. Conference programs 
were searched for papers presented within the last five years (2008 to 2013) at the 
annual conferences of the Society of Industrial and Organizational Psychology 
(SIOP), International Personnel Assessment Council (IPAC), and Academy of 
Management (AOM). Digital programs were searched using the aforementioned 
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keywords. Each unpublished work was cross-referenced with the existing list of 
published or in-press articles to ensure that it had not been published since its 
presentation date. A total of 49 unpublished sources were identified for potential 
inclusion in the meta-analysis. Of these, copies of 11 articles could not be located 
through online searches (e.g., through departmental or faculty websites). Authors 
were contacted to request a copy of the paper if the article could not be found. 
Five of these articles were provided from the authors, while 6 articles were unable 
to be obtained. The searches of unpublished research resulted in an additional 43 
sources for possible inclusion.  
Finally, I searched the reference lists of existing meta-analyses and 
literature reviews on faking and personality (i.e., Birkeland et al., 2006; Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003; Jenson & Sackett, 2012; Li & Bragger, 2006; Ones et al., 1993; 
Stanush, 1997; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). This search identified 17 additional 
sources for potential inclusion. The majority of these were older conference 
presentations and unpublished technical reports. University libraries and other 
sources were used to obtain copies of the additional sources, and primary authors 
were again contacted if the article could not be obtained. Only 4 of these articles 
or reports were located and added to the list of eligible studies.  
In total, the above search strategy identified 358 potential sources for 
inclusion in the meta-analysis. This included potential studies for both the meta-
analysis of effect sizes (i.e., the d dataset) and the meta-analysis of correlations 
(i.e., the r dataset). The next step was to identify the relevance of the articles for 
the present analyses as outlined below.  
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Inclusion Criteria 
In order to be included, a study had to (a) use a normal adult population 
(i.e., non-institutional, at least 18 years old), (b) employ a personality scale that 
measured at least one trait in the FFM, (c) provide an effect size or the data 
necessary to compute one, and (d) compare an honest to faked condition in the d 
dataset. More detail is provided on the inclusion criteria in the remainder of this 
section.  
Participants. Because this dissertation is focused on the applicability of 
faking to personnel selection, studies were included only if the participants were 
from an adult population or were comparable to a working population. Thus, 
college samples were included but any samples from grade school or high school 
were excluded. Studies with participants from clinical settings were also 
excluded; for example, if they focused on the use of the personality assessment 
for diagnosing pathological disorders. Because measures such as the MMPI can 
be used in both clinical and personnel selection settings, the participants were the 
primary factor in determining a study’s eligibility rather than the measure used. 
Five-Factor Model personality scale. Each study included in the meta-
analysis was required to examine faking in regards to at least one Five-Factor 
Model (FFM) traits. In other words, measures developed around the FFM or Big 5 
a priori (e.g., NEO Five Factor Inventory, International Personality Item Pool, 
Big Five Inventory, and Hogan Personality Inventory) met this criteria. Measures 
that assessed personality outside of the FFM were included as well, provided the 
measure could be converted to the FFM using the taxonomy provided by Hough 
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and Ones (2002), Birkeland et al. (2006), or other research provided on the scale. 
The test dimension to construct mapping can be found in Appendix A. Whether 
factors on the scale were aligned with the FFM a priori and post hoc was coded as 
a potential moderator. Measures that could not be mapped onto a FFM trait were 
excluded from the analyses. 
Effect size data. A primary study was included in the meta-analyses if it 
provided an effect size estimate of the amount of faking between honest and faked 
conditions, or sufficient information to calculate an effect size according to 
standard practice (e.g., Arthur, Bennett, & Huffcuttt, 2001; Morris & Deshon, 
2002). Acceptable reported statistics include t-statistics, F-statistics, or means, 
standard deviations, and sample sizes. Effect size calculations and conversions are 
discussed in the Results section.  
Comparing honest to faked conditions. To be included in the d dataset 
(i.e., the data measuring mean differences between faking and honest conditions), 
a primary study had to compare participant scores in honest and faked conditions. 
Both laboratory experiments (instructionally-induced faking) and applied 
organizational studies (comparing applicants to incumbents) were included. The 
comparison of an honest to faked condition was not necessary for the r dataset 
(i.e., the hypotheses assessing criterion-related validity). To be included in the r 
dataset, a study had to both (a) include a faking intervention and (b) have a faking 
condition (either instructionally-induced or naturally-occurring). The r analysis 
was focused on the ability to make valid inferences from test scores under 
applicant or simulated applicant conditions in the presence of an intervention. As 
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such, these hypotheses were not focused on the existence of faking (i.e., shift in 
mean scores from honest to faked conditions), but rather how motivated/faked 
scores could be used to predict organizational criteria. 
The exclusion of fake bad studies. This meta-analysis is focused on the 
use of personality assessments for employee selection, and thus is chiefly 
concerned with positive self-representation. For this reason, “fake bad” studies 
where participants are instructed to represent themselves in a negative light were 
excluded from the analysis. 
Results of Inclusion Criteria 
 Of the 358 sources identified through the search processes, 210 sources 
met the inclusion criteria for the d dataset, and 35 met the criteria for the r dataset. 
Most studies were excluded because they did not include an honest and control 
condition that could be compared. For example, some articles only compared test-
takers who received a time limit to those who did not receive a time limit. 
Another reason for exclusion was a lack of sufficient information to calculate an 
effect size. Whenever possible, the author(s) were contacted to obtain more 
information. The 245 retained studies included a total of 1870 effect sizes in the d 
dataset and 179 correlations in the r dataset. 
All effect sizes were mapped onto one of the broad Five Factor Model 
(FFM) traits. Some traits, such as self-monitoring or goal orientation, lacked 
sufficient conceptual or empirical overlap with a single trait in the FFM. 
Excluding these effect sizes provided a total of 1676 effect sizes distributed across 
the five personality traits in 210 studies in the d dataset, and 223 effect sizes 
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across 33 sources for the r dataset. Multiple measures of the same trait within a 
study were also collapsed into a single estimate by taking the sample-weighted 
average of the effect size. For instance, a study may have examined multiple 
facets of conscientiousness. Because all analyses were done at the broad trait-
level, these estimates could not be considered to be independent. This further 
reduced the dataset to 725 effect sizes from 210 sources in the d dataset and 86 
effect sizes from 33 sources for the r dataset. 
Finally, the effect sizes (both d and r) had to be inspected for 
independence prior to testing specific hypotheses. Consistent with best practice 
(Arthur et al., 2002), effect sizes were considered independent if different 
participants contributed to the effect or if the same participants contributed to 
effects that represented distinct constructs. Therefore, effect sizes for different 
traits were considered independent even if they were collected on the same group 
of participants. Some sources in the d dataset (k = 17, 8%) reported effect sizes 
comparing the same honest condition (i.e., control) to different faking (i.e., 
experimental) conditions. For example, some studies compared an honest 
condition to a faked condition with a) no intervention or b) with a warning. In 
these cases, the effect sizes were considered independent as a function of the level 
of the moderator analysis. Effect sizes were collapsed across interventions for 
overall estimates such that a sample would only contribute once to the specific 
analysis. Dependent effect sizes were combined and represented in the 
independent dataset by a sample-weighted average of the effect size.  
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After all of the above steps, a total of 610 independent effect sizes from 
210 sources were available in the d dataset, while the r dataset included 79 
independent effect sizes (r’s) across 33 sources. 
Coding Empirical Study Characteristics 
A codebook was developed and can be found in Appendix B. A variety of 
characteristics needed to be accounted for in the proposed study based on the 
extant literature (e.g., Hooper, 2007; Ones et al., 1996; Viswesvaran & Ones, 
1999). In addition to the hypothesized moderators (i.e., faking interventions), 
several other moderators were coded in the meta-analysis. Moderators are 
discussed in the following section.  
Faking intervention. The purpose of this meta-analysis is to study the 
effectiveness of various interventions for a) curbing the response inflation or 
faking and b) enhancing the ability to make valid inferences from test scores. 
Thus, the most important piece of this meta-analysis was to appropriately code 
effect sizes within each intervention. If a study did not meet any of the criteria for 
the 5 interventions discussed below, it was coded as “no intervention.” For 
preventive interventions, the difference between honest and faked mean scores 
was used to calculate the effect size for faking in the d dataset, and the correlation 
of a personality score with a criterion in a motivated condition (either 
instructionally-induced or naturally-occurring) was used in the r dataset. 
Remedial interventions were only applicable to the r dataset due to the study’s 
hypotheses. In the d dataset, most effect sizes (517) were available for the studies 
with no intervention.  
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Preventive interventions – warnings. Studies were coded as either 
including a warning or no (code of “1” or “0”). Warning “type” coding followed 
Pace and Borman’s (2006) five category taxonomy: detection, consequential, 
appeal to reason, educational, and appeal to moral principles. Detection warnings 
only stated that “faking can be detected,” while consequential warnings offered 
more of a threat (e.g., “Your application will be removed from the pool”). 
Appealing to reason warnings argued that responding honestly is more 
appropriate (e.g., “more accurately portray your personality”) while appealing to 
moral principles stated that faking is wrong (e.g., “as a moral person, it is wrong 
to distort your responses”). Finally, educational warnings provided the 
perspective of the test user or administrator (e.g., “We will not be able to evaluate 
your responses”). Based on the inclusion criteria, 97 effect sizes were included for 
warnings in the d dataset and 16 effect sizes were included in the r dataset.  
Preventive interventions - forced-choice. Forced choice (FC) scales 
were reviewed to differentiate partially ipsative from fully ipsative measures, in 
accordance with recent reviews highlighting the theoretical and practical 
differences between the scales (Dilchert & Ones, 2011; Meade, 2004). Coders 
identified the measure as partially ipsative if it satisfied any of the seven listed 
characteristics provided by Hicks (1970):  
 Respondents only partially order item alternatives, rather than ordering 
them completely 
 Scales have differing number of items 
 Not all alternatives ranked by respondents are scored 
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 Scales are scored differently for respondents with different characteristics, 
or are referred to different normative transformations on the basis of 
respondent characteristics 
 Scored alternatives are differentially weighted 
 One or more of the scales from the ipsative predictor set is deleted when 
data are analyzed 
 The test contains normative sections 
In most cases, however, the primary article did not provide sufficient information 
to make a determination on the seven factors from Hicks (1970). No further 
moderator analyses were done on level of ipsativity due to lack of available data. 
Within the FC intervention, 91 effect sizes were included in the d dataset and 12 
were included in the r dataset.  
Preventive interventions – time limits. Coders identified the existence of 
a time limit on a measure. If any time limit was reported in the article, it was 
recorded by the coders. Because time limits are not typically imposed on 
personality test, the primary article did not have to categorize the test as a speeded 
test versus a power test. Any report of time limit met the criteria for a time limit 
intervention. A dichotomous variable (i.e., “timed” or “not timed”) was the 
primary code for the time limit intervention. To the extent that the information 
was provided, a continuous time limit was also coded. Because the time limit 
depends in part on scale length, the ratio of time limit to number of items was 
coded. Only three studies and 15 effect sizes that used a time limit intervention 
were eligible for this meta-analysis (in the d dataset).  
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Preventive interventions - item transparency. Item transparency can 
exist in multiple forms. Measures are less transparent with randomized item sets 
than blocked item sets because the underlying traits are not as easily identified 
(McFarland et al., 2002). Item content can also be modified to make them less 
transparent, often done through the use of empirical-keying. Finally, using 
contextualized items focuses the test-taker on the desired context (e.g., “at work”) 
rather than a more general, ambiguous context. These three approaches to limiting 
item transparency were theorized to influence faking behavior in a similar manner 
based on the working model of faking (see Figure 3). Thus, item transparency was 
coded if the study employed either approach. Coders identified whether (a) item 
randomization, (b) subtle item content, or (c) contextualized items were 
implemented. Item randomization was operationalized by the primary author 
specifically mentioning that items on the measure were randomized. Subtle item 
content was operationalized by the use of empirical/criterion keyed tests that 
make the measured construct less verifiable. Additionally, the California 
Personality Inventory (CPI) satisfied the subtle item intervention because the test 
was developed with the purpose of including more subtle items (Dilchert & Ones, 
2012). Finally, contextualized items were operationalized by an explicit statement 
of an “at work” frame of reference in the personality measure. For any of the 
above three options, the study was included in the meta-analysis as “no 
intervention” if there was no specific reference to any of these three types of item 
transparency intervention. A total of 79 effect sizes were included in the d dataset 
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within one of the three item transparency interventions. Only 9 effect sizes for 
item transparency were included in the r dataset. 
Remedial interventions – corrections. Corrections made to personality 
trait or scale scores are typically done through social desirability responding 
(SDR), unlikely virtues scales (UV), or other lie scales. The first coding category 
for the statistical corrections intervention identified which of these scales was 
used to correct the score. With regards to SDR, coders identified which of the two 
factors was measured (impression management and self-deception; Paulhus, 
1991). Next, the adjusted personality trait and criterion correlation with SD, UV, 
or the lie scale partialled out was recorded. If the study did not report the 
corrected relationship, the semi-partial correlation was obtained based on the 
correlation matrix reported in the article. This provided the relationship between 
the personality trait and the criterion with social desirability partialled out of the 
personality measure (cf. Ones et al., 1996). A total of 30 effect sizes were 
included for the score correction intervention in the r dataset.  
Remedial interventions - removal of cases. Similar to score corrections, 
test-taker removal as a remedial intervention often uses SDR scales to inform 
those decisions. If a study removed cases, the scale that was used to remove cases 
and the name of the SDR scale was coded if applicable. The correlation between 
the personality trait and the criterion in this “modified” sample was coded as the 
effect size for studies that used this intervention. Only 12 effect sizes were 
available for case removal intervention in the r dataset.  
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Study characteristic - study setting. Many researchers maintain 
laboratory settings fail to fully replicate the conditions and incentives of employee 
selection (e.g., Dilchert & Ones, 2011; MacCann et al., 2011). Thus, study setting 
was included to identify whether systematic faking differences were observed in 
both settings. Studies were coded as either: (a) field, or (b) laboratory setting. 
Studies were coded as (b) lab if a student sample was used, even if students were 
instructed to fake “as if they were an applicant.” 
Study characteristic - study design. Most researchers argue that within-
subject designs are more appropriate for testing faking because they do not rely 
on nonequivalent comparison groups, namely applicants and incumbents (Griffith 
& McDaniel, 2006). However, practical issues often necessitate the use of 
between-subject designs. Past meta-analytic findings (e.g., Birkeland et al., 2006; 
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1996) suggest that within-subject designs show stronger 
effect sizes for faking, but no research has looked at the efficacy of faking 
interventions across different study designs.  
Study design was coded as (a) between-subjects or (b) within-subjects 
design. Additional categorizations were made for the latter to control for the order 
of faking versus honest responding. Three possible orders were coded: (a) honest 
conditions followed by faking, (b) faking followed by honest condition, or (c) a 
counterbalanced design. The time lag for within-subject designs was also coded in 
terms of number of days between the first and second administration.  
Study characteristic - type of faking. Instructionally-induced faking sets 
the upper limit on the extent to which personality trait scores can be changed or 
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faked (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1996). Instructionally induced faking also rests on 
the strong assumption that all participants hear the instructions in the same way 
and that the instruction is sufficient for replicating an application scenario 
(Holden & Book, 2011). Thus, this study sought to identify if the effectiveness of 
faking interventions differed across levels of faking fidelity (i.e., instructional vs. 
natural faking), and faking was coded as either: (a) naturally occurring or (b) 
instructionally induced.  
To be coded as naturally occurring, faking had to be done without any 
instructions to fake. For example, test-takers taking a personality test as part of a 
job application were considered “naturally” motivated. Alternatively, the 
instructionally induced code was assigned to any study where test-takers’ 
responses are altered by the instructions from the assessment administrator or 
researcher. The more contextualized instructions of “responding as an applicant” 
may more realistically simulate the application scenario, and give test-takers a 
clearer frame of reference for their responses. Thus, whether test-takers were 
instructed to: (a) present themselves in a positive light without any context 
provided (e.g., Gibby, 2004), or (b) instructed to respond as if they were an 
applicant (e.g., Robson et al., 2008) was coded.  
 Following the work of Hooper (2007), an additional distinction was coded 
within the latter category of “responding as an applicant.” Job relevance can 
influence faking behavior, consistent with previous research within the context of 
job valence (e.g., Day, 2008). It follows that the extent of faking behavior may 
depend in part upon how relevant the job is to the individual applicant. Thus, the 
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specificity of the job context was coded as either: (a) unspecified or (b) specified. 
Studies were coded as “unspecified job position” if they simply stated to respond 
as an applicant, while “specified job positions” included those in which test-takers 
were given a job description or other job content as a referent (Wolford, 2009).  
Study characteristic – criterion. For the criterion-related validity portion 
of the study (i.e., the r dataset), different types of criteria were distinguished. 
Following the work of Ones et al. (1996), coders identified the type of criterion 
reported within the following categories: (a) school success, (b) task performance, 
(c) counterproductive or organizational citizenship behaviors, (d) training 
performance or (e) job performance.  
School success was operationalized as any measure of performance in an 
academic setting. In this meta-analysis, the following were included in this 
category: ACT score, grade point average, and grades in an academic course. Job 
performance was most frequently measured by a performance review from a 
supervisor, where the reference is how the test-taker performed in the context of a 
work environment. This was frequently done for administrative purposes (i.e., as 
part of the normal performance review process), but some studies used the 
performance review for research purposes only. Studies in the latter were most 
frequently lab studies that sent performance reviews to a test-taker’s supervisor. 
Job performance was differentiated form task performance in that the latter 
involved things that may be done on a job but the study was not in an existing 
work environment during the typical workday. For example, in one study task 
performance was measured observer ratings of performance on a task that, while 
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similar to clerical jobs, was done in the lab for research purposes only (Mueller-
Hanson et al., 2003). Behavior on the job was most frequently measured through a 
counterproductive work behavior (CWB) scale, although it was also collected by 
self-reported and/or administratively recorded absence or lateness. Finally, 
training performance was less frequently observed but involved performance in a 
training-specific context. For example, this was observed for performance in a 
military training exercise (Fox & Dinur, 1988). This information on defining the 
criteria can also be found in Appendix A.  
Coding the Articles 
The dissertation author and one doctoral student in I/O Psychology coded 
the identified articles. The author trained the second coder on the codebook and 
provided a coding guidelines sheet (see Appendix A) to assist with making 
decisions during the coding process. After training, three articles were chosen at 
random, and both coders coded the three articles independently. The two coders 
met to identify the source of any discrepancies before moving forward. After 
coding an initial common set of three sources, each coder independently coded a 
common set of 10 articles. The 10 articles included at least one example from 
each faking intervention. A Kappa (К, Cohen, 1960) index was computed to 
examine the agreement between the two raters. Agreement across study 
characteristics was .96 and agreement across the 93 effect sizes was .94 for these 
10 studies. For study characteristics, coding discrepancies were often slight. For 
instance, a different total number of items were used to calculate the ratio of 
seconds to items. Disparities in effect size calculations were mostly attributable to 
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transcription error in the honest versus control condition. Because the agreement 
exceeded typical standards (Landis & Koch, 1977), the remaining articles were 
coded independently. 
After aggregating all effect sizes to be analyzed in the study, effect sizes 
for neuroticism were reversed so that the direction of the effect size would be in 
the same direction as the other traits. Positive effect sizes reflected higher scores 
in the faked condition than the honest condition.  
Analytical Strategy 
Meta-analyses typically correct for unreliability in the predictor and/or the 
criterion. Because the analyses are focused on the “operational use of personality 
inventories” (Ones et al., 1996, p. 201), no corrections were made for unreliability 
in the predictor (i.e., personality measure). However, to provide the operational 
validity estimate, corrections were made for unreliability in the outcome (i.e., 
criterion) in the r analyses. Only about 25% (k = 8) of studies reported criterion-
related validity, and this was most often internal consistency measured by 
coefficient alpha. Due to restricted variability across criterion types, the average 
criterion-related validity was estimated for each of the moderator x trait analyses, 
and this estimate was used to correct the observed r coefficient. Both the r and d 
datasets computed sample-weighted statistics to correct for sampling error and 
corrected for the attenuating effect of unequal or unbalanced sample sizes. The 
latter correction was especially appropriate for some studies that had significantly 
different sample sizes across applicant and incumbent samples. The formulas 
followed those offered by Hunter and Schmidt (2004). 
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Credibility intervals were used to estimate the variability of the effect 
sizes in the meta-analytic sample. If the credibility interval is relatively large, then 
it is likely that moderators may be present. If the credibility is relatively small, 
then it is likely that moderators are not in operation. The width of a credibility 
interval was used as one indicator of the presence of moderator, along with the 
percent of variance explained.  
Confidence intervals were used to estimate the accuracy of the effect size 
estimate, and these were used to test many of the hypotheses related to the d 
dataset. The confidence interval provides a range within which the mean effect 
size would likely fall if other studies were selected from the population (Arthur et 
al., 2002). To this end, the extent that the confidence interval bands around a 
given effect overlapped with the confidence interval band around a compared 
effect was used as a primary indicator of a significant difference. If the 95% 
confidence intervals around the estimates had zero overlap, they were considered 
significantly different. However, the inverse is not necessarily true; namely, 
estimates that have overlapping confidence intervals can still be significantly 
different from each other (cf. Cumming, 2009; Cumming & Finch, 2005). The 
“proportion overlap” (POL) was used to further test the effect size estimates that 
had overlapping confidence intervals. The POL was calculated by first taking the 
average distance between the two independent estimates and their respective CI95. 
Take the following as an example as Step 1: 
SWMD(1)= 0.79, CI95 = 0.72 to 0.86. (0.79 – 0.72 = 0.07) 
SWMD(2) = 0.57, CI95 = 0.41 to 0.74 (0.74 – 0.57 =  0.16) 
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The average of these two = (0.07+0.16)/2 = 0.12. The next step was to take the 
distance between the overlapping confidence intervals. In this case, the lower-
bound CI95 of the larger estimate is subtracted from the upper-bound CI95 of the 
smaller SWMD estimate. In the example, this would mean Step 2 is: 
 0.74 – 0.72 = 0.02 
Finally, to obtain the POL value, the distance between the two intervals obtained 
in Step 2 is divided by the average width of the intervals obtained in Step 1.  
 0.02/0.12 = 0.17 = 17% POL 
In line with previous research, independent estimates were considered 
significantly different if the obtained POL value was 50% or smaller (Cumming 
& Finch, 2005). Based on direction of the hypotheses, this ostensibly meant that 
less than 50% of the difference between the estimate and the lower-bound 
confidence interval for studies without an intervention could overlap with the 
upper-bound confidence interval for studies with an intervention.  
 This approach to determining the significance between two estimates has 
the potential for producing confusing values. For instance, if two estimates do not 
overlap at all, and thus the value obtained in Step 2 is negative, the resulting POL 
value will be negative. Similarly, if all of one estimate is completely subsumed by 
another, the resulting POL estimate will be greater than 100%. In both cases, the 
interpretation is more clearly represented by replacing a negative value with 0% 
and a value over 100% with 100%.  In the former, a negative POL simply means 
that there is no overlap between the two estimates, and this meaning is not altered 
by replacing a negative value with 0%. In the latter, a value greater than 100% 
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means that there is complete overlap between the estimates, and showing a 
maximum of 100% does not change this interpretation. This is similar to common 
approaches in meta-analysis for reporting percentage of variance attributable to 
sampling error, as values greater than 100% are replaced with 100%.  
Finally, it is important to consider when, or if, it is appropriate to combine 
effect sizes gathered from different study designs. Between- and within-subject 
effect sizes can be combined into the same meta-analytic estimate only if the 
study design moderator analysis is not significant (Morris & Deshon, 2002). If the 
moderator analysis is significant, the study design has a meaningful impact on the 
effect size in addition to the faking intervention in question. In such cases, a 
combined effect size estimate may not be appropriate. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that this is especially relevant to faking meta-analyses, as 
standardized mean differences between honest and faked conditions may differ 
substantially across study design (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). In cases where 
study design appears as a meaningful moderator, the meta-analytic results will be 
presented separately for each study design. 
 Within the analyses, a positive d suggested that the experimental (i.e., 
faking) condition scored higher than the control (i.e., honest condition) condition, 
while a negative d suggested the control condition scored higher. Similarly, a 
positive r indicated a positive relationship between the personality score and 
criterion of interest. Cohen’s (1992) guidelines of small (.20, .10), medium (.50, 
.30), and large (.80, .50) effect sizes were used for the d and r effect sizes, 
respectively.  
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Results 
Description of the Database  
As mentioned previously, two distinct datasets were used for the current 
meta-analysis: one that examined the standardized mean difference between an 
honest and faked condition (meta-analysis of d’s), and another that examined the 
criterion-related validity of personality test scores (meta-analysis of r’s).  
In the d dataset, conscientiousness was the most included effect size, 
comprising just over 25% of the included effect sizes across 162 studies. Across 
all of the traits, a majority of the effect sizes were obtained from studies using lab 
settings (k = 171, 81%) and student samples (k = 164, 78%), as opposed to field 
settings (k = 39, 19%) or non-student samples (k = 46, 22%). Because most of the 
studies measured faking in lab settings, the majority of studies manipulated faking 
via instructionally-induced faking. Just under half of all effect sizes represented (k 
= 101, 48%) faking with specific information provided about what the test-taker 
was faking to achieve. The context of this information ranged from a variety of 
positions including, but not limited to, customer service (k = 25, 12%), 
managerial (k = 17, 8%), police or military (k = 18, 9%), and sales (k = 12, 6%). 
Most of the eligible effect sizes used between-subjects designs (k = 119, 57%), 
while the majority of within-subjects designs presented the honest test-taking 
condition before faking (k = 45, 21%). The sample was generally a young 
working age (Mage = 23.16, SD = 4.87), although not all studies (k = 116) 
presented age data. This is consistent with the preponderance of lab-based, 
student sample studies included in the data set. Forced choice and warning 
interventions contributed the most effect sizes to the dataset (k = 30, 14%; k = 23, 
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11%, respectively). However, the majority of the effect sizes included in the data 
set were associated with a study that did not use any intervention to address 
faking (k = 135, 64 %).  
In the r dataset, conscientiousness was also the most included effect size 
(k = 31), comprising over 40% of the independent effect sizes. Job performance 
was the most frequently cited criterion (k = 13, 38%). Most (k = 11) of these 
studies measured job performance by supervisor or 360 ratings, while the 
remaining two studies operationalized job performance by a self-report measure. 
Most (k = 6) of the supervisor and 360 ratings were for collected as part of formal, 
administrative processes, with the remaining (k = 5) collected for research 
purposes only. The second largest criteria group for the r dataset was academic 
performance (k = 10, 29%). Most of the academic criteria were measured using 
grade point average (k = 7), while the remaining were a measured by ACT scores 
and class grades. In cases when the expected relationship was negative (e.g., 
conscientiousness with turnover or counter-productive work behaviors), the 
direction of the correlation was reversed to facilitate aggregation. Across all of the 
traits, a majority of the effect sizes were obtained from studies using lab settings 
(k = 21, 62%) and student samples (k = 20, 59%), as opposed to field settings (k = 
13, 38%) or non-student samples (k = 14, 41%). Because most of the studies 
measured faking in the lab, the majority measured faking via instructionally-
induced faking. Of the entire sample of articles, just under half (k = 15, 44%) 
measured faking with specific information provided about what the test-taker was 
faking to achieve. Most of the eligible effect sizes used between-subjects designs 
  79   
(k = 19, 56%). The sample was generally a young working age (Mage = 24.96, SD 
= 4.52), although not all studies presented age data. This is consistent with the 
preponderance of lab-based, student sample studies included in the data set. 
Correction for social desirability was the most frequent intervention (k = 7, 21%).  
Preliminary analyses. Prior to testing the espoused hypotheses, the data 
on effect sizes (i.e., the d dataset) were analyzed to compare the included effect 
sizes to previous meta-analyses on faking. The purpose of this dissertation is not 
to test whether participants can fake on personality test, as this has been 
established by the extant literature. However, comparing the standardized mean 
difference between honest and faked conditions in the current meta-analytic 
sample to previous estimates provides an important context for testing the 
hypotheses. It also informs which study characteristic moderators are most 
relevant for further inquiry.  
Table 2 shows the standardized mean difference of personality trait scores 
between honest and motivated conditions across the FFM traits. This table reports 
effect sizes independent of the presence of an intervention, and compares the 
results from previous meta-analyses conducted by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999), 
Birkeland et al. (2006), and Hooper (2007). All three meta-analyses serve as 
useful contextual comparisons for the current analysis. Other than excluding 
forced-choice inventories, the inclusion criteria for Hooper (2007) are identical to 
the current meta-analysis. Birkeland et al. (2007) focused only on applied samples 
(e.g., applicant versus incumbents), which is why only the “field” settings in the 
current meta-analysis were compared. Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) also  
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Table 2  
Standardized mean difference of personality scores between honest and faked conditions compared to previous meta-analyses. 
      Current Meta   Vis. & Ones (1999)   Birk. et al. (2006)   Hooper (2007) 
Trait Setting Design k d   k d   k d   k d 
Extraversion Field  28 0.27  - -  29 0.11  26 0.42 
 Lab  165 0.47  - -  - -  99 0.63 
  Between 85 0.48  15 0.63  - -  - - 
  Within 80 0.45  10 0.54  - -  - - 
Agreeableness Field  25 0.21  - -  20 0.16  18 0.52 
 Lab  138 0.41  - -  - -  57 0.57 
  Between 68 0.41  17 0.48  - -  - - 
  Within 70 0.40  14 0.47  - -  - - 
Openness Field  20 0.15  - -  20 0.13  16 0.23 
 Lab  111 0.36  - -  - -  46 0.37 
  Between 62 0.36  11 0.65  - -  - - 
  Within 49 0.34  9 0.76  - -  - - 
Emotional Stability Field  24 0.61  - -  25 0.44  24 0.75 
 Lab  144 0.82  - -  - -  98 0.93 
  Between 88 0.85  17 0.64  - -  - - 
  Within 56 0.76  29 0.93  - -  - - 
Conscientiousness Field  38 0.42  - -  27 0.45  27 0.75 
 Lab  179 0.82  - -  - -  75 1.07 
  Between 93 0.87  29 0.6  - -  - - 
   Within 86 0.75   24 0.89  - -  - - 
Note: Effect sizes represent the sample-weighted mean d between trait scores in honest versus faked conditions. Higher, positive values of d represent higher mean scores  
in the faked condition than the honest condition. Vis. & Ones (1999) = Viswesvaran & Ones (1999). Birk. et al. (2006) = Birkeland et al. (2006).
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included fake-bad studies in their meta-analysis, but these effect sizes are not 
shown in Table 2. These previous meta-analyses computed the sample-weighted 
mean effect size after accounting for sampling error, and only Birkeland et al. 
(2006) also corrected for unreliability in the predictor. 
As Table 2 shows, effect sizes in previous meta-analyses varied significantly. 
Likewise, the estimates in the current meta-analysis vary slightly from those in 
previous research. Although they vary slightly, sample-weighted mean d’s 
(SWMD) of honest versus motivated/faked trait scores in the current meta-analysis 
tend to align with the extant literature. All four meta-analytic sources report 
consistently larger effect sizes in lab samples than field samples. The SWMD for 
conscientiousness in lab studies (k = 179, d = .821) is twice as large as the SWMD 
in field studies (k = 38, d = .417). The SWMD for field studies found in the 
current meta-analysis are more in line with those reported by Birkeland et al. 
(2006) than by Hooper (2007). For example, the SWMD for conscientiousness in 
the current meta-analysis (k = 38, d = .417) is smaller than results reported by 
Hooper (k = 27, d = .75), but closer to those reported by Birkeland and colleagues 
(k = 27, d = .45). 
The main inconsistency between the current meta-analysis and previous 
analyses is observed for study design. Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) found that 
SWMD estimates tended to be higher in within-subject designs than between 
subject designs. In other words, there was a larger shift in personality trait scores 
from honest to faked conditions for studies that used a within-subjects design 
versus a between-subjects design. The current meta-analysis, on the other hand, 
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found consistently larger effects in between-subject designs. For example, SWMD 
estimates in the current analysis are quite similar for emotional stability in 
between-subjects (k = 88, d = 0.85) and within-subjects (d = 56, k = 0.76). 
However, Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) show a large difference for effect sizes 
in between-subjects (k = 17, d = 0.64) and within-subject (k = 29, d = 0.93) 
designs. A large part of this difference is likely attributable to larger k sizes in the 
current meta-analysis 
Table 2 showed some discrepancies in the effect sizes across study design 
in the current meta-analysis compared to previous analyses on faking. Tests for 
statistical significance based on proportion overlap (POL) were not possible 
because the necessary information was not provided in the previous meta-
analysis. However, discrepancies can be observed in the table. For instance, 
Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) found a larger effect size for conscientiousness in 
within-subject designs compared to between-subject designs, while the current 
meta-analysis found the opposite. Therefore, study design (i.e., within-subject and 
between-subjects design) was inspected within each of the following hypotheses 
to try and gain more insight on this why this discrepancy was observed. It is 
important to note that the effect sizes (i.e., standardized mean difference of scores 
across honest and faked conditions) did not significantly differ across study 
design within the current meta-analysis. Therefore, the estimates could be 
meaningfully combined within the various analyses (Morris & Deshon, 2002). 
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Hypothesis I - Warnings 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that the SWMD for personality scores between 
honest and faked conditions would be smaller for studies with a warning 
compared to studies without an intervention. Table 3 shows general support for 
this hypothesis at a high-level across each of the FFM traits. SWMD estimates 
were consistently smaller for warnings compared to no intervention. 
Conscientiousness and emotional stability consistently showed the largest SWMD 
across warning and no intervention compared to other traits, suggesting more 
faking on these traits. The SWMD for agreeableness, extraversion, and openness 
for warning studies were not only smaller than studies without an intervention, 
but the confidence intervals did not overlap. For instance, the upper-bound 
confidence interval for the observed SWMD for agreeableness under a warned 
condition (k = 16, d = 0.20, CI95 = 0.11 - .28) did not include the observed SWMD 
for agreeableness with no intervention (k = 103, d = 0.40, CI95 = 0.32 - .50), which 
suggests that the difference in effect sizes in such cases is particularly meaningful. 
Even though the confidence intervals overlapped for emotional stability for 
warnings (k = 22, d = .57, CI95 = 0.41 – 0.74) and no intervention (k = 111, d = 
0.79, CI95 = 0.72 – 0.86), the overlap was not substantial. The proportion overlap 
(POL) was only 17% for the two estimates. Because this is less than 50%, it 
suggests that the difference in the estimates should be considered significant 
(Cumming & Finch, 2005). Conscientiousness showed the smallest difference 
between no intervention (k = 135, d = .62) and warning (k = 23, d = .59), and the 
confidence interval of the warning estimate included the estimate for no   
  84    
Table 3 
Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions for Warnings Versus No Intervention 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness            
 No Intervention 64,452 103 0.40 0.40 4% 0.32 0.48 0.12 1.06  
 Warning 1,853 16 0.20 0.17 55% 0.11 0.28 -0.21 0.79 0%* 
Conscientiousness            
 No Intervention 88,778 135 0.62 0.42 4% 0.55 0.69 0.08 1.15  
 Warning 3,330 23 0.59 0.37 18% 0.44 0.74 0.07 1.07 100% 
Emotional Stability            
 No Intervention 38,511 111 0.79 0.39 7% 0.72 0.86 -0.11 0.91  
 Warning 2,861 22 0.57 0.39 17% 0.41 0.74 -0.35 0.49 17%* 
Extraversion            
 No Intervention 62,167 122 0.42 0.34 6% 0.36 0.48 0.28 1.29  
 Warning 2,602 21 0.22 0.22 40% 0.12 0.31 -0.07 0.50 0%* 
Openness            
 No Intervention 26,921 81 0.29 0.39 7% 0.20 0.37 -0.02 0.42  
  Warning 1,717 15 0.07 0.33 25% -0.10 0.23 -0.02 0.85 24%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap.
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intervention (POL = 100%). Hypothesis 1 was therefore generally supported, with 
the exception of conscientiousness. 
The lower bound of the 80% credibility intervals did not always exclude 
zero. Credibility intervals for emotional stability (-0.11, -0.35) and openness (-
0.02, -0.02) included zero for both no intervention and warning conditions, 
respectively. Further, the credibility intervals were relatively large for the effect 
sizes without an intervention, suggesting that the magnitude of the effect sizes 
varies meaningfully across studies and that moderators may be present. Although 
the 80% credibility intervals were more modest for effect sizes with a warning, 
moderators were investigated within both.  
Study design as a moderator of the effect size between honest and 
faked scores with a warning intervention. Study design was the first moderator 
investigated, given the known differences observed in SWMDs of scores across 
honest and faked conditions in the current meta-analysis compared to previous 
studies (see Table 2). As seen in Table 4, SWMDs varied substantially across 
study design. The results for warnings across study design (Table 3) showed that 
the 95% confidence intervals did not overlap across warning and no intervention 
studies for agreeableness, extraversion, and openness, and had minimal overlap 
for emotional stability. However, the same observation was only observed in 
between-subjects designs for agreeableness and extraversion and within-subject 
designs for openness. In other words, the 95% confidence interval on the SWMD 
for extraversion in warned, between-subjects designs (k = 14, d = 0.14, CI95 = 
0.03 - .25) did not overlap with the same level of moderator observed for studies 
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with no intervention (k = 74, d = 0.41, CI95 = 0.33 - .48). Similar to the findings 
presented in Table 3, the confidence intervals for the emotional stability estimates 
had minimal overlap for both between (POL = 41%) and within-subject (POL = 
53%) designs. In general, the study design moderator did not illuminate any new 
findings with regards to the usefulness of warnings. The difference in effect sizes 
between warnings and no interventions observed within each trait remained 
relatively consistent. This moderator showed continued support for Hypothesis 1, 
although the differences were still not strong or significant for conscientiousness.  
Although not as illuminating for warning effectiveness, this moderator analysis 
yielded useful insights in regards to the previous meta-analysis comparisons 
observed in Table 2. The effect sizes of scores between honest and faked 
conditions across study design reported in Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) more 
closely match the effect sizes from studies without any intervention in the current 
meta-analysis. For example, between-subjects (k = 74, d = 0.77) and within-
subject (k = 37, d = 0.91) with no intervention present are much closer in 
magnitude to those reported in Viswesvaran and Ones for between-subjects (k = 
17, d = 0.64) and within-subject (k = 29, d = 0.93) designs. This suggests that, 
outside of the large difference in k sizes, at least part of the large differences 
observed in Table 2 may be attributable to the inclusion of effect sizes with a 
faking intervention (in this case, a warning). 
Type of warning as a moderator of the effect size between honest and 
faked scores. Recent theory suggests that more attention should be paid to the 
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Table 4 
Study Design as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
Between Warning and No Intervention 
Trait Intervention Study Design N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
80% 
Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness            
 No Intervention           
  Between 57,511 59 0.40 0.42 3% 0.29 0.5 -0.13 0.93  
  Within 6,941 44 0.40 0.24 32% 0.33 0.47 0.1 0.7  
 Warning            
  Between 1,311 11 0.12 0.14 65% 0.04 0.2 -0.05 0.29 0%* 
  Within 543 5 0.38 0.08 84% 0.31 0.46 0.27 0.49 100% 
Conscientiousness            
 No Intervention           
  Between 78,836 76 0.60 0.40 2% 0.51 0.69 0.09 1.12  
  Within 9,942 59 0.71 0.50 9% 0.58 0.84 0.07 1.36  
 Warning            
  Between 2,298 17 0.57 0.41 15% 0.37 0.77 0.04 1.1 100% 
  Within 1,032 6 0.64 0.23 31% 0.45 0.82 0.34 0.94 100% 
Emotional Stability            
 No Intervention           
  Between 33,790 74 0.77 0.37 6% 0.69 0.86 0.29 1.25  
  Within 4,721 37 0.91 0.50 12% 0.75 1.07 0.28 1.55  
 Warning            
  Between 1,830 16 0.53 0.44 16% 0.32 0.75 -0.04 1.1 41%* 
    Within 1,032 6 0.64 0.27 26% 0.42 0.85 0.3 0.98 53% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap.  
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Table 4 
 
Study Design as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
Between Warning and No Intervention (continued) 
 
Trait Intervention Study Design N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
80% 
Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion            
 No Intervention           
  Between 55,278 74 0.41 0.33 5% 0.33 0.48 -0.02 0.83  
  Within 6,889 48 0.49 0.38 17% 0.38 0.6 0 0.98  
 Warning            
  Between 1,547 14 0.14 0.20 47% 0.03 0.25 -0.12 0.4 0%* 
  Within 1,056 7 0.33 0.19 42% 0.19 0.48 0.08 0.58 79% 
Openness            
 No Intervention           
  Between 22,951 51 0.27 0.39 6% 0.16 0.38 -0.23 0.77  
  Within 3,970 30 0.41 0.36 20% 0.28 0.53 -0.05 0.86  
 Warning            
  Between 1,175 10 0.01 0.38 19% -0.23 0.24 -0.48 0.49 46%* 
    Within 543 5 0.20 0.06 90% 0.14 0.26 0.12 0.28 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap.
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text of the warning, and not just the presence versus absence of a warning (Pace & 
Borman, 2006). Most of the existing literature on warnings has focused on the 
latter. In other words, most empirical studies examine the extent of faking for 
participants who are given a warning versus those who are not. As mentioned 
earlier, the type of warning may play a role in the effectiveness of a warning 
statement. Some warnings simply alert the test-taker to the detection of faking 
(i.e., faked responses can be detected), others offer a consequence of faking (i.e., 
being removed from the applicant pool), while still others offer some educational 
warning (i.e., faking does not allow for accurate measurement). The taxonomy put 
forth by Pace and Borman (2006) also identified appeal to moral principles and 
appeal to reason as other warning types, but there were not sufficient empirical 
studies to be included in the current meta-analysis. Table 5 reports the results of 
the warning type moderator, and the analysis is limited to the trait-level due to the 
available study size.  
There are two main findings from this moderator analysis. First, with the 
exception of the detection warning for conscientiousness, all warning types across 
the FFM reported smaller SWMDs (i.e., smaller mean score differences between 
honest and faked conditions) than studies without any intervention. This suggests 
that warning types, with the exception of detection warning are generally effective 
at limiting response distortion. However, the 95% confidence intervals for 
warning effect size estimates tend to have significant overlap with those without 
any intervention (e.g., all POL > 100% for conscientiousness. The effect sizes for 
educational warning in emotional stability and extraversion represent an 
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Table 5 
Warning Type as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
Trait Warning Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness                    
 No Interv. 64,452 103 0.4 0.4 4% 0.32 0.48 0.12 1.06  
 Consequence 595 5 0.34 0.17 54% 0.19 0.49 0.12 0.56 100% 
 Detection 800 7 0.13 0 100% 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0%* 
 Educational 459 4 0.14 0.21 44% -0.07 0.35 -0.13 0.41 21%* 
Conscientiousness           
 No Interv. 88,778 135 0.62 0.42 4% 0.55 0.69 0.08 1.15  
 Consequence 1,528 7 0.54 0.31 17% 0.31 0.77 0.15 0.94 100% 
 Detection 964 9 0.75 0.3 31% 0.55 0.94 0.37 1.13 100% 
 Educational 742 6 0.53 0.5 12% 0.13 0.93 -0.11 1.17 100% 
Emotional Stability           
 No Interv. 38,511 111 0.79 0.39 7% 0.72 0.86 -0.11 0.91  
 Consequence 1,084 6 0.58 0.28 23% 0.35 0.8 0.22 0.94 55% 
 Detection 1,036 10 0.74 0.48 15% 0.44 1.03 0.12 1.35 100% 
  Educational 742 6 0.33 0.25 35% 0.13 0.53 0.01 0.65 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap; Interv. = intervention. 
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Table 5 
Warning Type as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
(continued) 
Trait 
Warning 
N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Type Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion           
 No Interv. 62,167 122 0.42 0.34 7% 0.36 0.48 0.28 1.29  
 Consequence 1,084 6 0.24 0.25 26% 0.04 0.44 -0.09 0.57 62% 
 Detection 1,060 11 0.23 0.23 43% 0.09 0.37 -0.07 0.53 10%* 
 Educational 459 4 0.15 0 100% 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0%* 
Openness            
 No Interv. 26,921 81 0.29 0.39 7% 0.2 0.37 -0.02 0.42  
 Consequence 595 5 0.25 0.37 20% -0.08 0.58 -0.23 0.73 100% 
 Detection 664 6 -0.21 0.13 68% -0.32 -0.11 -0.38 -0.05 0%* 
  Educational 459 4 0.24 0.06 92% 0.19 0.3 0.17 0.32 100% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. Interv. = intervention.
  92   
exception, as the confidence intervals around these estimates do not overlap at all. 
The effect size of emotional stability with an educational warning (k = 6, d = 
0.33, CI95 = 0.13 - .53) does not overlap with the same trait without an 
intervention (k = 111, d = 0.79, CI95 = 0.72 - .86). Although the trend of the data 
suggests that educational warnings are more effective than other warning types, 
the small k size for this warning type suggests more research is needed.  
The second main finding from this moderator analysis is that effect sizes 
are inconsistent between the consequences warning compared to detection 
warning. Consequence effect sizes were smaller than detection for 
conscientiousness (d = 0.54 and 0.75, respectively) and emotional stability (d = 
0.58 and 0.74, respectively). This finding makes intuitive sense, as a consequence 
warning both acknowledges the ability to detect faking as well as offers an 
undesirable corrective action to the test-taker. However, the opposite relationship 
was observed for agreeableness, extraversion, and openness, where consequence 
effect sizes were larger than detection. This inconsistent pattern may be 
attributable to the very small k size within the warning type moderator, as they 
ranged from 4 to 11 studies. Based on limited research, warning “type” does not 
have a consistent effect on faking behavior across personality traits.  
Summary of warning hypothesis. Hypothesis I predicted that the 
standardized mean difference of personality scores between honest and faked 
conditions would be smaller (i.e., less faking) for studies with a warning than 
studies without any intervention. In general, this hypothesis was supported. Effect 
sizes tended to be smaller in the presence of a warning, and this relationship was 
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observed across study design as well as the type of warning supplied. 
Conscientiousness was one exception among the FFM, as the estimate in warning 
studies tended to significantly overlap with the estimate in studies without any 
intervention. Additional exceptions were observed with detection warnings and 
between-subject designs for conscientiousness, but the majority of the evidence 
supports the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis II – Forced-Choice 
 Hypothesis II predicted that effect sizes (representing the difference 
between scores in honest and faked conditions) obtained from a forced-choice 
(FC) measure would be smaller than effect sizes obtained in Likert-style 
measures. Table 6 compares the SWMDs for forced choice versus no intervention 
at the trait-level. Similar to the results presented for Hypothesis 1, the largest 
SWMD estimates for FC measures were observed for conscientiousness (k = 30, d 
= 0.70) and emotional stability (k = 14, d = 0.40). This suggests that 
conscientiousness was the most faked trait. Further, the SWMD for 
conscientiousness was larger than the SWMD for studies without an intervention 
(k = 135, d = 0.62). In contrast, the 95% confidence interval on the SWMD for 
emotional stability in FC measures (CI95 = 0.22 to .57) did not overlap with the 
effect size for no intervention (d = 0.79, CI95 = 0.72 to .86). The confidence 
interval around the estimate for agreeableness had minimal overlap (POL = 46%) 
with the effect size obtained for studies without an intervention (k = 103, d = 0.40, 
CI95 = 0.32 to .48), suggesting that the effect size was meaningfully smaller than 
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Table 6 
Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions for Forced-Choice versus No 
Intervention 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness           
 No Intervention 64,452 103 0.40 0.56 8% 0.32 0.48 -0.32 1.12  
 Forced Choice 2,951 19 0.15 0.56 8% -0.11 0.40 -0.57 0.86 46%* 
Conscientiousness           
 No Intervention 88,778 135 0.62 0.42 4% 0.55 0.69 0.08 1.15  
 Forced Choice 4,753 30 0.70 0.49 10% 0.52 0.87 0.07 1.32 100% 
Emotional Stability           
 No Intervention 38,511 111 0.79 0.39 7% 0.72 0.86 0.28 1.29  
 Forced Choice 2,589 14 0.40 0.33 17% 0.22 0.57 -0.03 0.82 0%* 
Extraversion           
 No Intervention 62,167 122 0.42 0.34 7% 0.36 0.48 -0.02 0.85  
 Forced Choice 3,165 25 0.30 0.35 21% 0.16 0.43 -0.15 0.74 77% 
Openness            
 No Intervention 26,921 81 0.29 0.39 7% 0.20 0.37 -0.21 0.79  
  Forced Choice 2,591 19 0.31 0.42 15% 0.13 0.50 -0.22 0.85 100% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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the analog effect size without an intervention. As with the previous findings with 
warnings, however, there is a stark contrast in the included k size for the FC  
intervention. Even though FC had sufficient k size to investigate meta-analytically 
(e.g., k = 19 for agreeableness), it is difficult to directly compare to an effect size 
drawn from over 100 studies. Results should be interpreted with caution. Overall, 
these mixed results do not offer strong support for Hypothesis 2. Certain study 
moderators, namely lab versus field samples, were investigated in order to 
provide a more meaningful comparison for FC measures. 
Lab studies as a moderator of the effect size between honest and faked 
scores with a forced choice intervention. Very little research to date has studied 
faking on FC measures in an applied setting. Indeed, only one study in the current 
meta-analysis used a field setting or non-student sample to test faking on a FC 
measure. This is likely in part due to difficulties in implementing FC measures for 
interpersonal comparisons, a central purpose for personnel selection. However, 
this meant that comparing FC measures to the entire range of studies without an 
intervention provided an unrepresentative comparison group. In other words, the 
comparator for FC measures should be limited to lab studies, considering all but 
one study used a lab, student sample. This is especially impactful given known 
differences in the effect sizes (i.e., honest versus faked scores) between lab and 
field studies (see Table 2). Table 7 compares the effect sizes of scores across 
honest and faked conditions of FC versus no intervention (i.e., Likert scales) for 
lab studies only. These results provide a very different story than the results at the
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Table 7.  
Standardized Mean Difference of Lab Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions for Forced-Choice versus No 
Intervention in Lab Studies  
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness – Lab           
 No Intervention 17,870 85 0.48 0.39 12% 0.40 0.56 -0.02 0.97  
 Forced Choice 2,639 18 0.08 0.56 8% -0.18 0.34 -0.64 0.80 0%* 
Conscientiousness – Lab           
 No Intervention 23,552 106 0.87 0.46 8% 0.78 0.96 0.27 1.46  
 Forced Choice 4,442 29 0.72 0.50 10% 0.53 0.90 0.08 1.36 88% 
Emotional Stability – Lab           
 No Intervention 18,929 94 0.93 0.46 10% 0.84 1.02 0.34 1.52  
 Forced Choice 2,589 14 0.40 0.33 17% 0.22 0.57 -0.03 0.82 0%* 
Extraversion – Lab           
 No Intervention 19,525 102 0.51 0.35 15% 0.44 0.58 0.07 0.95  
 Forced Choice 2,853 24 0.33 0.35 22% 0.19 0.47 -0.12 0.78 24%* 
Openness – Lab           
 No Intervention 13,716 67 0.42 0.33 16% 0.35 0.50 0.01 0.84  
  Forced Choice 2,279 18 0.31 0.45 14% 0.10 0.51 -0.27 0.88 100% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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overall trait-level presented in Table 6. There is consistently less of a difference 
between honest and faked scores (i.e., smaller effect sizes) across the five traits in 
lab studies, and the magnitude of the differences is quite a bit larger, than those 
presented in Table 6. For instance, the effect size for emotional stability is much 
larger in lab studies (k = 94, d = 0.93) than all studies (k = 111, d = 0.79). 
Although the small to moderate effect size for emotional stability (k = 14, d = 
0.40) from lab studies using a forced choice intervention is significantly smaller 
than the comparison in both cases (see Tables 6 and 7), the magnitude is much 
larger when the sample is limited to lab studies. As with the previous hypotheses, 
it is important to note the significant difference in k size for the effect sizes in 
question. Namely, results should be interpreted with caution when comparing 
effect sizes drawn from 94 versus 14 studies.  
The 95% confidence interval on the effect size for agreeableness in FC 
studies (k = 18, d = 0.08, CI95 = -0.18 to .34) did not overlap with the effect size 
in studies without an intervention (k = 85, d = 0.48, CI95 = 0.40 to .56). These 
results tend to provide more support of Hypothesis 2, even though the effect sizes 
for conscientiousness and openness significantly overlapped across FC and Likert 
studies (POL = 88% and 118%, respectively). Indeed, the effect size for 
conscientiousness in FC measures (k = 29, d = 0.72) is surprisingly large relative 
to other FC effect sizes. It is critical to note, however, that this effect is smaller 
than the effect size for Likert-scales without any intervention (k = 106, d = 0.87).  
Study design as a moderator of the effect size between honest and 
faked scores for lab studies with a forced choice intervention. Study design 
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(i.e., between vs. within subject) was analyzed as a potential moderator for FC 
interventions using lab/student samples. This was examined due to the large 80% 
credibility intervals around the SWMDs presented in Table 7, even despite the 
more focused approach to limiting only lab studies. It was also examined due to 
previously reported differences in faking across study design (e.g., Viswesvaran 
& Ones, 1999). The differences in estimates across study design in the current 
meta-analysis are smaller than those reported in previous meta-analyses, although 
part of that is dependent upon the presence of a faking intervention (see Tables 2 
and 3). That is, when looking across all studies included in the current meta-
analysis, the inclusion of studies that used an intervention (e.g., warnings, forced-
choice) that were excluded from previous meta-analyses attenuated the 
differences across study design. Considering study design (i.e., between group 
and within group) can help provide a more nuanced understanding of where FC 
measures show the largest effects.  
Table 8 shows the effect size for FFM scores across honest and faked 
conditions for forced choice and no intervention studies across study design. This 
analysis is limited to lab samples based on the limited field studies presented 
earlier. This moderator analysis revealed that SWMD estimates were consistently 
larger for studies using Likert measures (i.e., no intervention) than those with a 
forced choice measure in between-subject designs. Only openness had significant 
overlap between FC and Likert effect size estimates. The results were less 
consistent for within-subject designs. Compared to Likert/no-intervention studies,  
forced choice studies reported larger SWMDs for agreeableness (d = 0.39 and 
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Table 8 
Study Design as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions for 
Forced-Choice versus No Intervention in Lab Studies 
Trait Intervention Study Design N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness – Lab            
 No Intervention           
  Between 11,126 43 0.53 0.44 8% 0.4 0.66 -0.04 1.1  
  Within 6,744 42 0.39 0.24 31% 0.32 0.47 0.09 0.7  
 Forced-Choice           
  Between 1,851 6 -0.08 0.48 5% -0.46 0.31 -0.69 0.54 0%* 
  Within 788 12 0.45 0.55 17% 0.14 0.76 -0.25 1.16 100% 
Conscientiousness – Lab           
 No Intervention           
  Between 14,924 55 0.92 0.43 8% 0.81 1.03 0.37 1.47  
  Within 8,628 51 0.77 0.50 9% 0.63 0.91 0.13 1.42  
 Forced-Choice           
  Between 2,776 11 0.67 0.42 9% 0.42 0.92 0.13 1.21 61% 
  Within 1,666 18 0.80 0.60 12% 0.52 1.07 0.04 1.56 100% 
Emot. Stab. – Lab            
 No Intervention           
  Between 14,405 59 0.94 0.44 9% 0.82 1.05 0.37 1.5  
  Within 4,524 35 0.91 0.51 12% 0.75 1.08 0.26 1.56  
  Forced-Choice           
   Between 1,965 7 0.44 0.25 19% 0.25 0.62 0.12 0.75 0%* 
    Within 624 7 0.27 0.49 16% -0.09 0.63 -0.36 0.89 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap.  
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Table 8 
 
Study Design as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions for 
Forced-Choice versus No Intervention in Lab Studies (continued) 
 
Trait Intervention Study Design N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion – Lab            
 No Intervention           
  Between 12,833 56 0.53 0.34 14% 0.44 0.62 0.1 0.96  
  Within 6,692 46 0.48 0.36 18% 0.37 0.58 0.01 0.94  
 Forced-Choice           
  Between 1,804 7 0.26 0.24 21% 0.08 0.44 -0.06 0.57 0%* 
  Within 1,049 17 0.45 0.45 25% 0.24 0.66 -0.12 1.03 100% 
Openness – Lab            
 No Intervention           
  Between 9,943 39 0.44 0.31 14% 0.34 0.53 0.04 0.83  
  Within 3,773 28 0.39 0.36 19% 0.26 0.52 -0.06 0.85  
 Forced-Choice           
  Between 1,598 7 0.29 0.27 20% 0.09 0.49 -0.05 0.63 100% 
    Within 681 11 0.34 0.70 12% -0.07 0.75 -0.56 1.23 100% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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0.45, respectively) and conscientiousness (d = 0.77 and 0.80, respectively). 
However, within-subject forced choice studies had a significantly smaller SWMD 
for emotional stability (k = 7, d = 0.27, CI95 = -0.09 to 0.63) than studies with 
Likert/no-intervention (k = 35, d = 0.91, CI95 = 0.75 to 1.08). Outside of the 
similar caveat on sample size differences, especially with regard to small (k < 10) 
available studies, these mixed findings suggest that the efficacy of forced choice 
measures to address faking may be largely dependent upon the study design.  
Summary of forced choice hypothesis. Hypothesis II predicted that there 
would be less faking (i.e., smaller sample weighted mean d) for studies that used a 
forced-choice measure than those that used single-stimulus scale (e.g., Likert-
style scale) without any other faking intervention. This hypothesis was supported, 
although the results were limited to lab studies due to the absence of field studies 
in the forced choice literature. Indeed, lab studies showed consistently 
significantly less faking for emotional stability and agreeableness on FC measures 
than Likert measures. The amount of faking is largely influenced by study design, 
as large differences were observed in between- vs. within-subject designs on lab 
studies using FC measures. 
Hypothesis III – Item Transparency 
 Hypothesis III predicted that effect sizes representing the difference 
between scores in honest and faked conditions obtained from less transparent 
items will be smaller than effect sizes obtained from those that do not use any 
faking intervention. Table 9 shows mixed support at the trait-level across the 
different FFM traits. The effect size for conscientiousness with an item 
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transparency intervention (k = 22, d = 0.71) is actually larger than the effect size 
for studies without an intervention (k = 135, d = 0.62). However, the effect sizes 
for all other traits are smaller for studies that used an item transparency 
intervention than those that did not use any intervention. For example, the effect 
size for emotional stability with an item transparency intervention (k = 14, d = 
0.61, CI95 = 0.35 to 0.87) was smaller than the effect size without an intervention 
(k = 111, d = 0.79, CI95 = 0.72 to 0.86), although the difference was not 
significant (POL = 86%). However, the confidence intervals overlapped 
significantly. This suggests that while the effect sizes fell in the expected 
direction, the differences between effect sizes with an item transparency 
intervention and no intervention were generally small. 
Student/Lab sample as a moderator of the effect size between honest 
and faked scores with an item transparency intervention. Inspection of the 
study characteristics for studies that implemented an item transparency 
intervention yielded a similar finding to that of FC measures. Namely, all but two 
of the studies (k = 20) that used an item transparency intervention did so in a lab 
or student sample. Given the known disparities between naturally-occurring and 
instructionally-induced faking (see Table 2; Hooper, 2007), it is unsurprising that 
results at the trait-level provided largely mixed findings. The lab/student 
moderator was included in Table 9. Similar to Hypothesis II, effect sizes were 
larger (i.e., larger standardized mean difference of personality scores between 
honest and faked conditions) within the subset of item transparency studies that 
used lab studies than the overall item-transparency sample. Only two studies that  
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Table 9 
Lab/Student Sample as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked 
Conditions for Item Transparency versus No Intervention  
Trait Intervention Type 
Sample/ 
Setting N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Conscientiousness            
 No Intervention 88,778 135 0.62 0.42 4% 0.55 0.69 0.08 1.15  
  Student/Lab 23,552 106 0.87 0.46 8% 0.78 0.96 0.27 1.46  
 Transparency 2,712 22 0.71 0.54 11% 0.49 0.94 0.02 1.41 86% 
  Student/Lab 2,494 20 0.77 0.54 11% 0.53 1.00 0.08 1.45 100% 
Agreeableness            
 No Intervention 64,452 103 0.40 0.40 4% 0.32 0.48 -0.11 0.91  
  Student/Lab 17,870 85 0.48 0.39 12% 0.40 0.56 -0.02 0.97  
 Transparency 2,579 19 0.34 0.47 12% 0.13 0.55 -0.26 0.94 100% 
  Student/Lab 2,361 17 0.36 0.49 11% 0.13 0.59 -0.27 0.99 100% 
Emotional Stability            
 No Intervention 38,511 111 0.79 0.39 7% 0.72 0.86 0.28 1.29  
  Student/Lab 18,929 94 0.93 0.46 10% 0.84 1.02 0.34 1.52  
 Transparency 1,902 14 0.61 0.50 11% 0.35 0.87 -0.03 1.24 100% 
    Student/Lab 1,684 12 0.67 0.50 11% 0.38 0.95 0.03 1.31 63% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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Table 9 
 
Lab/Student Sample as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked 
Conditions for Item Transparency versus No Intervention (continued) 
 
Trait Intervention Type 
Sample/ 
Setting N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Openness             
 No Intervention 26,921 81 0.29 0.39 7% 0.20 0.37 -0.21 0.79  
  Student/Lab 13,716 67 0.42 0.33 16% 0.35 0.50 0.01 0.84  
 Transparency 1,624 11 0.09 0.39 15% -0.14 0.32 -0.41 0.59 100% 
  Student/Lab 1,406 9 0.10 0.43 13% -0.18 0.37 -0.45 0.64 19%* 
Extraversion            
 No Intervention 62,167 122 0.42 0.34 7% 0.36 0.48 -0.02 0.85  
  Student/Lab 19,525 102 0.51 0.35 15% 0.44 0.58 0.07 0.95  
 Transparency 2,332 18 0.45 0.34 21% 0.29 0.61 0.01 0.89 100% 
    Student/Lab 2,114 16 0.48 0.35 20% 0.31 0.65 0.03 0.93 100% 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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used item transparency interventions were done in the field and therefore not 
included in this analysis Although only two studies were excluded in this 
moderator, the effect sizes from the field studies were much smaller than those 
observed in lab studies. This is consistent with previous observations in this 
analysis. 
Hypothesis III received more consistent support when examining only lab 
studies as the comparison group. Although the effect size of personality scores 
between honest and faked conditions remained large for conscientiousness in 
studies that used an item transparency intervention (k = 20, d = 0.77, CI95 = 0.53 
to 1.00), it was smaller than the effect size for lab studies that did not use any 
intervention (k = 106, d = 0.87, CI95 = 0.54 to 0.69). The confidence intervals 
overlapped substantially for these effect sizes, so although the difference between 
observed effects is in the expected direction, it is not significant. Indeed, with the 
exception of openness, all of the confidence intervals around the effect size 
estimates significantly overlapped when comparing student/lab samples in studies 
without an intervention to those that used an item transparency intervention.  
Type of item transparency as a moderator of the effect size between 
honest and faked scores. The item transparency intervention was unique in the 
sense that it combined multiple types of interventions. Randomization of items, 
the use of subtle items, and the use of contextualized items were combined 
because they all theoretically influenced faking by limiting item transparency and 
thus ability to fake (see Figure 3). The type of item transparency was examined as  
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Table 10 
Type of Item Transparency Intervention as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest 
and Faked Conditions for Item Transparency versus No Intervention 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness                    
 No Intervention 64,452 103 0.40 0.40 4% 0.32 0.48 -0.11 0.91  
 Subtle 663 5 0.31 0.00 100% 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0%* 
 Randomized 396 4 0.53 0.18 57% 0.36 0.71 0.31 0.76 100% 
 Contextualized 1,061 8 0.57 0.41 16% 0.29 0.85 0.05 1.09 100% 
Conscientiousness           
 No Intervention 88,778 135 0.62 0.42 4% 0.55 0.69 0.08 1.15  
 Subtle 636 7 0.35 0.01 100% 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0%* 
 Randomized 396 4 0.95 0.50 15% 0.45 1.44 0.30 1.59 100% 
 Contextualized 1,221 9 0.71 0.58 9% 0.33 1.09 -0.03 1.45 100% 
Emotional Stability           
 No Intervention 38,511 111 0.79 0.39 7% 0.72 0.86 0.28 1.29  
 Subtle 469 5 0.13 0.00 100% 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0%* 
 Randomized 396 4 0.85 0.50 15% 0.36 1.34 0.21 1.49 100% 
  Contextualized 478 2 0.55 0.16 40% 0.32 0.77 0.34 0.75 37%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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Table 10 
 
Type of Item Transparency Intervention as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest 
and Faked Conditions for Item Transparency versus No Intervention (continued) 
 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion           
 No Intervention 62,167 122 0.42 0.34 7% 0.36 0.48 -0.02 0.85  
 Subtle 416 4 0.17 0.00 100% 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0%* 
 Randomized 396 4 0.57 0.34 27% 0.24 0.91 0.14 1.01 100% 
 Contextualized 1,061 8 0.55 0.41 16% 0.26 0.84 0.02 1.08 100% 
Openness            
 No Intervention 26,921 81 0.29 0.39 7% 0.20 0.37 -0.21 0.79  
 Subtle 416 4 0.14 0.00 100% 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0%* 
 Randomized 396 4 0.38 0.00 100% 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 100% 
  Contextualized 353 1 0.16 0.00 . - - - - - 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
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a potential moderator. Similar to the warning type moderator within Hypothesis I, 
this moderator was only applicable to the trait-level due to limited sample size. 
Table 10 shows the sample weighted mean d of scores between honest and 
faked conditions across the different types of item transparency interventions. The 
most notable result from this table is that the effectiveness of the item 
transparency intervention varies greatly between subtle and randomized items. 
Subtle items consistently demonstrate smaller SWMDs (i.e., less score inflation 
across conditions) across the five factors, and even have non-overlapping 
confidence intervals for every trait. For example, studies that used subtle items to 
measure conscientiousness reported less score inflation (k = 7, d = 0.35, CI95 = 
0.35 to .37) than those with no intervention (k = 135, d = 0.62, CI95 = 0.55 to .69). 
Non-overlapping confidence intervals for all of the FFM trait estimates indicate 
this is a useful intervention, but caution should be taken on these results due to 
limited k size for studies with an item transparency intervention.  
The opposite is true for randomized items, where the SWMD (i.e., 
personality score across honest and faked conditions) is consistently larger for 
studies that reported randomizing the items compared to those that did not report 
any intervention for faking. This is contrary to Hypothesis III, as it suggests that 
test-takers are able to inflate their scores more when test items are randomized 
compared to test-takers that do not receive any faking intervention.  
Finally, there were mixed results in terms of the magnitude of the SWMD 
of personality scores across honest and faked conditions for contextualized items 
compared to studies without any faking intervention. Conscientiousness, 
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agreeableness, and extraversion had higher SWMD’s for contextualized item 
conditions, while emotional stability and openness reported smaller d’s. Only the 
confidence interval for the effect size estimate emotional stability with 
contextualized items (k = 2, d = 0.55, CI95 = 0.32 to .77) did not overlap with the 
interval for the estimate without any intervention (k = 111, d = 0.79, CI95 = 0.72 
to .86). However, the small k size (k = 2) limits generalizable conclusions from 
this result.  
This moderator analysis highlights that these three interventions are not 
equivalent with regards to their ability to limit faking, even though they 
theoretically influence faking in the same way (i.e., limiting faking ability at the 
item level; Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). The hypothesis was partially supported 
– namely, subtle items seem to reduce mean differences between honest and faked 
conditions, but not randomized or contextualized items.  
Summary of item transparency hypothesis. Hypothesis III predicted 
that the item transparency intervention would be effective at limiting response 
inflation. Support for this hypothesis was predominantly limited to subtle items, 
as randomizing items or using contextualized items (e.g., “at work” FOR) showed 
similar SWMD estimates to studies without any intervention. Indeed, the latter 
two interventions at times reported larger SWMDs than studies without an 
intervention, although not significantly so as the 95% confidence intervals had 
substantial overlap. 
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Hypotheses IVa, IVb, and IVc – Time Limit 
 The fourth set of hypotheses predicted that studies with a time limit would 
report larger effect sizes for the scores between honest and faked conditions (i.e., 
more faking) than (a) warnings, (b) FC measures, and (c) item transparency 
interventions. Table 11 shows the trait-level results of this hypothesis. First, it is 
important to note that only three (k = 3) studies were eligible for the time limit 
intervention in this meta-analysis. No additional moderators were analyzed, and 
the k size also limits the ability for any firm conclusions to be made for the time 
limit intervention. Analyses with k < 5 produce questionable meta-analytic results 
(cf. Arthur et al., 2001), although this is not a universally accepted cut-off. Indeed, 
as mentioned in the previous hypotheses, caution should be taken when 
interpreting effect sizes with k > 5, as there is still the potential for greater 
variability when based on a smaller study sample. However, even greater caution 
should be taken when k sizes are especially small. For this reason, the results for 
Hypotheses IVa-c cannot be fully tested in the present study. The following 
discussion is limited to high-level trends observed across the available studies.  
Warnings consistently showed smaller SWMDs (i.e., smaller differences in 
mean scores between honest and faked conditions) than time limit strategies 
across the five traits. Indeed, the magnitude of the effect size for personality 
scores between honest and faked conditions was typically twice as large with time 
limit interventions as with warning interventions. For example, the effect size for 
conscientiousness with a warning (k = 23, d = .59) was a third of the size of the 
effect size for time limits (k = 3, d = 1.97). FC measures also tended to report  
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Table 11 
Intervention Type (Warning, Forced Choice, Transparency, and Time Limits) as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of 
Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
 Trait Intervention Type 
  
N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval 
  Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness          
 Warning 1,853 16 0.20 0.17 55% 0.11 0.28 -0.02 0.42 
 Forced Choice 2,951 19 0.15 0.56 8% -0.11 0.4 -0.57 0.86 
 Transparency 2,579 19 0.34 0.47 12% 0.13 0.55 -0.26 0.94 
 Time Limit 204 3 0.47 0 100% 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Conscientiousness          
 Warning 3,330 23 0.59 0.37 18% 0.44 0.74 0.12 1.06 
 Forced Choice 4,753 30 0.70 0.49 10% 0.52 0.87 0.07 1.32 
 Transparency 2,712 22 0.71 0.54 11% 0.49 0.94 0.02 1.41 
 Time Limit 204 3 1.97 0 100% 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 
Emotional Stability          
 Warning 2,861 22 0.57 0.39 17% 0.41 0.73 0.07 1.07 
 Forced Choice 2,589 14 0.40 0.33 17% 0.22 0.57 -0.03 0.82 
 Transparency 1,902 14 0.60 0.50 11% 0.34 0.86 -0.03 1.24 
  Time Limit 204 3 1.05 0.50 21% 0.48 1.62 0.41 1.69 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies. 
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Table 11 
 
Intervention Type (Warning, Forced Choice, Transparency, and Time Limits) as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of 
Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions (continued) 
 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion          
 Warning 2,602 21 0.22 0.22 40% 0.12 0.31 -0.06 0.5 
 Forced Choice 3,165 25 0.29 0.35 21% 0.16 0.43 -0.15 0.74 
 Transparency 2,332 18 0.45 0.34 21% 0.29 0.61 0.01 0.89 
 Time Limit 204 3 0.59 0 100% 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Openness           
 Warning 1,717 15 0.07 0.33 25% -0.1 0.23 -0.35 0.49 
 Forced Choice 2,591 19 0.31 0.42 15% 0.13 0.5 -0.22 0.85 
 Transparency 1,624 11 0.09 0.39 15% -0.14 0.32 -0.4 0.59 
  Time Limit 204 3 0.31 0.14 76% 0.15 0.46 0.13 0.48 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies. 
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smaller effect sizes than time limit strategies. Openness reported the same effect 
size for FC (k = 19, d = .31) and time limit strategies (k = 3, d = .31), but the 
confidence intervals significantly overlapped. The smaller confidence interval for 
time limit studies is likely due in large part to the smaller k size from which to 
draw variability. Finally, item transparency interventions showed smaller effect 
sizes than time limits across all five traits. 
Effect sizes of scores between honest and faked conditions for time 
limits versus no intervention. Although not hypothesized, the effect sizes for 
time limit strategies were also compared to those without any intervention. Across 
the five traits, the effect size for studies with a time limit was consistently larger 
than for studies without any intervention. For example, the effect size was three 
times larger for conscientiousness in studies with a time limit (k = 3, d = 1.97) 
than studies without any intervention (k = 135, d = 0.62). The three studies 
included in this analysis were collected on small, between-subject, student 
samples, with only around 30 participants in the honest and faked conditions. The 
participants completed either the Personality Research Form (Jackson, 1984) or 
the NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), with the former measuring 
conscientiousness through academic orientation. Despite the unexpectedly large 
effect sizes observed for this intervention, it is important to reiterate that the effect 
sizes for time limit intervention are not generalizable, and more research should 
be done before making solid conclusions regarding the efficacy of the 
intervention. That being said, initial results do not appear promising for this as a 
useful intervention to reduce faking.  
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Summary of time limit hypothesis. The fourth set of hypotheses could 
not be tested based on limited available data. However, trends from the data 
presented in Table 11 show that time limit strategies are not an effective way of 
reducing faking behavior, and may actually have the opposite effect for important 
traits such as conscientiousness.  
Hypothesis V – Intention vs. Ability Interventions 
Hypothesis V predicted that the SWMD for personality scores between 
honest and faked conditions would be smaller in studies with preventive 
interventions focused on intent than in studies with preventive interventions 
focused on ability. In other words, this hypothesis predicted that warnings would 
be most effective at reducing response inflation. Hypothesis I, II, and III showed 
that these interventions were generally useful in reducing faking compared to 
studies without an intervention, and Hypothesis IV showed that warnings tend to 
be different than the other interventions.  
Table 12 shows the effect sizes for scores between honest and faked 
conditions with warnings (i.e., intent intervention) compared to the combined 
effect size for FC, item transparency, and time limit (i.e., ability interventions). 
Partially supporting Hypothesis V, most of the effect sizes were smaller for 
studies using a warning than studies using one of the other, ability-focused 
interventions. The confidence intervals around the effect size for 
conscientiousness and agreeableness significantly overlapped across intent and 
ability, while the overlap in confidence intervals was minimal for extraversion. 
Emotional stability, on the other hand, reported a larger SWMD for the scores  
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Table 12 
Intervention Type as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Personality Scores Between Honest and Faked Conditions 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness                    
 Ability (FC/Trans/Time) 5,734 41 0.24 0.52 10% 0.09 0.4 -0.42 0.91  
 Intent (Warning) 1,853 16 0.20 0.17 55% 0.11 0.28 -0.02 0.42 100% 
Conscientiousness           
 Ability (FC/Trans/Time) 7,670 55 0.74 0.54 10% 0.59 0.88 0.05 1.43  
 Intent (Warning) 3,330 23 0.59 0.37 18% 0.44 0.74 0.12 1.06 100% 
Emotional Stability           
 Ability (FC/Trans/Time) 4,695 31 0.51 0.44 12% 0.35 0.66 -0.06 1.07  
 Intent (Warning) 2,861 22 0.57 0.39 17% 0.41 0.73 0.07 1.07 100% 
Extraversion           
 Ability (FC/Trans/Time) 5,701 46 0.37 0.35 21% 0.27 0.47 -0.08 0.81  
 Intent (Warning) 2,602 21 0.22 0.22 40% 0.12 0.31 -0.06 0.5 42%* 
Openness            
 Ability (FC/Trans/Time) 5,701 46 0.37 0.35 21% 0.27 0.47 -0.08 0.81  
  Intent (Warning) 1,717 15 0.07 0.33 25% -0.1 0.23 -0.35 0.49 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap; “FC/Trans/Time” = a combination of three faking interventions: 
Forced Choice/Transparency/Time Limit.  
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between honest and faked conditions for studies using an intervention focused on 
intent versus an intervention focused on ability. The effect size for intent (i.e., 
warning) interventions (k = 22, d = 0.57, CI95 = 0.41 to .73) was slightly larger 
than the effect size for ability interventions (k = 31, d = .51, CI95 = 0.35 to .66). 
Because of the inconsistent effect sizes for the FFM traits across ability and intent 
interventions, these findings offer only partial support for Hypothesis V.  
Specific faking intervention as a moderator of the effect size between 
honest and faked scores. Hypothesis V compared intent and ability 
interventions. However, given the known differences between interventions 
observed in the previous hypotheses, all interventions should be compared 
separately in order to more clearly identify one particular intervention’s 
effectiveness. It is also important to compare ability interventions to each other 
(notably FC and item transparency) given their separation in previous hypotheses.  
This moderator analysis re-examines the data presented in Table 11. The 
sample weighted mean d’s across the traits and provides partial support for 
Hypothesis V. Warnings show the smallest effect size (i.e., less faking) for 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and openness. The most traditionally job-relevant 
trait, conscientiousness, showed a moderate effect size in warned studies (d = 
0.59), compared to large effect sizes for forced- choice (d = 0.70) and item 
transparency (d = 0.71) studies. The time limit study also showed a larger effect 
size for conscientiousness (d = 1.97), but the small sample of studies (k = 3) 
makes interpreting this effect size tenuous. However, FC measures appear to 
lessen faking for agreeableness and emotional stability. Table 11 shows that the 
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effect size for agreeableness (d = 0.15, 0.20) and emotional stability (d = 0.40, 
0.57) are smaller in FC studies than studies with a warning, respectively. 
Summary of Intent vs. Ability Hypothesis. Similar to the previous 
hypotheses, Hypothesis V received modest support. Although the trend was in the 
expected direction, the relationship was not consistent enough across all of the 
traits to make a definitive statement about the intervention’s effectiveness. With 
the exception of emotional stability, interventions that limit intention to fake (i.e., 
warnings) tend to be more effective at limiting response inflation than 
interventions that limit ability to fake (i.e., forced choice, item transparency, time 
limits). Although not predicted in Hypothesis V, the analyses showed that (with 
the exception of openness) FC interventions are consistently more effective at 
producing less response distortion than item transparency interventions. This was 
unexpected because they both theoretically impact faking in similar ways, namely 
by limiting test-takers ability to fake the assessed construct. 
Hypotheses VI to VIII – Remedial interventions 
  A meta-analysis of r’s was used to test Hypotheses VI-VIII that focused 
on the criterion-related validity of the personality test scores in a motivated 
condition. Specifically, these hypotheses predicted that personality test scores 
would show stronger criterion-related validity with a range of outcomes (e.g., 
contextual performance, task performance) under preventive rather than remedial 
interventions. Due to limited available data, results were only interpreted when k 
≥ 3.  
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Table 13 
Intervention Type as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Personality Scores and Performance Criteria 
Trait Intervention N k 
Sample-
weighted 
mean r 
Corr. 
Mean r 
(ρ) 
Corr. 
SD 
(SDρ) 
Variance 
due to 
Artifacts 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Agreeableness                    
 Correction 1,651 5 0.1 0.11 0.07 49% 0.05 0.15 -0.02 0.24 
 Removal 17,172 3 0.18 0.2 0.03 26% 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.26 
 Warning 648 3 0.05 0.06 0 100% -0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05 
 Forced Choice 471 2 -0.04 -0.05 0.1 44% -0.13 0.05 -0.24 0.15 
 Transparency 281 2 0.14 0.16 0 100% 0.03 0.26 0.16 0.16 
Conscientiousness           
 Correction 4,080 9 0.18 0.2 0.11 22% 0.15 0.21 -0.01 0.41 
 Removal 18,034 3 0.18 0.2 0.01 75% 0.17 0.2 0.18 0.22 
 Warning 1,449 5 0.06 0.07 0.05 60% 0.01 0.11 -0.03 0.17 
 Forced Choice 2,719 6 0.28 0.31 0.1 40% 0.25 0.31 0.12 0.5 
 Transparency 641 4 0.27 0.3 0.05 75% 0.2 0.35 0.21 0.39 
Emotional Stability           
 Correction 2,199 6 0.12 0.14 0.03 76% 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.2 
 Removal 17,353 3 0.15 0.16 0.02 38% 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.2 
 Warning 1,005 4 0.12 0.13 0.08 43% 0.05 0.18 -0.03 0.28 
  Forced Choice 471 2 0.05 0.06  0 100% -0.04 0.14 0.06 0.06 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; corr. Mean r (ρ) = corrected population correlation rho; corr. SD (SD ρ) = corrected standard 
deviation of the population correlation rho; confidence intervals = the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies
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Table 13 
Intervention Type as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Personality Scores and Performance Criteria (continued) 
Trait Intervention N k 
Sample-
weighted 
mean r 
Corr. 
Mean r 
(ρ) 
Corr. SD 
(SDρ) 
Variance 
due to 
Artifacts 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion            
 Correction 2,164 5 0.03 0.03 0.15 13% -0.01 0.07 -0.26 0.32 
 Removal 17,853 3 0.12 0.13 0.08 4% 0.10 0.13 -0.03 0.29 
 Warning 1,005 4 0.06 0.07 0.00 100% 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.07 
 Forced Choice 1,613 2 0.03 0.04 0.15 17% -0.01 0.08 -0.26 0.33 
 Transparency 281 2 0.11 0.13 0.08 57% 0.00 0.23 -0.03 0.28 
Openness            
 Correction 983 3 0.08 0.09 0.08 41% 0.02 0.15 -0.07 0.26 
 Removal 16,672 2 0.19 0.21 0.06 6% 0.18 0.20 0.08 0.33 
 Warning 648 3 0.03 0.03 0.00 100% -0.05 0.10 0.03 0.03 
  Forced Choice 203 1 0.13 0.14 0.00 . - - - - 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; corr. Mean r (ρ) = corrected population correlation rho; corr. SD (SD ρ) = corrected standard 
deviation of the population correlation rho; confidence intervals = the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies 
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First, Hypothesis VI predicted that the criterion-related validity of test scores 
would be higher when using a warning compared to (a) correcting scores or (b) 
removing scores based on social desirability. The results presented in Table 13 
fail to support either Hypothesis VIA or VIB. For each of the FFM traits, the 
criterion-related validity was lower in studies that used a warning versus either of 
the remedial interventions. For instance, the relationship between criteria and 
conscientiousness scores was smallest for warnings (k = 5, ρ = .07, 95% CVL = 
.05) compared to both correcting for social desirability (k = 9, ρ = .18, 95% CVL = 
-.01) and removing test-takers based on social desirability (k = 3, ρ = .18, 95% 
CVL = .18). Most notably, the 95% confidence intervals did not overlap between 
warning and score correction conditions.  
Next, Hypothesis VIIA and VIIB predicted that the criterion-related 
validity of test scores would be higher for measures using a forced choice method 
than those using a remedial faking intervention. The results provided mixed 
support for this hypothesis. As seen in Table 13, conscientiousness had a stronger 
relationship with the criteria in FC tests (k = 6, ρ = .31, 95% CVL = .12) compared 
to both correcting for social desirability (k = 9, ρ = .18, 95% CVL = -.01) and 
removing test-takers based on social desirability (k = 3, ρ = .18, 95% CVL = .18). 
The combination of mixed support and limited data fail to provide sufficient 
evidence to support the pair of hypotheses. 
Finally, Hypotheses VIIIA and VIIIB predicted that the criterion-related 
validity would be stronger for studies that used an item transparency intervention 
than those that used a remedial intervention (e.g., either score correction or case  
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Table 14.  
Criterion-Related Validity Estimates in the Current Meta-Analysis Compared to Previous Personality Meta-Analyses 
Trait 
Barrick & 
Mount (1991) 
Job 
Performance 
Ones et al. 
(1996) 
Correct for 
Social 
Desirability 
Hurtz & 
Donovan 
(2000) 
Operational 
Validity 
McCabe & 
Oswald (2013) 
GPA 
Current Meta-Analysis 
Score 
Correction 
(k =9) 
Score  
Removal 
(k =3) 
Warning 
(k =5) 
Forced 
Choice 
(k =6) 
Transp. 
(k =4) 
Agreeableness 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.06 -0.05 0.16 
Conscientiousness 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.28 0.27 
Emotional 
Stability 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.05 - 
Extraversion 0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.13 
Openness -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.21 0.03 0.14 - 
Note. All values reflect estimated criterion-related validity for test scores within the specified FFM trait; k = number of effect sizes included in the current meta-
analyses 
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removal). In support of Hypotheses VIIIA and VIIIB, results based on limited 
data presented in Table 13 suggest that item transparency interventions may offer 
a useful avenue for improving the criterion-related validity of personality 
assessments. The relationship between the criteria and conscientiousness was 
stronger for item transparency studies (k = 4, ρ = .30, 95% CVL = .21) than either 
corrections (k = 9, ρ = .18, 95% CVL = -.01) or case removals (k = 3, ρ = .18, 95% 
CVL = .18). A similar result was observed for agreeableness and openness for 
score corrections, but not case removal. In other words, the criterion-related 
validity was stronger for agreeableness and openness for case removal than item 
transparency interventions. No data were available for emotional stability or 
openness to contribute to the current meta-analysis. Because the relationship was 
enhanced under the most traditionally job-relevant trait (i.e., conscientiousness), 
the hypothesis was partially supported. However, a limited number of studies 
preclude any confident conclusions. 
Additional analyses. The limited data for the hypotheses on criterion-
related validity did not allow for any further moderator analyses. For example, 
many of the lab studies used a school success criterion (37%). The number of 
available studies examining different criteria within each intervention was 
consistently less than 5 and often less than 3. This did not allow for meaningful 
results to be presented for most FFM traits. However, it is important to frame the 
current findings around the extant literature on the criterion-related validity of 
personality test scores. An analysis of the criterion-related validity of the available 
literature on personality test scores was beyond the scope of this meta-analysis. 
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Instead, Table 14 presents the results of the current meta-analysis compared to 
previous meta-analyses on personality, namely Barrick and Mount (1991), Hurtz 
and Donovan (2000), Ones et al. (1996), and McCabe and Oswald (2013). These 
meta-analyses were chosen for a variety of reasons. The first two were chosen 
because they are the most frequently cited meta-analyses on the criterion-related 
validity of personality test scores. Finally, McCabe and Oswald (2013) was 
chosen because it is the most recent meta-analysis on the relationship between 
personality and GPA. Because a meaningful subset of the current data examined 
school performance, the comparison to McCabe and Oswald seemed prudent. 
 Similar to previous meta-analyses, the current study found that criterion-
related validity tended to be highest for conscientiousness across interventions. 
However, warnings (ρ = .06), score corrections (ρ = .18), and score removal (ρ = 
.18) interventions reported lower criterion-related validity for conscientiousness 
scores compared to previous meta-analyses. Thus, there is no support that these 
interventions improve the criterion-related validity of personality traits.  
Some of the differences in the observed validity coefficients in the current 
meta-analysis and those reported in previous analyses may be attributable to the 
mix between job and academic performance criteria. As seen in Table 14, traits 
such as emotional stability vary greatly across these criteria (Hurtz & Donovan, 
2000; McCabe & Oswald, 2013). Due to the limited available data for the current 
analysis, no moderator analyses were possible within the criteria.  
Summary of criterion-related validity hypotheses. In general, there is 
little support for Hypotheses VI. These hypotheses predicted that preventive 
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faking interventions would enhance the ability to make valid inferences from test 
scores in a motivated condition compared to remedial interventions. Indeed, the 
criterion-related validity observed in warning studies was actually smaller across 
many traits compared to the remedial interventions. It is important to also keep 
the larger context in mind; namely, how these estimates compare to the extant 
literature on the criterion-related validity of personality test scores. The estimates 
presented in the current analysis (Table 14) are inconsistent relative to previous 
meta-analyses. Some estimates are larger than previously reported estimates, 
while others are smaller. These inconsistencies are at least partially attributable to 
the need to collapse across criteria due to limited data (k = 34 across the 5 
personality factors). Combined with significant overlap across moderators (e.g., 
criterion type and study design), the lack of data did not allow for further analysis 
within moderators.  
Discussion 
 The findings presented in the Results section generally supported the 
hypotheses surrounding faking (i.e., Hypotheses I-V), but not the hypotheses on 
criterion-related validity (i.e., Hypotheses VI-VIII). In other words, faking 
(operationalized as the standardized mean difference between honest and faked 
conditions) tends to be reduced in the presence of various interventions, but there 
is limited evidence that interventions enhance the criterion-related validity of the 
assessment scores. The majority of the discussion will focus on response inflation 
rather than criterion-related validity because the preponderance of studies 
included in the meta-analysis measured the former.  
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The main findings can be summarized in three main points. First, faking 
still exists even if steps are taken to minimize it. This is evidenced by moderate to 
large effect sizes on FFM traits between honest and faked conditions even in the 
presence of a faking intervention. Although test-takers can still fake in the 
presence of an intervention, the second main finding is that the interventions are 
generally effective at limiting faking on FFM traits. However, the magnitude of 
this difference is not always practically or statistically significant. Finally, there is 
insufficient evidence that interventions improve the criterion-related validity of 
assessment scores taken in a motivated context. The limited available evidence, 
interventions do not appear to enhance the ability to make valid inferences from 
motivated test scores. These points are detailed below. 
Main Findings 
Faking still exists. One of the main conclusions from this study is that 
test-takers are able to distort their responses even when given one of the various 
faking interventions. While some of the faking interventions were useful at 
limiting faking, faked scores still tend to be moderately higher than honest scores. 
This is consistent with previous literature. Modest effect sizes were observed for 
conscientiousness in both warnings (d = .42; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003) and 
item transparency (d = .57; Cucina et al., 2010) interventions. The findings around 
forced-Choice (FC) interventions were also consistent with the existing literature. 
For example, Christiansen et al. (2005) reported moderate effect sizes for 
conscientiousness across honest and faked conditions (d = .40) when collected via 
a FC measure. Although this was smaller than the effect size for a traditional, 
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Likert-style measure of conscientiousness (d = .68), test-takers were still able to 
inflate their scores to a moderate degree on the FC measure. The difference in 
faking between FC and Likert scales was even more muted in Heggestad et al. 
(2006), where the faking effect size for conscientiousness in FC measures (d = 
1.20) was only nominally different than Likert measures (d = 1.23).  
Given the extant empirical research on faking, it is unsurprising that test-
takers were still able to increase their assessment scores even in the presence of a 
faking intervention. This is consistent with the key assumption of the faking 
literature, and one that researchers and practitioners alike will readily 
acknowledge: namely, that test-takers will fake their responses to the extent that 
they are motivated to do so, or believe that doing so will increase their odds in 
obtaining a valued outcome (Ellingson et al., 2011). Although presenting a 
warning against faking or using an alternative test method may curb the severity 
of the distortion, it is unlikely that the intervention will completely override the 
situational and motivational factors at play during the test-taking process. 
Researchers or practitioners looking for the “answer” to the faking problem will 
instead have to accept that score inflation is likely an unavoidable situation for 
self-report tests in motivated contexts. That does not mean, however, that nothing 
can be done about the issue. This study identified various interventions that, in the 
right contexts, were particularly useful for limiting response distortion.  
It should be noted that a fair amount of the extant literature on intervention 
effectiveness compares faked scores in the presence versus absence of an 
intervention. For instance, McFarland (2003) and Robson et al. (2008) provided a 
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large amount of the empirical support for the effectiveness of warnings as a 
faking intervention, while Converse et al. (2008) was instrumental in building the 
theory around FC interventions. However, these primary studies were not 
included in the meta-analysis because they did not compare an honest to a faked 
condition. The finding that test-takers are still able to raise their FFM trait scores 
in a faked condition compared to an honest condition helps refine the focus of the 
faking literature. Specifically, scores should always be compared to an honest 
group (whether the design is between- or within-subjects) because it more directly 
answers the research question of “do test-takers fake.” Only collecting faked 
responses and comparing across the presence or absence of an intervention 
oversimplifies the subject of faking on personality assessments by failing to take 
into account the movement relative to an “honest” or “baseline” score.  
Intervention effectiveness – score inflation. There are two main 
approaches to determine the effectiveness of a faking intervention based on the 
analyses presented in this study. The first approach is to inspect the lower-bound 
95% confidence interval. If the interval includes the point estimate in studies that 
used an intervention, this means that the intervention was generally effective in 
reducing response inflation. This was observed for some traits within many of the 
interventions, but the relationship was not consistent across the traits and 
interventions. For instance, forced choice interventions were generally effective at 
reducing response inflation for agreeableness. The lower-bound 95% confidence 
interval around the SWMD for agreeableness included zero, and also included 
zero within many of the study moderators such as lab studies and between-
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subjects designs. Based on these findings, forced choice designs seem to be useful 
in inhibiting test-takers ability to fake their agreeableness score on personality 
tests (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). While some confidence intervals included 
zero for other interventions, this finding was inconsistent across interventions and 
traits. Thus, generalizable conclusions of intervention efficacy for a given trait 
were difficult to make.  
Identifying if the confidence interval includes zero is a useful indicator of 
an intervention’s effectiveness. It helps researchers and practitioners identify if, in 
the presence of a given intervention, test-takers are able to meaningfully inflate 
their responses to a personality test. However, it is not surprising that few of the 
confidence intervals included zero. The previous section detailed the existing 
literature that has found consistently higher scores when test-takers are motivated 
to present themselves in a positive light. Further, this method of judging the 
faking intervention fails to take into account the relative inflation of the trait with 
no intervention present. Comparing conscientiousness and openness serves as a 
useful example in this case. Conscientiousness demonstrated much more response 
inflation (k = 135, d = .62) than openness (k = 81, d = .29) in studies without an 
intervention, and the lower-bound confidence intervals differed substantially (.545 
and .202 for conscientiousness and openness, respectively). The findings related 
to Hypothesis I demonstrated general support for less faking with the presence of 
a warning than when no intervention was present. It therefore is unsurprising that 
more of the lower-bound 95% confidence intervals included zero for traits with 
less faking to begin with, such as openness (and to a lesser extent, agreeableness).  
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The current study employed a more practical approach to examining an 
intervention’s usefulness. Specifically, the amount of overlap of confidence 
intervals was a primary determinant of whether an intervention was effective as 
compared to a no intervention condition (Cumming, 2009; Cumming & Finch, 
2005). For example, as demonstrated in Hypothesis I, warnings against faking 
appeared effective for emotional stability even though the lower-bound 
confidence interval did not approach zero. Despite the moderate effect size (d = 
0.57), it was significantly smaller (POL = 17%) relative to faking in studies 
without any intervention (d = 0.79). Although the effect sizes for interventions 
were not always significantly smaller to the appropriate comparison for no 
intervention (e.g., conscientiousness for warnings), the pattern was consistent 
enough to suggest that the interventions were generally effective at limiting 
distortion. 
Criterion-related validity. Faking interventions are especially helpful for 
organizations that use top-down selection, as faking can influence the rank-order 
of test-takers (e.g., Rosse et al., 1998). However, faking interventions are perhaps 
most impactful if they alter or enhance the criterion-related validity of the 
assessment for predicting performance. Job performance ratings were the most 
frequently used criterion in the current study (k =13). This was most frequently 
operationalized by supervisor ratings, and was split between being used for 
administrative and research purposes. Another subset of the sample in the r 
dataset (k = 10) used academic performance, most frequently operationalized by 
GPA.  
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The extant literature is mixed on faking’s impact on the criterion-related 
validity of personality assessments, and the current meta-analysis was 
unsuccessful in making firm conclusions. Although the interventions may be 
helpful in limiting response inflation, they do not appear to influence the ability to 
make valid inferences about future or concurrent performance from the scores on 
the assessment. In many ways, the lack of a significant finding is not surprising. 
Many researchers have found only modest differences in the criterion-related 
validity between honest and faked conditions, suggesting that faking itself may 
not impact the criterion-related validity of personality test scores (e.g., Hough, 
1998; Ones et al., 1993). It is also important to point out that the extant literature 
on faking interventions and criterion-related validity is much less mature than the 
literature on response inflation. The limited number of studies did not allow for as 
much power or moderator analyses in the validity analyses as it did in the 
response inflation analyses. More empirical and theoretical research is needed 
before generalizable conclusions are made about the impact of a faking 
intervention on a test score’s criterion-related validity. As mentioned in the 
previous section, Figure 3 represents a potential starting point for framing 
continued research in this area.   
Practical Implications 
Practitioners will likely focus on the modest difference in effect sizes 
between the presence versus absence of a faking intervention. If organizational 
leaders are truly concerned that faked scores are no longer representative of the 
true, underlying trait, the results of this meta-analysis do little to quell their 
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concerns. However, the analyses found that scores are consistently less inflated in 
the presence of a warning. Warnings are easy to implement: there are not many 
costs associated with using a warning, and they do not require sophisticated 
development strategies. It also appeared, on review of the literature, that some 
instructions included a warning about detection of faking even without expressly 
testing the effectiveness of a warning. This suggests that warnings may already be 
implemented in the instructions of some tests. 
Although the cost of development is low, organizational leaders wishing 
to add a warning against faking into the instructions of their personality 
assessment have some important decisions to make. First, leaders need to be 
comfortable with providing a false warning. The extant literature suggests that 
there is little reason to believe that there are readily available methods for 
detecting faking behavior in a consistent, reliable manner (cf. Griffith et al., 
2006). Providing a warning without a way of verifying a “faked” response may 
come across disingenuous to applicants. Although extant literature has not shown 
a large difference in applicant reactions as the result of a warning (e.g., Converse 
et al., 2008; Mitchell & Adair, 2014), organizational leaders should consider if 
this is consistent with their values. 
Another consideration before implementing warnings is the type of 
warning provided. Many warnings include a statement of consequence (e.g., “if 
you fake, you will be removed from the applicant pool”) while others are more 
positively framed (e.g., “faking inhibits our ability to make valid assessments”). 
The differences in warning type are reviewed by Pace and Borman (2006), and 
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despite a dearth of primary research directly comparing warning type, the current 
meta-analysis was able to compare the amount of faking under different types of 
warnings. Table 5 shows that the effect sizes were consistently smaller in the 
presence of a warning compared to no warning, although differences between 
warning types were inconsistent. Consequential warnings showed less response 
inflation on conscientiousness and emotional stability, the two traits more 
traditionally related to job performance (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). However, 
educational warnings had some significantly smaller effect sizes compared to 
other warnings. Interestingly, one primary study found that appeal to moral 
reason warnings were most effective at reducing faked responses to 
conscientiousness scores on the Big Five Inventory (BFI; Mitchell & Adair, 
2014). This warning type was not included in the current analysis, as there were 
insufficient primary studies to include it in a meta-analysis. More research using 
real applicant data is needed prior to making definitive judgments about the best 
“type” of warning. 
Interventions focused on limiting faking ability also limited response 
inflation. Forced-Choice (FC) measures reported less faking on most traits than 
Likert measures without any other intervention. These studies were generally 
limited to lab/student samples, but the findings were generally consistent. Item 
transparency interventions were most effective when using subtle items (see Table 
10). Practitioners looking to curb faking should consider investing resources in 
developing such measures that go beyond standard, single-stimulus personality 
measures. 
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However, FC measures or subtle items are difficult to implement in 
practice. They require a fair amount of effort to develop as well as validate. For 
FC measures in particular, efforts must be taken to address ipsativity (cf. Hicks, 
1970). These interventions may not be as attractive to organizations wishing to 
test personality, especially considering that the difference in faking effect size is 
generally small and actually in the opposite direction for conscientiousness. 
Organizations may also incur similar costs if wishing to develop a test with more 
subtle items. This typically requires a larger item pool, and test-taker reactions 
tend to be lower for longer assessments. All the same, great strides have been 
made in implementing FC measures in part due to their less “fakeable” nature. For 
instance, the Tailored Adaptive Personality Assessment System (TAPAS) used by 
the United States Army uses item-response theory (IRT) to construct and score its 
multidimensional forced choice measure (Drasgow, Stark, Chernyshenko, Dye, 
Hulin, & White, 2012). This test has been used widely to select and promote 
entry-level Army cadets, and results suggest that there is little difference between 
scores in honest and motivated conditions.  
Implications for Research 
One of the core implications from this research is that, although faking 
still exists in the presence of faking interventions, the interventions limited faking 
in most cases. This suggests that the interventions are generally working, and that 
faking can be decreased by further calibrating the interventions. For instance: 
does the type of warning depend on the context of the job? Is it possible to 
develop good, subtle conscientiousness items, considering that test-takers were 
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able to fake subtle items more than transparent items on this trait? This meta-
analysis is crucial for faking researchers because it provides the first comparison 
of various faking interventions. Although there is a significant base of primary 
research, this study offers an essential starting point for consolidating the 
literature and guiding future faking research.  
Another implication for faking research in general, and research on faking 
interventions specifically, is the importance of sample and study design. Contrary 
to Hooper (2007), the current meta-analysis observed consistently larger effect 
sizes in lab than field studies. This implies that research done on lab studies may 
not be generalizable to the field, and highlights that lab studies likely represent the 
upper limit of faking (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). It is also important to 
highlight the incredibly modest number of field studies compared to lab studies, 
as the large differences observed between these samples may be due to the 
quantity of empirical research. This was most noticeable in FC and item 
transparency interventions, where almost all studies were performed on student 
samples in the lab.  
Study design (i.e., between- vs. within-subject) also highlighted important 
trends in the faking literature. Most studies used between-subject designs, despite 
arguments in the literature that a within-subjects design is more appropriate (e.g., 
Griffith & McDaniel, 2006). Between-subject designs are easier to implement, 
and indeed are frequently a requirement for field research. In other words, field 
studies often compare applicants to incumbents to identify faking. One way to 
incorporate within-subjects designs in field settings is to compare applicants at 
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Time 1 to the same employees after they are incumbents at Time 2. One potential 
problem with this design is that it may result in range restriction, as only 
“favorable” respondents to the assessment at Time 1 will be available for 
comparison in Time 2.  
Researchers that are limited to student samples should strive to employ 
within-subject designs whenever possible. Recent literature in warnings is a good 
example of how researchers can employ these designs. For instance, Fan et al. 
(2012) and Ellingson et al. (2011) both used an honest group and then offered a 
warning to half of the group, with the other half continuing to the faked condition 
without a warning. This provides a more robust test of the warning effectiveness 
than comparing independent groups.  
As mentioned earlier, a more robust test of the TPB-based model in Figure 
3 is needed in order to understand exactly how the interventions function. For 
example, the model suggests that warnings influence faking behavior primarily 
through their impact on intent to fake. Some empirical research supports this 
claim. Mitchell and Adair (2014) found that the presence of a warning influenced 
pre- to post-intentions to fake, but did not influence perceived ability to fake. 
More empirical research is needed to test other parts of the model, especially the 
ability to fake interventions. This is especially important considering the large 
differences observed within this group. For instance, randomizing items actually 
increased faking behavior relative to no intervention, while subtle items appeared 
to consistently reduce faking. Testing the underlying mechanisms of these 
interventions is a crucial step to extending the research.   
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One final result may be interesting for researchers, and deserves further 
inquiry. Effect sizes across many of the interventions closely approximated the 
effect size of that trait in the field without any intervention. For example, the 
SWMD for emotional stability scores across honest and faked conditions with a 
warning (k = 22, d = 0.57) was quite similar to the effect size for field studies 
without an intervention (k = 17, d = 0.65). This was similar across several other 
interventions and traits. Researchers should investigate if an intervention (in this 
case, a warning) helps approximate the applicant context by increasing test-taker 
accountability to a similar level as in true applicant scenarios. In other words, 
faking in lab studies is often regarded as the “upper limit” of faking (Viswesvaran 
& Ones, 1999). If implementing a warning results in faking estimates that are 
more consistent with “real-life” faking, this may help further researchers’ 
understanding of applicant faking without the costs and difficulties often 
associated with conducting research in the field.  
Limitations 
Faking in the field. One of the first limitations of the current study was 
that the final dataset was disproportionately lab-based, especially within the 
studies that used a faking intervention. Only around 10% of the total studies were 
measured in field samples, with only seven out of 75 (9.3%) of studies in 
warning, FC, and item transparency studies. This severely limits the 
generalizability of these findings to a field setting because of the large differences 
in faking observed in the field versus lab. Effect sizes from field studies were 
consistently smaller than lab studies measuring the same trait at the same level of 
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a given moderator. For instance, studies without an intervention reported larger 
effect sizes in the lab than the field (d = 0.87 and 0.52, respectively), and a similar 
trend was observed for warning studies in the lab and field (d = 0.62 and 0.43, 
respectively). Even with a sufficient k size, the current meta-analysis is more 
reflective of faking in the lab than in the field. Applying these findings to the field 
should be done cautiously. The largely lab-based sample in the current meta-
analysis reinforces the call for increased field studies in faking research (e.g., 
Dilchert & Ones, 2011). The representation was so small in FC and item 
transparency studies in the d dataset that the 3 field settings in these cases were 
ostensibly removed from the analyses to help create a more representative 
comparison to studies without an intervention.  
FFM measurement: Facets and post hoc mapping. One potential 
limitation with the current meta-analysis was that some studies were included and 
mapped to one of the FFM traits even though they were developed and validated 
outside of that model. Personality is not limited to the five traits measured in this 
paper, and meaningful insights can be gathered by traits outside of the FFM. 
Indeed, effect sizes were at times quite different between FFM traits measured 
from an a priori measure compared to post hoc measures. The mapping process 
was well documented and supported by empirical testing, but that does not change 
some of the differences observed. Despite being mapped to a FFM trait, it is 
possible that some of the post hoc scales share minimal construct-relevant 
variance with the a priori scale measuring the same trait. This may be most 
evident for measures of aggression, depression, and irritability that were mapped 
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to the FFM trait of emotional stability. While one part of emotional stability (the 
opposite of neuroticism) includes a lack of control over emotions and behavior 
that is similar to aggression, an argument could be made that these are distinct 
constructs. Table 15 displays the effect sizes for emotional stability across the a 
priori and post hoc measures, and inspection of the POL shows that the effect size 
estimates within each of the interventions do not overlap between the two types of 
measurement. This finding suggests that a priori and post hoc measures may be 
measuring different constructs, or there is some systematic difference in the way 
these measures are applied that tends to make post hoc measures less fakable.  
Another potential issue of the observed effect sizes within the FFM is that 
it ignores a growing literature on the importance of facet traits (e.g., Fisher, Bell, 
Dierdorff, & Belohlav, 2012). Test-takers applying for a sales job may be more 
prone to fake on a measure of assertiveness than a measure of excitement seeking. 
The decision to include effect sizes at the “global” trait level was necessary in 
order to achieve necessary k size. Additionally, very few studies reported effect 
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Table 15 
A-priori/Post-Hoc Measurement as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Emotional Stability Scores Between Honest 
and Faked Conditions Across Types of Faking Interventions  
Intervention A-priori/ Post-Hoc N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
No Intervention                    
 A-priori FFM 24,101 64 0.90 0.37 8% 0.81 0.99 0.43 1.37  
 Post hoc FFM 14,719 49 0.60 0.36 10% 0.50 0.70 0.13 1.06 0%* 
Warning            
 A-priori FFM 1,121 9 0.31 0.27 30% 0.14 0.49 -0.04 0.66  
 Post hoc FFM 1,740 13 0.74 0.37 19% 0.54 0.94 0.27 1.21 0%* 
Forced-Choice           
 A-priori FFM 801 2 0.56 0.00 100% 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56  
 Post hoc FFM 1,682 11 0.30 0.37 16% 0.08 0.52 -0.18 0.77 0%* 
Item Transparency           
 A-priori FFM 1,495 9 0.73 0.50 9% 0.40 1.05 0.09 1.37  
  Post hoc FFM 407 5 0.15 0.00 100% 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap. 
  140   
sizes on applicable facet traits such as achievement motivation or dutifulness. The 
focus of the current analysis was not on the appropriateness of FFM 
measurement, so this was not included as a hypothesis or focus of analysis. 
However, future primary studies may wish to incorporate the aforementioned 
evidence regarding “job-relevant” faking along with the dearth of literature on 
facet traits to investigate faking within FFM facets compared to global traits. 
Future Directions 
 The results of this meta-analysis revealed fruitful areas for future research. 
First, the results can guide research on faking interventions by highlighting which 
interventions are most effective, and the conditions (e.g., study design, sample) in 
which this effect is maximized. As no research to date has compared faking 
interventions, this research was sorely needed. Second, results can also guide 
theory development on faking and the integration of faking interventions with 
TPB. Finally, new questions emerged based on a deeper dive into the results of 
this meta-analysis. For example, future research can examine the job-relevance of 
some interventions as well as the impact of faking interventions on the 
psychometric properties of the personality assessment. More detail on these 
potential avenues for future research is described below 
Guiding future research on faking theory. The results of the current 
study contribute to the extant literature on faking by illuminating areas for 
research within faking theory. For instance, an intervention’s effectiveness should 
be further examined within the framework of Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). 
This theory was used as the basis for understanding how the interventions 
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influenced faking behavior (see Figure 3). Support for Hypothesis I and V 
indicated that warnings tended to be more effective at limiting faking than other 
interventions, and warnings also influence faking behavior the earliest according 
to theory by influencing faking intentions. These results suggest that the “earlier” 
the intervention, the better for reducing score inflation. However, the opposite 
appeared to be the case with the criterion-related validity results. Indeed, 
warnings appeared to do little to enhance (and, in fact, lessened) the ability to 
make valid inferences from test scores. More robust, empirical tests of this model 
are needed in order to make stronger claims about how faking interventions are 
best represented within TPB, but the current study offers useful guidance for 
future theoretical work.  
Curvilinear faking and the job-relevance of faking interventions. The 
current study found that faking interventions decreased the amount of faking 
when operationalized as the standardized mean difference between honest and 
motivated conditions. Some may argue that this operationalization oversimplifies 
faking, as it relies on two strong assumptions. First, it assumes that faking should 
be considered as linear, such that higher scores are always better. The relationship 
between personality and various criteria is likely curvilinear (cf., Converse & 
Oswald, 2014), so it stands to reason that faking should be considered curvilinear 
as well. Indeed, research suggests that item desirability ratings are not linear 
across response options and tend to vary as a function of occupational context 
(Dunlop, Telford, & Morrison, 2012). Further answers to this question of non-
linearity are best provided by primary studies, rather than meta-analyses, in order 
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to capture the nuances necessary to report a curvilinear relationship. The current 
study, along with several other meta-analyses (e.g., Hooper, 2007; Birkeland et 
al., 2007), have clearly established that mean scores in motivated conditions are 
higher than in honest conditions. While the current study shows that faking 
interventions are useful for reducing faking in this operationalization, the next 
step for intervention research is to examine how the interventions influence faking 
or item desirability in non-linear ways.  
The second main assumption in this operationalization is that faking 
operates independent of important contextual cues. Although the results and 
previous discussion focus more on conscientiousness than openness, the question 
of job-relevant faking is raised. In other words, how effective are interventions at 
reducing job-relevant faking? The above analysis suggests that test-takers are able 
to fake more traditionally job-relevant traits (e.g., conscientiousness) than less 
job-relevant traits (e.g., openness). It therefore stands to reason that a faking 
intervention may also be influenced by the larger context. For instance, faking 
may differ when the personality assessment is used as the only predictor or based 
on multiple factors because of the perceived weight given to personality test 
scores (Ziegler et al., 2011). In a similar vein, applicants may be more inclined to 
fake on a “pre-test” that is given as a first hurdle in a selection system, as they are 
unaware of what (if any) future steps await in the selection process (Reeder & 
Ryan, 2011).  
The type of job that the applicant is seeking represents another important 
contextual factor. Although conscientiousness is commonly regarded as the most 
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effective trait at predicting job performance (e.g., Hurtz & Donovan, 2000), there 
are certainly job positions for which other traits are also important. For instance, 
extraversion is often considered an important trait in sales positions (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991), although recent research again suggests that the relationship is 
curvilinear (Grant, 2013). All the same, warnings may not be as effective at 
deterring applicants for sales jobs that potentially reward cut-throat behavior and 
Machiavellianism as they are in other, more “white-color” jobs. Because the 
current study offers useful information about faking interventions across contexts, 
the next step for future research is to examine the interventions within specific 
jobs to identify if the effectiveness is dependent upon contextual factors of the 
job.  
In order to provide some context for this future research, the current d 
dataset was examined to assess whether intervention effectiveness varied across 
job position. The job position (including both naturally-occurring and 
instructionally-induced faking) provided by primary studies varied significantly, 
so they were collapsed into a meaningful sub-set that provided sufficient k sizes to 
provide additional analyses. Table 16 shows the primary study context and the 
mapping used for this analysis. Customer service was the most consistently used 
context (k =27, 13%) across all of the included studies, but none of the warning 
studies were collected in this context.  
The job position context was examined as a supplementary analysis to 
provide a preliminary test of whether faking interventions differ by job position. 
Table 17 illustrates some interesting findings, albeit on limited data. Faking is 
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Table 16 
Examples of Specific Job Positions Within Collapsed Position Areas 
Collapsed Position Specific job position information (provided to test taker) 
College or 
University 
Scholarship selection, student organization, 
university applicant 
Customer Service Customer Service Representative 
Government "Sensitive government position" 
Librarian Librarian 
Managerial Entry-level manager, store manager 
Misc. Blue Collar Gardener, manufacturing 
Misc. White Collar Bank Teller, Administrative Assistant, Accountant 
Nursing Nurse 
Police or Military Patrolman, Army, Border Patrol Agent 
Sales Salespeople 
Teacher Teacher, Professor 
Note: Misc = Miscellaneous.  
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Table 17 
Applicant Job Position as a Moderator of the Standardized Mean Difference of Extraversion Scores Between Honest and Faked 
Condition for Different Faking Interventions 
Trait Intervention Type N k 
Sample 
Weighted 
Mean d 
Corrected 
SDδ 
Variance 
due to 
Sampling 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
80% Credibility 
Interval POL 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Extraversion - Sales                    
 No Intervention 1,055 8 0.64 0.33 23% 0.41 0.86 0.22 1.05  
 Warning 367 4 0.55 0.27 38% 0.28 0.82 0.20 0.90 100% 
 Forced Choice 412 2 0.48 0.00 100% 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 65% 
 Transparency 412 2 0.48 0.00 100% 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 65% 
Extraversion - Misc. White Collar           
 No Intervention 3,309 7 0.56 0.18 21% 0.42 0.69 0.33 0.79  
  Warning 431 3 0.05 0.00 100% 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0%* 
Note. N = total sample size across all effect sizes; k = number of effect sizes included in the meta-analyses; SDδ = sample size weighted standard deviation of the mean effect size; confidence intervals = 
the variability around the mean effect size; credibility intervals = the variability of the mean effect size in the population of studies; POL =proportion overlap of 95% confidence intervals, where the 
referent is the effect size for “no intervention” in that trait. * for POL means that the confidence intervals did not significantly overlap.
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relatively prevalent among sales jobs, with a sample-weighted mean d of 0.64 
without any intervention. The effect size decreases across each of the 
interventions, but not nearly as much as it does in other jobs where extraversion 
may be less critical for job performance. These “miscellaneous white collar” jobs 
include accounting, administrative assistant, and human resources positions. 
Applicants for these positions may feel less pressured to appear extraverted on 
selection tests, so a warning against faking may be more effective at limiting 
response inflation. More research should investigate the extent to which faking 
interventions vary as a function of job type or the relevance of a given trait for 
performance. 
Faking and other psychometric properties. The analyses presented in 
this meta-analysis focused primarily on mean scores and the criterion-related 
validity of these scores. However, faking can affect other test properties. In 
particular, the internal consistency and construct validity can be meaningfully 
altered by faking. 
Reliability. Test scores are more reliable to the extent that the measure is 
internally consistent. No research to date has expressly examined the influence of 
faking on internal consistency, although many authors suggest that faked scores 
have greater variance (e.g., Heggestead, 2011). To provide a baseline for future 
research, the reliability coefficients for the obtained scores were compared across 
honest and faked conditions. Table 18 shows the sample-weighted reliability 
across the available studies in honest and faked conditions. This analysis suggests 
that faked scores tended to be more reliable than honest scores, although the  
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Table 18.  
Reliability Across Honest and Faked Conditions among Types of Faking 
Interventions 
Intervention Trait 
Alpha 
(Honest) 
Alpha 
(Faked) 
No Intervention    
 Agreeableness 0.76 0.71 
 Conscientiousness 0.74 0.82 
 Emotional Stability 0.77 0.76 
 Extraversion 0.78 0.77 
 Openness 0.74 0.73 
Warning    
 Agreeableness 0.78 0.79 
 Conscientiousness 0.82 0.83 
 Emotional Stability 0.80 0.84 
 Extraversion 0.82 0.79 
 Openness 0.73 0.75 
Item Transparency    
 Agreeableness 0.71 0.73 
 Conscientiousness 0.83 0.86 
 Emotional Stability 0.73 0.64 
 Extraversion 0.76 0.74 
 Openness 0.71 0.60 
Forced Choice    
 Agreeableness 0.75 0.64 
 Conscientiousness 0.76 0.74 
 Emotional Stability 0.74 0.68 
 Extraversion 0.81 0.77 
  Openness 0.75 0.72 
Note: All estimates reflect the internal consistency (alpha).  
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opposite is true for FC measures. The largest shifts are observed for 
conscientiousness. A large shift in the reliability between honest and faked 
conditions is consistent with the literature on the Semantic Exercise Model of 
cognitive processing (e.g., Hsu et al., 1989; Martin, 2011). This model suggests 
that faked responses reflect a less complex schema than a self-referenced schema 
and should therefore take less time because it is easier to reference an ideal or 
faked schema than it is to make a complete self-evaluation. Along those lines, it 
seems that the faked schema results in a more consistent measure. Table 17 
further shows that the reliability tends to be higher in warning studies compared 
to other interventions. This is interesting in light of the reduced criterion-related 
validity for scores with this intervention, and further highlights that more reliable 
scores do not necessarily make the test more valid. While these findings serve as a 
useful starting point for future research, more primary, empirical research is 
needed to test the nuanced effects of faking interventions on various test 
properties. Primary research can also address some of the limitations of the 
current meta-analysis by examining test properties at the facet trait level.  
Construct Validity. Faking can influence the factor structure underlying 
the personality scale, which in turn can result in a personality assessment that no 
longer measures job-relevant traits. Some studies suggest that traditional 5-factor 
personality inventories offer the best fit for non-applicants (e.g., incumbents), but 
not for job applicants. Specifically, a sixth-factor termed the “ideal employee” 
factor, may maximize the fit for job applicants (e.g., Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, & 
Klawsky, 1996; Schmit & Ryan, 1993). Confirmatory factor analyses by Zickar 
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and Robie (1999) found that applicants and non-applicants differed in the number 
of latent factors, error variance, and factor correlations. Item response theory 
(IRT) also shows that items function differently across an independent sample of 
applicants and non-applicants (Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 
2001). However, not all research shows that faking affects construct validity. 
Smith, Hanges, and Dickson (2001) found that the scale structure remained  
relatively stable across applicant, incumbent, and student samples, suggesting that 
faking does not have a strong influence on construct validity coefficients. 
The literature on construct validity and faking is relatively scarce and the 
findings are somewhat inconsistent. More research is needed on the influence of 
faking on construct validity as well as the ability of various faking interventions 
to maintain or improve the factor structures of personality measures. 
Conclusion 
The current meta-analysis judged the efficacy of various faking 
interventions with the goal of furthering both practice and research on the use of 
personality for employee selection. The limited data on faking and criterion-
related validity suggests that more research is needed before solid conclusions can 
be reached on the impact of faking on making inferences for selection. 
Additionally, the limited research in field settings suggests that more research on 
actual job applicants is needed before results can be generalized to real-world 
faking. This caveat is even stronger considering observed differences between lab 
and field studies when the data were available. Despite some of these limitations, 
the extensive literature on mean difference scores in faking allows for specific 
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recommendations. The below 5 recommendations offer a summary of the 
analyses.  
1. Warnings are as effective as other methods for limiting response inflation.  
2. However, warnings appear to limit the criterion-related validity, so 
organizationally-specific validation tests should be done to ensure the 
warning does not alter predictive validity and other important test 
properties. 
3. Randomizing items does not reduce faking behavior and therefore has 
limited utility as a faking intervention. 
4. To limit faking ability, both a) FC measures and b) using subtle items are 
effective interventions. 
5. Given the null effects on criterion-related validity and the potential for 
removing or altering valid test scores, correcting or removing responses 
due to a test-taker’s score on a social desirability measure is not 
recommended.  
Test-takers are generally able to inflate their scores from honest to faked 
conditions, regardless of the presence of a faking intervention. However, the 
current meta-analysis succeeded in demonstrating that faking interventions can 
reduce score inflation on personality tests. This is most important for 
organizations using top-down selection methods on personality assessments, as 
any influence to the rank order of applicants can alter a selection decision. All the 
same, top-down selection systems still have the potential for selecting a mix of 
faked and honest responses to the extent that an intervention reduces all faked 
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scores to a similar degree. More research is needed to test if interventions function 
differently for “fakers” versus “honest responders.”  Additional research is also 
needed on non-student samples and the effect of faking interventions on the 
ability to make valid inferences on organizational criteria from personality scores. 
However, the current analysis is instrumental in addressing what can be done to 
address the problem of faking.
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Coding Information & Guide 
1. Type of publication 
a. Very few of the articles should be coded as unpublished 
manuscripts (6). Many of them are either from conference 
presentations (3) or are theses/dissertations (4/5).  
 
2. Big Five Factors measured 
a. Each personality variable will get a different code sheet. Most 
likely, conscientiousness and neuroticism will receive more code 
sheets than others. Be sure to keep all code sheets together with the 
same focal article, even though they will ultimately be separated 
into distinct meta-analyses for each trait.  
b. a priori vs. post hoc 
i. Some measures of the Big 5 are direct measures of these 
traits (1). Examples include: 
1. NEO (FFI or PI-R), IPIP, HOGAN 
PERSONALITY INVENTORY (HPI), BFI 
ii. Others will measure one of the Big 5 indirectly. These 
types of measures will be converted to the Big 5 post hoc 
(2). Use the table at the end of this sheet to identify how to 
code one of these scales.  
 
3. Type of faking 
a. Naturally Occurring 
i. Code a study as naturally occurring faking if participants 
are not explicitly told to fake. This is most likely the case 
when comparing job incumbents to job applicants, where 
job applicants have “naturally occurring” faking.  
b. Instructionally Induced 
i. Code a study as instructionally induced if the participant is 
told to respond in a certain pattern. If there is a monetary 
incentive given to “top performers,” code as instructionally 
induced. If participants are instructionally induced to “fake 
bad” or respond poorly, do not include in the analysis.  
ii. Fake good – respond as applicant 
1. If the instructions explicitly state for the participant 
to “respond as applicant”, code as (1). If there is no 
explicit statement of a job context, but participants 
are still instructed to respond positively, code as (2). 
2. Note whether a job context is provided. A job 
context could be applying for a sales, nursing, 
management, etc. position.  
 
4. Monetary Incentive 
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a. Again, if monetary incentives are offered to “top performers”, the 
study should be coded as “instructionally induced” (2). Note the 
amount given per participant if reported.  
5. Criterion 
a. School Success 
i. This involves students, classes, grades, school environment, 
or learning in a school setting  
b. Job Performance 
i. Some clear measure of job performance (most often 
managerial performance review). The setting is at an actual 
work place, participants are workers, in work environment. 
Likely to be a field setting, doing things that would be done 
on the job. 
c. Task Performance 
i. The task involves things that may be done on a job but the 
study is not in the participant’s work environment during 
the “typical” workday. Participants may or may not be 
actual workers/employees, could be students. (i.e., students 
acting as stoker brokers, group decision making on work 
issue) or workers in a simulation.  
ii. The task can not be a training task designed for a job (that 
will be a separate code), but can be a task done in a job 
setting.  
iii. Key differentiator between (b) and (c) is that: (b) is a 
measure of job performance used at the individual’s place 
of work.  
d. Behavior on the job 
i. Some studies examine counterproductive work behaviors 
(CWBs) such as theft, deviance, absence from work, etc. 
This is often measured through actual behaviors.  
ii. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (OCBs) represent 
“work behaviors that support the broader organizational, 
social, and psychological environment.”  
iii. Either CWBs or OCBs may be measured via scale (e.g., 
Dineen et al., 2006 – based off of a critical incidents 
technique).  
e. Training performance 
i. This criterion involves performance within the context of 
training and may include the acquisition of skills and/or 
knowledge. This training may simulate a normal workday, 
but it is not done during work hours and is not a final 
measure of job performance.  
 
6. Study Context 
a. Lab: creating a setting to conduct research, generally able to 
impose more experimental control as to participants and setting. 
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b. Applied/Real World: Research is in a more natural setting, people 
do not perceive the setting to have been created to conduct the 
research, may be using an existing group. 
c. Simulation: No actual participant data collected, a simulation is run 
based on explicitly defined parameters.  
 
7. Study Design 
a. Between Subjects: Two distinct, independent groups participate 
under different conditions.  
b. Within Subjects: Same participants are exposed to multiple 
conditions. This is most likely the case when participants take a 
test once without an intervention and then once with it.  
 
8. Interventions 
a. Score Correction 
i. Primary studies may partial out the effect of a social 
desirability or lie scale from the correlation between 
personality and a criterion. Code the article as Score 
Correction (1) if the article explicitly states that the 
correlations accounted for or corrected for the effect of SD.  
b. Removal of Cases 
i. Code a study as Removal of Cases (2) if the correlation or 
validity coefficient reflects a limited number of the 
participants based on their responses to Social Desirability 
or a lie scale.  
c. Warning Statement 
i. Code a study as Warning Statement (3) if there is/are 
explicit warning(s) against faking. This may come in five 
categories: 
1. Detection (faking can be detected) 
2. Consequential (penalties will be enforced if you are 
identified as a faker) 
3. Appeal to moral principles (as a moral person, 
faking is wrong) 
4. Appeal to reason (responding accurately will more 
accurately portray your personality characteristics) 
5. Educational (faking a response will not allow 
researchers to evaluate the responses) 
d. Time Limit 
i. If there was any mention of a time limit, make a note of 
that.  
ii. There may not always be a “timed” and “untimed” group.  
iii. If there was no mention of a time limit, mark that there was 
no time limit given  
e. Forced Choice 
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i. Code an article as Forced Choice if it meets any of the 
characteristics listed in the codebook.  
ii. Similar to time limit, there may not be a forced choice vs. 
likert condition.  
iii. If no mention of forced choice, standard likert format 
applies.  
f. Item Transparency 
i. Both item transparency and item order are applicable to this 
category 
ii. Blocked items means that the article explicitly states that 
all items measuring the same construct appear together. 
iii. Randomized items means that there is no order to the items 
a priori 
iv. Subtle items means that a technique was used to make the 
underlying construct less visible 
1. Empirically-keyed items satisfy the “subtle items” 
code 
Effect Size Coding  
 NOTE: There are separate coding sheets for within vs. between subjects 
designs 
 Define the condition (e.g., fake-good, warned, etc.) 
 Record the number of participants for each condition  
 Record the means and standard deviation of the personality variable for each 
condition 
 If there are multiple iterations of the intervention, report the mean, SD, and 
N for each (these will be averaged). 
o For instance, if multiple warning “types” are administered. 
 Record the mean and SD of the social desirability (if applicable). If social 
desirability is not broken down between impression management/self-
deception, just record one and cross out the IM/SD distinction. 
 Record the correlation between personality and a criterion (if applicable) 
 Multiple studies with different subjects (Study 1, Study 2) get their own 
effect sizes 
 
 
Guide for Identifying Traits within Big 5 Framework (Birkeland et al., 2006) 
Extraversion 
Number Inventory Scale 
1 Adjective Checklist Assertiveness 
2 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) 
Reserved (R) 
Submissive (R) 
Sober (R) 
Shy (R) 
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Dominance 
Liveliness 
Social Boldness 
Privateness (R) 
3 Gordon Personal Profile Inventory (GPI) 
Sociability 
Ascendancy 
4 Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI) Sociability 
Likes parties 
Entertaining 
Experience setting 
Likes crowds 
5 Assessment of Background and Life Experiences (ABLE) 
Dominance 
Energy Level 
6 Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule (EPPS) 
Exhibition 
Affiliation 
7 Matthew temp Gregariousness 
8 Psychotisim, Extraversion, 
Neuroticism (PEN) 
E 
9 California Psychological Inventory 
(CPI) 
Sociability 
Social presence 
Dominance 
Capacity for status 
Empathy 
Self-acceptance 
10 PPI Influence 
 
Agreeableness 
Number Inventory Scale 
1 Adjective Checklist Cooperativeness 
2 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) 
Tough minded 
Natural 
Privateness (R) 
Warmth 
Sensitivity 
3 Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI) Likeability 
4 Assessment of Background and Life 
Experiences (ABLE) 
Cooperativeness 
5 Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) 
Deference 
Abasement 
Succorance 
Nuturance 
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Openness 
Number Inventory Scale 
1 Adjective Checklist Imaginativeness  
2 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) 
Less intelligent (R) 
Practical (R)  
Conservative (R) 
Openness 
Abstractness 
3 Hough Adaptability Openness 
4 California Psychological Inventory 
(CPI) 
Intellectual efficiency 
5 Global Personality Inventory (GPI) Openness to change 
6 Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule (EPPS) 
Change 
 
Neuroticism / Emotional Stability 
Number Inventory Scale 
1 Adjective Checklist Calmness 
2 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) 
Emotionally unstable 
Trusting 
Self-assured 
Relaxed 
NPF 
Emotional stability 
Tension 
3 Gordon Personal Profile Inventory Emotional stability 
4 Guilford Martin I 
N 
D 
C 
M 
5 Hough Resilient self-esteem 
6 Assessment of Background and Life 
Experiences (ABLE) 
Self-esteem 
Emotional stability 
7 Matthew temp Maladjustment 
8 PSYCHOTICISM, 
EXTRAVERSION, NEUROTICISM 
(PEN) 
N 
9 California Psychological Inventory 
(CPI) 
Well-being 
IndePsychoticism, 
Extraversion, Neuroticism 
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(PEN)dence 
Self-control 
Neuroticism 
10 PPI Emotional control 
Self-tolerance 
 
Conscientiousness 
Number Inventory Scale 
1 Adjective Checklist Conscientiousness 
2 16 Personality Factors (16 PF) 
Expedient (R) 
Poorly integrated (R) 
Rule-conscientiousness 
Vigilance 
Perfectionism 
3 Gordon Personal Profile Inventory Responsibility 
4 Hough DePsychoticism, 
Extraversion, Neuroticism 
(PEN)dability 
Achievement 
Detail Mindedness 
5 Assessment of Background and Life Experiences (ABLE) 
Work orientation 
Conscientiousness 
6 Edwards Personal Preference 
Schedule (EPPS) 
Endurance 
Achievement 
Order 
Consistency 
7 Matthew temp Thoughtfulness 
8 California Psychological Inventory 
(CPI) 
Responsibility 
Ach via conformance 
Socialization 
Flexibility 
Self-acceptance 
9 PPI Work-focus 
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Coder Name: ________________________ Article Code: _________________________ 
Study Number: ______________________ Publication Year: _____________________ 
Authors: ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Type of Publication (choose one):  
_____ Journal Article (1)   _____ Book Chapter (2) _____ Conf Paper/Presentation (3) 
_____ Masters Thesis (2) _____ Doctoral Dissertation (5) _____ Unpublished Manuscript (6) 
 
DEFINITION OF FAKING 
_____ Naturally Occurring (1) 
_____ Instructionally-Induced (2) 
      _____ Respond as Applicant (3) 
            _____ Specific info given (4) 
            _____ Unspecified context (5) 
            _____ Can’t be determined (6) 
      _____ No context given (7) 
      _____ Fake to the Max (8) 
      _____ Cannot be determined (9)  
_____ Cannot be determined (99) 
 
STUDY CONTEXT (choose one): 
_____ Lab (1) 
_____ Applied/Real World (2) 
 
Did the study use a student sample? 
______ YES (1)         _______ NO (2) 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS:  
_____ Percent Male 
_____ Percent White 
_____ Average Age 
_____ Average Hours Worked 
 
STUDY DESIGN (Choose one) 
_______ Between-subject (1) 
_______ Within-subjects (2) 
        ____ Honest followed by faking (1) 
        ____ Faking followed by honest (2) 
        ____ Counterbalanced (3) 
_______ Predictive Validity (3) 
_______ Concurrent Validity (4) 
        ____ Cannot be determined (99) 
 
 
 
If within-subjects or predictive, what is time 
lag between administrations? 
 
 
 
 
Was there incentive to perform well? 
________ Yes (1) 
        Name incentive:  
________ No (2) 
 
Was GMA measured?  
 ________ Yes (1) 
   How was it measured? ________________ 
________ No (2) 
(need to code specific values at end of codebook) 
Is there any dependent data in the study? 
 ________ Yes (1) 
________ No (2) 
 
If YES, Explain below:  
164 
INTERVENTION CODE SHEET (Use a separate sheet for each trait/intervention)
____ Score Correction (1) OR  
____ Removal of Cases (2) 
    ____ Social Desirability Scale (1) 
        _____ Edwards (1) 
        _____ BIDR (2) 
              _____ Impression Management (1) 
              _____ Self-deception (2) 
              _____ Both (3) 
              _____ Cannot be determined 
        _____ K scale on MMPI (3) 
        _____ Marlowe-Crowne (4) 
        _____ OTHER (5): _________________ 
    ____ Unlikely Virtues Scale (2) 
    ____ ABLE Validity Scale (3) 
    ____ Bogus Item Scale (4) 
 
_____ Warning Statement (3) 
      _____ Detection (1) 
      _____ Consequential (2) 
      _____ Appeal to Moral Principles (3) 
      _____ Appeal to Reason (4) 
      _____ Educational (5) 
      _____ Cannot be determined (99) 
 
_____ Item Transparency (4) 
      _____ Randomized Items (1) 
      _____ Subtle content (2) 
     _____ Cannot be determined (99) 
Note: Empirical/criterion keyed satisfies “subtle” code 
 
_____ Time Limit (5) 
      Time given in seconds:   ___________ 
      Number of items:       ___________ 
      Ratio of seconds to items: ___________ 
 
Once for each study, use the following indicators of Item 
Transparency (circle all that apply): 
 1. Section Headers:             Yes = 1   No = 0   DK 
 2. Blocked Items:               Yes = 1   No = 0   DK 
 3. Construct name in item stem:   Yes = 1   No = 0   DK 
 4. Rationally keyed items:        Yes = 1   No = 0   DK 
                             TOTAL: _______ 
________ Forced Choice (6) 
Put an X if any of the following are true.  
Satisifes the partially ipsative if any have an X. If the scale identifies as Forced Choice, with no X’s, it is fully ipsative 
__________ Respondents only partially order item alternatives, rather than ordering them completely  
__________ Scales have differing number of items 
__________ Not all alternatives ranked by respondents are scored 
__________ Scales are scored differently for respondents with different characteristics, or are referred to different normative transformations on the basis of respondent characteristics 
__________ Scored alternatives are differentially weighted 
__________ One or more of the scales from the ipsative predictor set is deleted when data are analyzed 
__________ The test contains normative sections 
Based on checklist above to Forced Choice, what type of scale?    
__________ Fully Ipsative (1) __________ Partially Ipsative (2) 
 
What criterion was used? 
____ Personality trait (1) (a measure of personality, often comparing mean levels with and without intervention) 
____ Self-reported faking (2) (a self-report measure, often a direct question of faking).  
____ School Success (3) (e.g., grades, school environment, or learning in a school setting) 
____ Task Performance (4) (things that may be done on a job but the study is not in an existing work  
     environment during the “typical” work day). 
____ Behavior on job (5) 
     ______CWB (theft, absence from work, etc. This could be measured through actual behaviors or through  
            the use of a test/measure). 
     ______ OCB (prosocial work behaviors – support the broader organizational, social, and psychological  
            environment). 
     ______ Job Performance (4) (some clear measure of job performance in work setting – e.g., number of  
            widgets made, performance review) 
____ Training Performance (6) (performance during the training, not during the “typical” work day) 
____ Other (7): ____________________________________________________________________ 
IF 3 through 7 below, what is the reliability of the criterion? ______________________________ 
Is the reliability coefficient measured via coefficient alpha? Y  N     If N, name: 
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Big Five Factors measured (choose one, separate code sheet for each trait within study) 
NOTE: If Post Hoc, complete this section after coding. In this codesheet, note the trait as identified in the 
primary article. 
_____ Conscientiousness  (1) 
  
 ______ Agreeableness (2) _____ Extraversion (3) 
_____ Emotional Stability (4) 
  
 ______ Openness (5) _____ Other (6) ____________________ 
 
How was the trait measured? 
A Priori FFM Scales 
_____ NEO (1) _____ IPIP (2) _____ HPI (3) _____ BFI (4) 
  _____ Golberg (5)       ____ Other a priori:  
Post Hoc FFM Scales 
   _____ EPI (6) _____ MMPI (7) _____ 16PF (8) _____ CPI (9) 
_____ Adj Checklist (10)     ______ Other post hoc:  
 
If Post Hoc (6 – 10), name trait here: _________________________________________________ 
 
Reliability of personality scale marked above for specified trait: ________________ 
Is the reliability coefficient measured via coefficient alpha? Y  N     If N, name:  
 
Between Groups Design 
 
 Control 
(Honest) 
Experimental 
(Faked) 
N    
Mean Personality (or 
SRF) 
  
Std. Dev. Personality (or 
SRF) 
  
Crit-Related Validity 
(personality) 
  
EFFECT SIZE (d): 
  
 
Within Subjects Design 
 Control 
(Honest) 
Experimental 
(Faked) 
N    
Mean Personality (or 
SRF) 
  
Std. Dev. Personality 
(or SRF) 
  
Crit-Related Validity 
(personality) 
  
EFFECT SIZE (d): 
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 Correlations - For studies w/ correlations that don’t fit in previous table (e.g., correlation of time 
w/ traits) 
Criterion N Control 
(honest) 
Experiment
al (faked) 
z (diff in 
r’s) 
d (effect 
size) 
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________ __________
___________________ _________ __________ __________ __________  
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